611.86/2–1951
Memorandum by the Director, International Security Affairs (Cabot), to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry)
Subject: Proposed NSC Paper on U.S. Policy toward the Arab States and Israel
We transmit without concurrence attached paper.1 If the purpose were merely to suggest reimbursable aid we would approve. Further legislation and the reference thereto (Paragraph 6a) then would be unnecessary. We believe such aid should be given when arms become available beyond the needs of other allies deserving priority. But, if the purpose is to justify grant aid, we feel that a legislative request for such a doubtful area requires further study in view of the jeopardy to our aid program as a whole from including such a doubtful area.
We feel that if we extend grant aid to areas not presently threatened there is danger of becoming extended beyond our resources.
While the paper does not state with any preciseness the exact purposes that would be achieved by supplying military assistance to the Arab States or Israel, presumably this would be done to accomplish one or more of the following objectives:
- 1.
- To provide weapons which these nations need and presently do not have in order to preserve their internal security, i.e., to deal with dissident or potentially dissident elements.
- 2.
- To provide weapons for existing or projected forces of these nations on the theory that such forces, if so equipped, would in fact contribute substantially in a defense against Soviet military aggression, either on their own or in conjunction with Allied forces committed to the area.
- 3.
- To provide weapons with which military or paramilitary forces located in these nations could, in the event of Soviet conquest of the area, harass supply lines, conduct guerrilla warfare and otherwise prevent consolidation of the Soviet position.
- 4.
- To “buy” strategic bases, rights of access, etc., by providing something which these nations uniformly appear to want, i.e., weapons.
- 5.
- To foster the Western orientation of these countries, and, conversely, to prevent their drift toward neutralism or toward the Soviet orbit by indicating through the provision of arms that the United States (and the United Kingdom) has a friendly feeling toward them and is prepared to come to their support in the event of Soviet military aggression.
The mere statement of these possible objectives raise a series of questions which should be answered before a decision is reached to supply arms. Among these questions are the following:
- 1.
- Which of these objectives are the objectives sought?
- 2.
- In what ways could an arms program in fact contribute to the attainment of these objectives?
- 3.
- What is the proper size and character of the arms program to attain such objectives?
- 4.
- Is token assistance enough?
- 5.
- Would cash reimbursable aid succeed in its purpose?
- 6.
- Would the program be based on a plan for the area as a whole, or handled as a matter of individual political expediency or individual requirements?
- 7.
- When can the types and quantities of arms which would be required be made available?
- 8.
- What will be the impact of furnishing these weapons on other MDAP programs?
- 9.
- Is the program, if it is adopted, to be a continuing program, and, if so, what are likely to be its eventual dimensions?
- 10.
- Would the effort to secure authority to provide grant aid to this area have adverse Congressional or public effects in terms of securing the passage of the FY 1952 foreign aid bill and, if so, should they nonetheless be risked?
- 11.
- What adverse effects might flow from the furnishing of arms to this area under the circumstances contemplated in the paper? What effect would it have on the negotiations for the Dhahran airbase? Would it increase the likelihood, either immediately or in the event of increased international tension, of a resumption of Arab-Israeli hostilities?
- 12.
- How soon would it be possible to make any deliveries to these countries and would the delay preceding the first deliveries, or the delay following such first deliveries and preceding further deliveries, have adverse repercussions which would outweigh any advantages?
Since earlier discussions of this matter with Mr. McGhee and others our ISAC Committee has been organized and we believe this matter might well be placed on its agenda. We would welcome your thoughts as to this.