Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 47 Series

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary, National Security Council (Lay)¹

top secret

[Washington,] February 28, 1951.

Subject: United States Policy Toward the Arab States and Israel

The enclosed proposed Statement of Policy on the Arab States and Israel and the accompanying Staff Study were prepared by the Department of State after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and officials of the Department of Defense. It is requested that the proposed statement and Staff Study be circulated to the members of the National Security Council for their consideration and comment or approval. Certain of the proposed policies require legislative action. I hope therefore that this question will be considered by the Council as soon as possible.

James E. Webb

[Enclosure 1]

Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council²

top secret

[Washington, undated.]

The Arab States and Israel

1. The stability of the Arab States and Israel continue to be of critical importance to the security of the United States. The factors which make the area of such importance to the security interests of the United States are primarily:

a. The geographic position of the area with respect to Western Europe, Africa and European and Asiatic Russia;

b. Oil resources;

c. Military bases; and

d. Communications and facilities.

2. It is in the U.S. interest to maximize the will of the Arab States and Israel to cooperate with the United States and friendly countries in resistance to the USSR both now and in the event of war.

3. Finally, it is in the U.S. interest that the United Kingdom have primary military responsibility for Israel and the Arab States except Saudi Arabia.

4. Accordingly, the U.S. should:

a. Take steps, in cooperation with the United Kingdom, to strengthen the Arab States and Israel internally and against the threat of USSR expansionism;

b. Hold politico-military discussions with the United Kingdom to clarify the respective roles and responsibilities of each country in strengthening the Arab States and Israel;

5. The United States and the United Kingdom should, on an individual but coordinated basis:

a. Obtain the right to operate in the various nations upon the threat of or during general hostilities;

b. Develop local fighting groups and techniques;

c. Furnish small advisory groups and individual technicians and consider requests for training;

d. Initiate when possible limited arms supply programs;

e. Make “show-the-flag” visits;

f. Where feasible, place orders in local industries for needed raw materials and equipment.

6. Finally, the United States should:

a. Take legislative action which will permit the development of appropriate arms supply programs.

b. Undertake and accelerate technical and economic assistance; and

c. Expand and intensify the United States psychological effort toward the area.

d. Make clear, in a manner best calculated to produce maximum effect, the fact that the United States is prepared to assist the Arab States and Israel to strengthen their capabilities to defend themselves against aggression.

[Enclosure 2]

National Security Council Staff Study

top secret

[Washington, undated.]

United States Policy Toward the Arab States and Israel

the problem

1. To define and assess the policy which the United States should follow towards the Arab States^* and Israel, particularly in the light of the growing tendency in the area toward neutralism and the decline of an attitude favorable to the United States and other friendly countries.

analysis

2. NSC 47/2, October 17, 1949, covering United States policy toward Israel and the Arab States and NSC 65/3, May 17, 1950, on United States policy toward arms shipments to this area set forth policies which now require supplementing in light of the material changes in the international situation.

3. The political and economic stability of the Arab States and Israel were determined in NSC 47/2 to be of critical importance to the security of the United States, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of both the United States and the United Kingdom have as recently as October 26, 1950 agreed that “The Middle East in war is of importance second only to Europe”. The factors which make the area critically important to the security interests of the United States are primarily:

(a) The geographic position of the area with respect to Western Europe, Africa and European and Asiatic Russia;

(b) Oil resources;

(c) Military bases; and

(d) Communications and facilities.

4. United States objectives in the Arab States and Israel are:

(a) To preserve and strengthen the orientation of the nations in the area toward the United States and other nations friendly to us;

(b) To create political stability in depth for the benefit of Greece, Turkey and Iran and as a contribution to the stability of the Middle East as a whole;

(c) To induce the countries to increase their indigenous defensive capabilities against the USSR and Soviet satellites; and

(d) To obtain the right to deploy, base and operate forces in the territories of the nations of the areas upon threat of and during general hostilities, and to lay the political groundwork for us to regain access to the territories of the nations of the area in event of their loss during general hostilities.

5. The increasing belief, particularly in the Arab States, that the United States will not help the countries to prepare to defend themselves, is producing marked political disaffection and deterioration. The risk is increasing that important areas will swing away from the West toward neutrality, or even toward the USSR. It is important that this adverse trend be halted.

6. Retention and use of even a part of Middle East oil production or even delayed loss of it would contribute importantly and perhaps critically to an allied war effort.

7. It is in the interest of the United States that the United Kingdom maintain primary military responsibility in Israel and the Arab States, other than Saudi Arabia. Although the political influence of the United Kingdom has been declining in certain parts of the area, it is, nevertheless, still stronger than that of any other country in other parts, and it is in our mutual interest that there be cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom in order that the maximum benefit may be derived from our respective efforts. The United States has recently decided to make available $76,000,000 cash reimbursable assistance to Saudi Arabia. It is in our interest that primary military responsibility for this area should rest with the United States; but there should, nevertheless, be coordination with the United Kingdom. Israel is aware that the United Kingdom has primary military responsibility with regard to the area in which Israel is located.

8. The indigenous defenses in the Arab States and Israel can be increased through relatively small United States and United Kingdom efforts in the area, particularly in the difficult terrain of the Arabian Peninsula where American-operated desert facilities, engineering equipment and American experience already exist.

9. If military assistance were supplied to the Arab States and Israel, these states would (a) become more closely oriented towards the United States; (b) be better able to preserve internal security; (c) contribute after a time to the defense of the area; (d) be able to conduct guerilla warfare and harassing operations in the event the area or part of it is overrun; and (e) be more amenable to the granting of strategic rights.

10. If the Arab States and Israel do not become firmly oriented toward the United States and countries friendly to us during the cold-war period, it is doubtful that the support of these countries could be obtained during a global war or regained after the war.

conclusions

11. It is in United States interest to maximize the will of the governments and peoples in the Arab States and Israel to cooperate in resistance to the USSR both now and in the event of war; to translate that will into indigenous efforts to strengthen internal security; to resist the Soviet advance; to grant the Western Powers necessary military rights therein; and, if the area is nevertheless overrun, to harass and sabotage the invader and to assist in liberation.

12. Taking cognizance of the fact that it is in the United States interest that the United Kingdom have primary military responsibility for Israel and the Arab States excepting Saudi Arabia, discussions should be held on a combined United Kingdom-United States politico-military level to clarify the respective roles and responsibilities of the United States and the United Kingdom in strengthening the Arab States and Israel.

13. Following agreements reached in the discussions held in accordance with paragraph 12, above, the United Kingdom and the United States should, on an individual but coordinated basis undertake and accelerate the following measures with respect to the Arab States and Israel:

(a) Obtaining the right to deploy, base and operate forces in the territories of the nations of the area upon threat of and during general hostilities;

(b) Development of fighting groups and techniques which are best suited to local capabilities and terrain;

(c) Initiating when possible limited arms supply programs, required to achieve (a) and (b) above by early delivery of token quantities;

(d) Furnishing on request small advisory groups and individual service technicians, and consider requests for training of national military personnel in service schools;

(e) Making, in agreement with local governments, “show-the-flag” visits by air force planes and naval vessels; and

(f) Placing of orders in local industries for needed raw materials and war materials.

14. The United States should take legislative action which will permit the development of appropriate arms supply programs. Subject to the enactment of such legislation, appropriate authorities of the United States should develop the necessary programs.

15. The United States should undertake and accelerate technical and economic assistance that will help convince the peoples of the Arab States and Israel that they will benefit as individuals as well as States, from the victory of the Free World.

16. The United States should expand and intensify the United States psychological effort toward the area.

17. The United States should make it clear in the manner best calculated to produce the maximum effect upon the peoples of the area that it is prepared to assist the Arab States and Israel in strengthening their capabilities to defend themselves against aggression.

1. Drafted by Kopper; cleared by S/A, S/ISA, BNA, and G.
2. The text of this document was subsequently circulated to the NSC as NSC 47/3; see the editorial note, infra.
3. Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. [Footnote in the source text.]