ISAC Files: Lot 53 D 443: ISAC D–6

Paper Prepared in the International Security Affairs Committee, Department of State1

[Extract]
top secret
ISAC D–6

Statement of Considerations Involved in a Discussion Concerning the Feasibility of: (A) Increasing Turkish Military Establishment; (B) Expediting Delivery of Military Equipment to Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia During Calendar Year 1951; (C) Formulating Military Assistance Programs for Israel and the Arab States

c. israel and the arab states, including egypt and libya (Supporting Data–Tab C)2

Background:

The Department of State has recommended that more affirmative U.S. action is required to safeguard our vital security interests in the Middle East. In the Department’s view the need for such action is made urgent by the political deterioration which has taken place in the area. In order to clarify some of the issues involved, the views of the Department of Defense have been requested on the following proposals:

“1. That the United States make it clear to all of the countries of the Middle East that the United States in coordination with the United Kingdom is prepared to assist them in strengthening their capabilities to defend the area as a whole against aggression.

“2. That the United States furnish small training missions and individual service technicians to the Arab States and Israel to assist them in the development of fighting groups and techniques which are best suited to local capabilities and terrain and to the defense of the Middle East as a whole.

“3. That the number of Arab and Israeli trainees in the United States military schools be increased.

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“4. That the United States furnish, in conjunction with the training in paragraph 2, token quantities of arms and ammunition (of the order of magnitude of $5–10 million) to the Arab States and Israel on a cash reimbursable basis, making it very clear that greater quantities cannot be made available for another 12–18 months.

“These token quantities could be diverted from the programs for Greece, Turkey and Iran by delaying deliveries to these countries: if such a course is absolutely necessary, we believe on political grounds that the diversion should be made.

“5. That the United States discuss with the United Kingdom the establishment in the Middle East of a combined military mission, or establishment of a separate United States military mission for the purposes of:

  • a. stimulating and coordinating the military efforts of all of the Middle East countries for the defense of the Middle East as a whole;
  • b. creating stability in depth in the Arab States and Israel so as to enable Greece, Turkey and Iran to make the most effective use of the fighting power we are developing there;
  • c. coordinating in terms of the concept of area defense the activities of the United States and United Kingdom military missions in the individual countries; and
  • d. stimulating and coordinating, with appropriate backstopping in Washington and London, United States and United Kingdom planning to make the maximum effective use of available resources for the defense of the area.”

As the result of subsequent conversations in the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informally have transmitted their views with respect to the Middle East as follows:

“Political and military conditions in ME are of such significance to the security interest of the Western nations that provision should be made for grant aid to the other countries comprising the ME area. Firm programs of assistance for these countries cannot be developed at the present time but it is highly desirable that a contingency fund be provided that will permit immediate military assistance to the ground forces of these countries if such need for assistance becomes urgent.

“Accordingly legislation should be sought which will provide a contingency fund that will permit additional grant military assistance in the amount of $50,000,000 to countries in the ME area.”

Discussion:

It is recognized that, politically, the situation in the Arab States and Israel has deteriorated in recent months. That steps should be taken to counter this trend is also recognized. Partially to accomplish this end, an economic assistance program is planned for the area and a program of reimbursable military assistance to the extent of five to ten million dollars has been recommended by the Department of [Page 82] State. However, the form in which this assistance should be provided is a question which remains to be resolved.

One method which is within the framework of present legislative authority would provide military equipment on a cash reimbursable basis under Section 408(e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act as amended. In order to provide such assistance a determination would have to be made that each country in the area “whose ability to defend itself or to participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part is important to the security of the United States”. Assuming that such determinations are made, the countries in question could then request procurement assistance from the United States for the required equipment for which they would agree to pay. Negotiations for such an agreement with Saudi Arabia, which has been declared eligible under this Act, are now under way.3

Another method, which would require new legislative authority, would involve a series of grant aid programs for the countries in the area. Under this method surveys would have to be made to determine equipment deficiencies, assumptions would have to be made that the recipient countries were unable to pay for the needed equipment and complete justifications would have to be provided for the appropriations requested for this purpose.

Still another method, also involving the steps described in the previous paragraph, would be the creation of a contingency fund within the appropriation provided for Title II countries (Greece, Turkey and Iran) which could be used in the general area upon a determination by the President that the use of the funds in the country or countries in question would be important to the security of the United States. This latter method probably would provide more flexibility in channeling equipment into the countries where maximum benefits would accrue.

If deliveries of equipment can be limited to small quantities they probably would not interfere to any greater extent with the programs under way in countries of higher strategic importance unless given a high priority. However, if major quantities of equipment are to be involved and if deliveries of that equipment are to be expedited in order to achieve our objectives in the area, the programs will have to be worked out against a background of all other MDA countries. It is inconsistent, for instance, to suggest that there be a build up of strength in Greece and Turkey as in problems A and B above, and at the same time to embark upon a program of military assistance for the Arab States and Israel by diverting equipment from Greece and Turkey as has been suggested as a possibility.

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Present availabilities of military equipment are strictly limited and the demands upon U.S. productive capacity are of such magnitude that deliveries of presently-programmed equipment for MDAP countries will be long delayed for certain types of matériel. The only result which can come from adding new recipients will be to further aggravate an already difficult position unless production of the needed items is stepped up substantially. Therefore, a great deal of study must be given to questions involving the relative importance of the Middle East, NATO, and the Far East; the types and quantities of equipment that would have to be provided to the Arab States and Israel in order to accomplish our objectives; and whether or not assistance in the form of military equipment is a necessary method to accomplish those objectives.

Also, study will have to be given to possible developments between the Arab States and Israel if military equipment to increase their war potential is provided.

Recommendations:

1. ISAC should determine if the security interests of the U.S. require military assistance programs for the Arab States and Israel.

2. If military assistance programs are to be instituted for the Arab States and Israel, the Department of Defense should recommend to ISAC specific country programs in terms of quantities and types of equipment.

3. If military assistance programs are to be instituted for the Arab States and Israel, ISAC should determine whether such assistance should be provided on a reimbursable basis, on a grant basis with a specific program for each country, or on a “contingency fund” basis.

  1. A covering memorandum from ISA Committee Secretary Robert G. Efteland stated that this paper was prepared in ISAC and was intended to serve as a basis for discussion and judgment on the problems enumerated in the “Statement of Considerations”. Appended to the source text, but neither printed, are, as Tab A, a problem paper prepared in ISAC on increasing the Turkish military establishment, and, as Tab B, a memorandum from the Ambassador to Greece transmitting a paper on expediting the delivery of military equipment to Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Also appended to the source text, as Tab C, is a copy of the letter from Secretary Acheson to Secretary Marshall, with annex, dated January 27, p. 21. Pages 1–6 of this paper, not printed, deal with the increase in the Turkish military establishment and the delivery of military equipment to Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia during 1951.
  2. Not printed; see footnote 1 above.
  3. For documentation on these negotiations, see pp. 1017 ff.