S/SNSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 47 Series

Staff Study by the National Security Council 1

top secret

United States Policy Toward the Arab States and Israel

the problem

1. To define and assess the policy which the United States should follow towards the Arab States* and Israel, particularly in the light of the growing tendency in the area toward neutralism and the decline of an attitude favorable to the United States and other friendly countries.

analysis

2. NSC 47/2, October 17, 1949, covering United States policy toward Israel and the Arab States, and NSC 65/3, May 17, 1950, on United States policy toward arms shipments to this area, set forth policies which now require supplementing (but should not be superseded) in light of the material changes in the international situation.

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3. The political and economic stability of the Arab States and Israel were determined in NSC 47/2 to be of critical importance to the security of the United States, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of both the United States and the United Kingdom have as recently as October 26, 1950 agreed that “The Middle East in war is of importance second only to Europe”. The factors which make the area critically important to the security interests of the United States are primarily:

a.
The geographic position of the area with respect to the Mediterranean, Western Europe, Africa and European and Asiatic Russia;
b.
Oil resources;
c.
Military bases; and
d.
Communications and facilities.

4. United States objectives in the Arab States and Israel are:

a.
To preserve and strengthen the orientation of the nations in the area toward the United States and other nations friendly to us;
b.
To create political stability in depth for the benefit of Greece, Turkey and Iran and as a contribution to the stability of the Middle East as a whole;
c.
To induce the countries to increase their indigenous defensive capabilities against the USSR and Soviet satellites;
d.
To obtain the right to deploy, base, and, upon the threat of and during general hostilities, to operate, forces in the territories of the nations of the area and to lay the political groundwork for us to regain access to the territories of the nations of the area in event of their loss during general hostilities; and
e.
To provide a correlated approach to the individual countries of the area with the purpose of reducing rivalries and furthering acceptance of a spirit of mutuality of interest among all of the countries concerned.

5. The increasing belief, particularly in the Arab States, that the United States will not help the countries to prepare to defend themselves, is producing marked political disaffection and deterioration. The risk is increasing that important areas will swing away from the nations of the free world toward neutrality, or even toward the USSR.

6. Since the beginning of the Korean conflict there has been growing awareness on the part of the Arab States and Israel of their vulnerability vis-à-vis the USSR and, in most cases, of their almost total lack of an ability to defend themselves. In view of these feelings, particularly in the Arab States, there has been extreme hesitancy to give any significant support to the United States program in the United Nations to combat communist aggression. The voting record of the Near East States on the United Nations resolution condemning Communist China as an aggressor in Korea shows that only Lebanon, Israel and Iraq supported the resolution, with Syria, Egypt, Yemen and Saudi Arabia abstaining. There is a definite fear that support of the United States program will provoke retaliatory measures by the [Page 99] USSR. It is also evident that the bitterness toward the United States policy on the Palestine question has contributed to an attitude of indifference on Korea.

7. The failure of the United States to make concrete offers of military assistance to these states in response to their repeated requests for aid with which to defend themselves has given added impetus to the already existing attitude that neutrality in the present conflict may present the best opportunity for their survival in an all-out war. The fact that neither the United States alone nor the nations of the free world as a group have made any clear cut declaration concerning the defense of the Arab States and Israel has given further weight to this tendency towards neutralism. In the absence of information to the contrary, these peoples assume that the nations of the free world do not intend to come to their defense. Leaders throughout the area have voiced the opinion that they are hard put to defend policies sympathetic to the free world in their countries when their countries are exposed, weak, and uncertain of the prospects of practical and effective support from the nations of the free world in the event of a further deterioration in the international situation. It is important that this adverse trend be halted.

8. Retention and use by the free world of even a part of Middle East oil production and even a delay in the loss thereof to an enemy would contribute importantly and perhaps critically to an allied war effort.

9. Because of United States commitments in other areas, it is in the interest of the United States that the United Kingdom maintain primary military responsibility in Israel and the Arab States. However, the special United States-Saudi Arabia arrangements now existing should continue.2 Although the political influence of the United Kingdom has been declining in certain parts of the area, it is, nevertheless, still stronger than that of any other country in other parts, and it is in our mutual interest that there be cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom in order that the maximum benefit may be derived from our respective efforts. The United States has recently decided to make available $76,000,000 cash reimbursable assistance to Saudi Arabia. It is in our interest that primary military responsibility for this area should rest with the United States; but there should, nevertheless, be coordination with the United Kingdom. Israel is aware that the United Kingdom has primary military responsibility with regard to the area in which Israel is located.

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10. The weak indigenous defenses in the Arab States and Israel can be somewhat increased through relatively small United States and United Kingdom efforts in the area, particularly in the difficult terrain of the Arabian Peninsula where American-operated desert facilities, engineering equipment and American experience already exist.

11. If military assistance were supplied to the several Arab States and Israel, these states would (a) tend to become more closely oriented towards the United States; (b) be better able to preserve internal security; (c) contribute after a time to the defense of the area; (d) be able to conduct guerrilla warfare and harassing operations in the event the area or part of it is overrun; and (e) be more amenable to the granting of strategic rights.

12. If the Arab States and Israel do not become firmly oriented toward the United States and countries friendly to us during the cold-war period, it is doubtful that the support of these countries could be obtained during a global war.

conclusions

13. It is in United States interest to maximize the will of the governments and peoples in the Arab States and Israel to cooperate in resistance to the USSR both now and in the event of war; to translate that will into indigenous efforts to strengthen internal security; to resist the Soviet advance; to grant the Western Powers necessary military rights therein; and, if the area is nevertheless overrun, to harass and sabotage the invader and to assist in liberation.

14. Because of United States commitments in other areas it is in the United States interest that the United Kingdom have primary military responsibility for Israel and the Arab States. However, the special United States-Saudi Arabia arrangements now existing should continue.3 Accordingly early discussions should be held on a combined United Kingdom-United States politico-military level to clarify the respective participation and responsibilities of the United States and the United Kingdom in strengthening the several Arab States and Israel.

15. Following agreements reached in the discussions held in accordance with paragraph 14, above, the United States and the United Kingdom should, on an individual basis, but correlating their actions [Page 101] as far as practicable, and without partiality but consistent with strategic considerations as between Israel and the several Arab States:4

a.
Attempting to resolve local differences in order that the several Arab States and Israel may be able to meet the greater threat of international communism;
b.
Obtaining the right to deploy, base, and, upon the threat of and during general hostilities, to operate forces in the territories of the nations of the area;
c.
Developing fighting groups and techniques which are best suited to local capabilities and terrain;
d.
Initiating when possible a limited arms supply program and providing early delivery of token quantities;
e.
Furnishing supervisory and technical personnel for the arms supply program;
f.
Making, in agreement with local governments, “show-the-flag” visits by air force planes and naval vessels; and
g.
Where feasible and desirable, placing orders in local industries for needed raw materials and war materials.

16. The United States should seek legislative action which will permit the development of appropriate arms supply programs. Subject to the enactment of such legislation, appropriate authorities of the United States should develop the necessary programs, and establish suitable area coordinating machinery in the field for administering the program.

17. The United States should undertake and accelerate planned technical and economic assistance that will help convince the peoples of the Arab States and Israel that they will benefit as individuals as well as States, from the victory of the free world.

18. The United States should expand and intensify the United States psychological effort toward the area.

19. The United States should make it clear in the manner best calculated to produce the desired effect upon the peoples of the area that it is prepared to assist the Arab States and Israel in strengthening their capabilities to defend themselves against aggression.

  1. The source text is the annex to NSC 47/4 amended in accordance with the amendments to the draft statement of policy in NSC 47/4 adopted by the National Security Council at its 86th meeting on March 14. See editorial note, p. 92. It was circulated to the Council with the Statement of Policy, NSC 47/5, supra.
  2. Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. [Footnote in the source text.]
  3. The words “other than Saudi Arabia” appeared at the end of the first sentence of paragraph 9 in the annex to NSC 47/4. These words were deleted and the sentence “However, the special United States-Saudi Arabia arrangements now existing should continue.” was added to conform to the amendments to the Statement of Policy in NSC 47/4 adopted by the National Security Council at its meeting of March 14.
  4. The words “excepting Saudi Arabia” appeared at the end of the first sentence of paragraph 14 in the annex to NSC 47/4. The words were deleted, and the sentence added as follows: “However, the special United States-Saudi Arabia arrangements now existing should continue.” This was added to conform to the amendments to the Statement of Policy in NSC 47/4 adopted by the National Security Council at its meeting of March 14.
  5. In the annex to NSC 47/4, paragraph 15 began as follows:

    “15. Following agreements reached in the discussions held in accordance with paragraph 14, above, the United Kingdom and the United States should, on an individual but correlated basis and without partiality among the several Arab States and Israel, undertake and accelerate the following measures with respect to the Arab States and Israel:”

    The wording of the first sentence of paragraph 15 was revised to conform to the amended wording of paragraph 5 of the draft Statement of Policy in NSC 47/4 adopted by the National Security Council at its meeting on March 14; see footnote 4, p. 96.