Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

PPS Files: Lot 64 D 563: “Villard”

Draft Study by the National Security Council¹

top secret

Washington, December 27, 1951.

The Position of the United States With Respect to the General Area of the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East^*

problem

1. To determine U.S. national objectives and policies with respect to the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East countries.

analysis

2. Geographically the area has great strategic importance. It lies at the land, sea and air crossroads of three continents. It contains important Western military bases, the Suez Canal, Dardanelles and Bosphorus and has natural defensive barriers in its mountains and deserts. It lies close to Soviet centers of industry, population and oil resources.

3. Approximately half the world’s known oil reserves are in the Middle East. Access to these rich oil reserves is of great importance to the Free World in peace and war. Detailed discussion relating to oil in this area may be found in the NSC 97 studies and related papers.²

4. The maintenance and defense of Western interests in the Middle East is so important to the over-all position of the West that it is in the interest of the United States to take whatever appropriate measures it can, in the light of its other commitments, to maintain and defend these interests.

5. The extension of Soviet control over the Middle East would mean a violent shift in the world balance of power. It is necessary to counter efforts in this direction by the Soviet Union—and this is one of the objectives of U.S. policy in the Middle East. There is, however, little danger that the Soviet Union will take aggressive military action against the Middle East as a whole unless it has decided to initiate general war. The problem of preparing for general war, and the measures to be taken in the Middle East should be determined in accordance with strategic plans for conducting a general war with the Soviet Union.

6. The major threats to Western interests in the Middle East lie in the growing instability within the Middle Eastern states and in the tensions and hostile attitudes between, first the Arab States and Israel and, second, the Arab States and the Western powers, notably the U.K., and in the prevailing attitude of neutralism. The major problem for the United States in the Middle East is to find ways of dealing with these threats.

The US and UK Roles in the Area

7. In the past the United States has relied primarily on the U.K. for the maintenance and defense of Western interests in the Middle East. However, the rapidly declining ability of the U.K. to maintain and defend Western interests in parts of the Middle East now creates the need for a review and restatement of U.S. policy toward the Middle East. In some countries where the British have been unable to discharge this responsibility, the United States has assumed it. Greece and Turkey are examples of the transfer of major responsibility from the U.K. to the United States in this part of the world. Also, where the United States has major military and economic interests, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, U.S. influence has largely replaced U.K. influence.

8. However, the ability of the U.S. to exercise influence in the area is limited and it is desirable for the U.S. to work closely with the U.K. (and the Commonwealth countries), France and Turkey. To the extent that the exercise of influence requires the use of force by a Western power as a necessary and appropriate means of maintaining and defending Western interests in the area, it is in the U.S. interest that the U.K. provide such force.

9. The declining ability of the U.K. to maintain and defend Western interests in the Middle East does not appear to be primarily due to the inadequacy of British military forces in the area. On the contrary, the British probably have sufficient military forces in Cyprus, Egypt, and Iraq to take local military actions that might become necessary in the area. The decline of British capabilities is a complex phenomenon. It is partly a result of the decline of the U.K. as a world power. It is in important measure a reflection of the nationalist aspirations of the Middle Eastern states—accompanied and intensified by the desire to end what they regard as unjust exploitation and by the belief, fostered by the creation of the United Nations and adoption of the UN Charter and by the coming to independence of Pakistan, India, and other Asiatic nations, that a new era has begun in international affairs. It is also traceable in part to the discontent of the peoples of the area with their social and economic conditions—a factor which weakens the grip on power of the ruling classes and which therefore weakens the ability of the West to maintain stability in these states by working through the ruling classes.

10. This analysis makes it doubtful that it would be possible for the U.S. or the U.K., or both together to maintain and defend Western interests in the area in the 19th century fashion. In fact, it seems clear that the West must work toward the establishment of a new basis and a new kind of relationship with the Middle Eastern states. The change to a new basis will not, of course, be clean-cut. Western power and prestige, exercised directly and through ruling groups, will continue to be important factors in the maintenance of stability within the area. There may well be occasions, as in Egypt at the present time, when the West will have to be prepared to use force to maintain its interests or to accept the loss of these interests. Whatever the U.S. can do to bolster both generally and locally the power and prestige of the U.K. will assist the U.K. in maintaining stability in the area and will reduce the need for direct action by the U.S. or other Allied powers—provided that the Western posture toward the area comes more and more to be regarded by the states in the area as being in harmony with their basic interests.

the middle east command

11. Despite the weakness of their military position, the states of the area have learned neither the value of unity nor the collective strength they might attain by banding together. Local rivalries divide the nations, and this political fragmentation militates against the development of any regional cohesion and regional concepts. The Arab League is a weak reed upon which to build any area program, and would be weaker still if it were not held together by its antipathy toward Israel.

12. Egypt, Iraqi, Iranian, Jordan and Israeli armed forces have received some equipment from British and American sources and have benefited in the past from military tutelage but, in general their standards are not comparable to Western ones. (The Arab Legion in Jordan is British trained and of higher caliber than its Arab neighbors’ forces, but its strength is less than one division.)

13. While the foregoing considerations present serious obstacles to a unification of forces for the immediate present, the fact remains that, in the event of failure of efforts to secure coordinated action, as by the establishing of a Middle East Command, the opportunity exists for building up military strength in individual countries and thus enhancing their powers of resistance to aggression. Thus those countries which contain economic, communication or base facilities highly important to our strategic aims may be strengthened unilaterally, and strong political reasons may exist for strengthening the nations of the area. Our most important economic resource of this region is oil, and to protect it, consideration should be given to insuring priorities of military assistance to friendly forces in Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Important strategic communication routes and bases (the Suez, Bosphorus, Dardanelles, bases in Saudi Arabia) indicate that consideration should be given to insuring priorities of military assistance to friendly forces in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. It has recently been agreed that some military assistance should go to Syria in order to increase its political stability and secure its orientation toward the West.

14. The United States maintains hope that some of the various political barriers dividing this area may be gradually lowered by the Middle East states working together against the common threat of aggressive communism through participation in a Middle East Defense arrangement.

15. The Middle East Command—assuming that the present obstacles to the participation of the Middle Eastern states in this command can be overcome—if handled adroitly, could help in various ways to deal with the problem of maintaining and defending Western interests in the area:

a. To the extent that fear of Soviet aggression deters the governments of the Middle Eastern countries from taking needed measures, the acknowledgment by the United States of its interest in the security of the area together with its readiness to participate in the MEC should help to overcome that fear. It should thereby help to build internal strength and to strengthen the will of the people to resist any Soviet aggression.

b. To the extent that the decline of British power and prestige is a factor contributing to instability in the area, the association of the U.S. with the U.K. in the MEC should help to demonstrate the joint interests of the U.S. and U.K. and thus lead to an increase of British prestige and respect for Western power. Furthermore, the cooperation of the British and the Middle Eastern states in the MEC should tend to provide increased opportunities in a favorable climate for efforts to settle disputes between them.

c. To the extent that the desire for “equal treatment” is a factor affecting relations between the Middle Eastern states and the Western powers, the principles underlying the MEC and its institutional character should help by assuaging this desire of the Middle Eastern states.

d. To the extent that tensions within the area are a source of instability, cooperation in the MEC on problems related to the defense of the area as a whole against outside aggression should be helpful, for it should tend to be reflected in increased regional cooperation and understanding in other than military matters.

e. To the extent that the weakness of the present governments in the Middle East is a factor contributing to instability, the MEC should be helpful by providing opportunities to the Western powers for bolstering these governments in various ways in order to increase the local power and prestige of the governments.

16. In order to provide a sound foundation for the development of U.S. policy toward the Middle East, it seems desirable, if politically practicable, to obtain a Congressional endorsement of the growing interest of the United States in the security of the Middle East and specifically of U.S. participation in the MEC. The acknowledgment of this interest contained in the quadripartite statement of principles of November 10 and the commitments implied by U.S. participation in the MEC are major developments of U.S. foreign policy, about which the Congress should be consulted and its support, at least for appropriations, will be necessary.³

17. Congressional action, if any is sought, should be such as to:

a. Make it unnecessary to secure reciprocal commitments from the Middle Eastern States.

b. Avoid raising Arab-Jewish problems, as a treaty would.

c. Give the U.S. maximum freedom of decision and action in implementing our undertaking and in reacting in the event of an attack on the area.

d. To avoid, unless we desired it, the proliferation of international institutions on the NATO pattern.⁴

18. To bolster the likelihood of success of the Middle East Command it may be desirable to furnish considerable U.S. personnel to advise the staff of this command. Further, in order to help friendly nations who desire to help themselves become stronger it may be desirable to furnish military assistance missions to show U.S. interest and to bolster political, psychological and economic efforts. The U.S. should not undertake to commit forces in the area, but should retain flexibility in this matter and arrive at a decision on the employment of U.S. forces only in the light of particular circumstances as they may exist.

Social and Economic Problems in the Area.

19. The low standards of living in the Arab countries and Iran engender mass discontent, perpetuate political and social instability and ferment and increase the vulnerability of these impoverished peoples to the blandishments of communism. A growing awareness of and dissatisfaction with these conditions is apparent. Social revolution may be impossible to prevent but it might be guided to insure friendliness to Western powers. Society is predominantly feudal in character in the majority of states and established governments often appear unable to adapt themselves to changing circumstances and to contribute sufficiently to higher standards of living and the demands of their peoples. Responsibility for the people’s lot is often shifted to the colonial and imperialistic practices attributed to the Western powers, and communist propaganda supports this criticism. A strong movement towards neutralism and xenophobia has resulted.

20. The establishment of the MEC and the most effective possible use of the MEC as an instrumentality for serving U.S. interests in the area will not alone solve the problems confronting the U.S. in the Middle East. It will be necessary in addition to work with the governments of these states in improving the basic social and economic conditions in the area. In developing and carrying out these programs it will be necessary to make compromises between long-term and short-term considerations. In the long term it is probable that the present ruling groups will lose more of their power—unless they prove able to adjust their outlook and to assume leadership of the changing social and economic and political development of their countries. In the short term, however, the West depends greatly on these groups for the maintenance of stability in the area, and will often find it necessary to work with and through men and groups competent to exercise power, but with whom it is not in full sympathy. It would probably be necessary, however distasteful it may be, to funnel a considerable amount of our economic assistance through these groups in order to bolster their hold on power. Where this is necessary, our attempt should be to modify the policies of these groups in ways desirable from the long-term point of view, but we should not deliberately sacrifice important short-term interests because of our view as to what constitutes the desirable long-term course of development.

21. Insofar as social and economic actions in the Middle East are concerned, the U.S. and the U.K. (and where desirable France) should support each other by concerting their policies so as to make the most effective use of their respective capabilities in the area. It will probably be necessary in the U.S. national interest over the next several years to continue our programs of economic aid to the countries of the Middle East, including the resettlement of refugees, along the lines provided by MSP.⁵ Somewhat larger sums may be required later on than the $125 million authorized for 1952. In carrying out these programs it may be desirable to concentrate on pilot projects susceptible of having early regional application and on programs productive of tangible benefits at an early date for many people. Such programs should carefully avoid the appearance of partiality to Israel, and in implementing military aid under MSA it will be necessary to give due regard to the dangers of an arms race between the Arabs and the Israelis. We should also explore ways and means of developing consultation and collaboration on social and economic problems among the states associated with MEC in order to promote nonmilitary enterprises of benefit to the region as a whole.

22. The U.S. has been viewed with distrust by the Arab States in the last few years because of the responsibility ascribed to it for the establishment of Israel as a nation. In order to overcome this distrust it will be necessary to intensify present psychological efforts in the area. For this purpose it should be possible to draw upon the reservoir of good will, which is probably still existent, engendered by U.S. philanthropic and educational agencies and by the practices of U.S. oil companies in the area.

23. Only in the case of Iran is there a present serious possibility that the communists might be able to come to power by internal action. There is also in the case of Iran the possibility that a Soviet occupation of the northern provinces might occur in certain circumstances. This move would probably not be made by the Soviet Union except to exploit what the Soviet rulers might regard as a safe and favorable opportunity arising from internal chaos in Iran or as a counter to efforts by the West to maintain and defend its interests in Iran. The Iranian case is thus a special one.

24. Excluding an attack via Turkey which will be covered by the NAT commitment, an attack on the Middle East can only be made through Iran. Iran has not yet been invited to join the MEC. The permanent exclusion of Iran from the MEC and more particularly its exclusion from the area covered by the recommended concurrent resolution by the Congress would set Iran apart and indicate that the U.S. and its Western allies might react differently to an attack on Iran than to an attack on the rest of the Middle East. This would increase the dangers in the Iranian situation [and] it is therefore recommended that Iran be included in the area covered by the resolution and as soon as possible after a settlement of the oil problem, in the MEC.

25. The greatest danger in the Iranian situation, however, is that Iran will come under Soviet control through the coming to power in Iran of the Tudeh Party or other extremist groups. The United States should continue its efforts to assist the British and Iranians to settle their dispute and should be prepared to take such financial measures as might be necessary to prevent the collapse of the Iranian Government through the inability of that government to meet its current operating expenses, but such assistance should be kept to a minimum in order to maintain pressure for a settlement of the oil problem.

26. …

1. The source text indicates that this was a draft prepared by Henry S. Villard of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff for the NSC Staff.
2. The term “Middle East” is used in this paper to refer to the Arab States, Iran, and Israel. Turkey is excluded because our policy toward Turkey is determined within the NATO–ERP framework. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. For documentation on U.S. interest in Near and Middle East petroleum, see pp. 268 ff.
3. There follows at this point in the source text a handwritten addition which reads as follows: “The MSA act now contains a general evaluation of US interest in the security of the Middle East. An amendment of this language to strengthen it and to refer specifically to the MEC appears to be the most desirable form of Congressional action that is most feasible.”
4. Section 17 of the source text is enclosed in handwritten brackets, presumably in light of the textual addition mentioned in footnote 3 above.
5. For documentation on the Middle Eastern refugee problem, see pp. 559 ff.