Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

S/ISA Files: Lot 52–26: NSC General

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( Berry ) to the Director, International Security Affairs ( Cabot )¹

top secret

[ Washington ,] February 21, 1951.

Proposed NSC Paper on U.S. Policy Toward the Arab States and Israel

I. I have read with interest your memorandum of February 19² commenting on the paper on U.S. policy toward the Arab States and Israel which NEA had prepared for NSC consideration. I believe that the questions which you have raised are very much to the point and that they should and can be clarified. In addition, I think that a number of the points would be valuable additions to the proposed NSC paper.

II. With regard to the opening paragraph of your memorandum, NEA came to the conclusion the day before Mr. McGhee left for Istanbul, February 8,³ that it would be necessary to have some form of grant aid in the Arab States and Israel to achieve the desired objectives. For reasons which are set forth in detail in paragraph IX below, NEA now believes that a combination grant aid-cash reimbursable program should be instituted. We concur with you that aid should be given on a priority basis. We certainly do not believe that a large grant aid program should be established which would adversely affect our program in Western Europe. We have in mind a grant aid program of $50,000,000 and a cash reimbursable program of $76,000,000 (this includes the $76,000,000 cash reimbursable program already approved for Saudi Arabia) for all of the Arab States and Israel to be put into operation by July 1, 1952.

III. NEA is puzzled over the fact that you have described the area in which the Arab States and Israel are located as “doubtful”. We would very much appreciate a clarification of what is meant by this. As you know, the National Security Council has determined the Arab States and Israel to be of critical importance to the security of the United States. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of both the United Kingdom and the United States have as recently as October 26, 1950 agreed that “the Middle East in war is of importance second only to Europe”. If by “doubtful” you mean that its political orientation is a question mark, I would point out that one of our objectives in assisting this area, just as in others, is to strengthen its orientation towards the West. Obviously a small program of grant aid assistance could not be expected to build up the Arab States and Israel as a major military force, but we believe much could be accomplished in aligning this area solidly with the West.

IV. With regard to paragraph 2 of your memorandum, it has long since been determined that Greece, Turkey and Iran are very much on the front line. The position of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia in relation to Turkey and Iran is quite clear. The northeastern border of Syria is less than 200 miles from the Soviet Union. Iraq is barely 150 miles. The geographic importance of the area with respect to Western Europe, Africa and European and Asiatic Russia is quite obvious. Its importance during World War I and World War II was clearly demonstrated. If Turkey and Iran are in danger, we believe it almost axiomatic that the Arab States are in a similar position. It is assumed that the USSR would be deficient in oil during war and would not only attempt to deprive the Western powers of Middle Eastern oil but would also seek to obtain it for her own use. The great debate going on in the Arab world now is whether it should align with the west or try to steer a neutral course. Basically, this stems from a fear of the USSR and a lack of confidence and military strength.

V. The objectives of supplying military assistance to the Arab States and Israel include all of the five points mentioned in paragraph 3 of your memorandum, with some modifications on point two. We had not envisaged that it would be possible to provide weapons in such quantity that the Near Eastern states could contribute substantially in the defense against a major Soviet military aggression. On the assumption that it might be possible to supply grant aid in the amount of $50,000,000 in cash reimbursable aid up to another $76,000,000 over the next several years and finally on the assumption that the UK would also be assisting this area, it is conceivable that 18 months or two years after the program was commenced the Arab States and Israel would be in a far better position to defend themselves, and thereby to assist in the allied effort. In this connection, I would call your attention to the fact that during the first World War the central powers were forced to divert considerable strength to the Near Eastern area to take care of underground and harassing operations.

I believe it would be useful to incorporate in the NSC paper the objectives mentioned in your memorandum.

VI. In response to question 2, MPA believes that an arms program would go a long way toward obtaining the objectives. In particular, we feel that the attitude towards the United States would change markedly for the better.

VII. At the present time we believe that the effort to build up the strength of the Arab States and Israel should, of course, be dovetailed with other efforts to build up strength in other areas. We believe that the effort should be well planned on a simple but effective basis. The proper size over a period of time would depend to some extent on what can be done during the next two years. We believe that it would not be too much to expect to aim at a $126,000,000 aid program ($50,000,000 on grant aid and $76,000,000 cash reimbursable) to be launched in the fiscal year 1952 and carried on as expeditiously as possible, taking into account priorities in other areas. Such a program would not be large and could be absorbed. We do believe that early token assistance would be highly desirable.

VIII. Early token assistance would help towards achieving several of the objectives which you have enumerated; specifically Nos. 1, 4 and 5 and possibly 3. Over a period of time token assistance would not be adequate.

IX. I do not believe that cash reimbursable aid alone will succeed in achieving what we desire to achieve. In this connection your attention is called to paragraph 2 of Telegram #287 from Istanbul, February 17.⁴ This paragraph clearly indicates that we may have great difficulty in obtaining the rights we desire in Saudi Arabia unless we give some grant aid assistance. It was because we had reached the conclusion in NEA on February 8 that cash reimbursable assistance was not sufficient that we decided we should seek grant aid also. The ability to pay is conspicuously lacking in all of the states in the area except Saudi Arabia and Egypt. With respect to the two latter countries, NEA feels that partial grant assistance is essential to achieve our strategic interests.

X. We would contemplate that the program should be handled with individual states, but there should be a coordination of the assistance so that the area as a whole would benefit. We believe that the types and quantities of arms would be largely for Infantry use, Light Artillery and light tanks to become available in the next 15 to 18 months. There would also be some air and navy assistance. During this period there would be an opportunity for us to make thorough and complete plans as to how the types and quantities could be best used in the individual countries and in the area as a whole.

XI. NEA is not in a position to decide what impact the furnishing of weapons would have on the other MDAP plans. However, since we are not suggesting that the contemplated assistance be given immediately, but rather over a period of time. In addition, since the program we are suggesting is relatively small in comparison with other programs, it is difficult to see how the other MDAP programs could be adversely affected to even a small degree.

XII. As far as question 9 is concerned, we are unable to state specifically what the eventual dimensions of a program in the NE are likely to be. You will recall that it was difficult in 1947 to predict how much aid we were going to give to Greece and Turkey. At the present time, however, we do not contemplate more that $50,000,000 grant aid through June 30, 1952. Much will depend on developments in the international situation during the next year as to whether a supplementary program in the NE will be required for fiscal ‘53 or ‘54. At the present time, NEA does not believe that the Arab States and Israel would be capable of handling a program which involved more than $50,000,000 grant aid, plus $76,000,000 cash reimbursable between now and July 1, 1952. It does not seem to me that grant aid to the Arab States and Israel would have adverse Congressional or public effects in terms of securing passage of FY 1952 Foreign Aid Bill. Since the area is of critical importance to the security of the United States, NEA believes that we have an obligation to strengthen it as much as it is capable of being strengthened and, in so far as it is possible for us to do so without jeopardizing other important efforts for our own resources. We do not anticipate adverse effects flowing from the furnishing of arms to the Arab States and Israel. We believe that it would assist in negotiations for the Dhahran Air Base and for the securing of other facilities. In so far as the resumption of Arab-Israeli hostilities is concerned, the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950⁵ makes very clear the position of the US, UN and France with regard to any aggression by either Israel or any of the Arab States towards each other. All of the information we have received from the Arab States since that time indicates that they recognize the futility of a second round; however, in the absence of normal political relations between the Arab States towards Israel, it is necessary to be quite candid and state that the strengthening of either side is a calculated risk. However, the same can be said for West Germany and Japan.

XIII. In response to Question 12, we understand from the JCS that it would be difficult to make deliveries of any quantity for some time to come. However, we believe our declaration of intention to make future deliveries would have such a pronounced beneficial effect in the Arab States and Israel that there is little danger that a lapse of time would cause any serious adverse repercussions, certainly none which would outweigh the advantages. We believe that the period of time between the passage of legislation authorizing grant aid assistance and the time of the actual first major deliveries could be most profitably utilized in developing sound programs. We do believe that certain token assistance should be sent as soon as possible.

XIV. NEA understands that the JCS has approved a $50,000,000 grant aid program for the Near East. The details have not as yet been worked out. It is difficult to work them out until a general policy determination approving the principle has been made. Finally, NEA quite willingly concurs in your suggestion that this item be placed on the agenda of the ISAC Committee if you feel it desirable. We should like a firm departmental position worked out first, however.

1. Drafted by Kopper.
2. Ante, p. 78.
3. For documentation on the Conference of Middle East Chiefs of Mission held at Istanbul February 14–21 and attended by McGhee, see pp. 49 ff.
4. In telegram 287, February 17, from Istanbul, McGhee reported from the Chiefs of Mission Conference that “we agree increased dollar program Arab States and Israel desirable but early shipment more important consideration. Conference unanimous arms aid must be extended on same term to Israel and all Arab States including Saudi Arabia to prevent damaging charges favoritism et cetera. DAF negotiation has shown limited appeal cash reimbursable aid and SAG appears likely hold out for real quid for very important Dhahran quo. Consequently conference believes Saudi program should be converted grant basis and arms other Arab States and Israel likewise grant. Cash reimbursable facilities would be useful supplement only.” (780.5/2–1751)
5. For documentation on the Tripartite Declaration regarding arms shipments to the Arab States and Israel, issued by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France on May 25, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, pp. 975–990 and 1027–1031; and ibid., vol. v, pp. 131–168. The text of the declaration is in Department of State Bulletin, June 5, 1950, p. 886.