Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

780.5/12–1951

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)¹

top secret

Washington, December 29, 1951.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: The Middle East Command, in which the United States announced its intention to participate along with the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and Turkey, involves many problems, a few of which were outlined as follows in Mr. Matthews’ letter to you of October 31, 1951:²

• “A.

  1. Defense of the Middle East (Defense).

  2. Definition of MEC area (State-Defense).

  3. MEC relationship to NATO (State-Defense).

  4. Role of Turkey in MEC (State-Defense).

• B. Detailed organization of MEC, including location of MEC headquarters (Defense).
• C. Steps required to secure association of Arab states, Israel and other interested states with MEC (State-Defense).”

Group A of these problems will have to be worked out in such consultations as those which took place in Rome on November 27, 1951³ but, as General Bradley and I indicated on that occasion, these problems should not be allowed to impede planning for the establishment of the Middle East Command. This letter is devoted to the desirability of proceeding with the establishment of the Middle East Command (points B and C above).

This Department considers it would be desirable from political point of view that there be established on Cyprus not later than March–April of 1952 a Middle East Command headquarters, as a going institution with United States, United Kingdom, French, Turkish and possibly Commonwealth staff officers in residence. The Four Powers have stated publicly their intention to proceed with the establishment of the Middle East Command. We believe that the United States should use its influence and resources to accelerate the transformation of MEC from a paper enterprise into an established physical entity.

The MEC is at the very least a quadripartite enterprise with which Australia, New Zealand and South Africa will also be associated. Since MEC headquarters will be located initially on the British territory of Cyprus, it is logical that the United Kingdom should take the initiative in formulating plans for the headquarters. However, the British military authorities are, we understand, still hopeful that it will be possible to locate MEC headquarters in Egypt and, consequently, are inclined to postpone as long as possible preparations and planning for a headquarters on Cyprus. There is no doubt that Egypt would be the best location for the headquarters and it was for this reason that Egypt was offered founder status in the MEC. However, under the present circumstances, this Department sees no possibility of the Anglo-Egyptian impasse being resolved in the course of the next few months in such a way that it will be possible to locate MEC headquarters in Egypt. Since actions have a greater impact than words upon Middle Eastern States, we would like to see the necessary planning undertaken now so that the Cyprus headquarters can be opened in the first part of next year. We believe that the political impact of the early inauguration of the headquarters will be both favorable and profound.

Since the “cold war” objectives of MEC are politico-military in character, we believe that it would be desirable to initiate at this time an informal State–Defense working group to study the various practical problems connected with the establishment of the MEC headquarters. We suggest that this should be a clearing house for ideas and that the establishment of such a working group would itself be a stimulus to the United Kingdom in getting on with the job.

Subject to your concurrence with the general idea, I suggest that Defense channels be used to advise the United Kingdom of the establishment of this Working Group which at an early meeting would:

a) set down for consideration by higher authority the unresolved questions such as those discussed at Rome,

b) fix its own terms of reference,

c) prepare a schedule of work which would result in a preliminary statement of the United States position to be advanced in early discussions with the United Kingdom, France and Turkey as well as Australia, New Zealand and South Africa,

d) work out a suggested time table for discussions with other interested states (c above).

I would be glad to know whether you concur in the foregoing suggestions and your ideas as to how they can be implemented most effectively. It will be desirable, of course, to keep the working group as small as is consistent with the accomplishment of its purpose.⁴

Sincerely yours,

Dean Acheson

1. Drafted by G. Lewis Jones, cleared by Matthews, S/P, BNA, GTI, WE, NEA, RA, and S/S. The source text indicates that this letter was signed by Acheson on December 28. A covering memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs Burton Y. Berry, of December 19, stated that it was deemed necessary to establish a State–Defense Working Group on MEC in order to assist in developing the advance planning necessary on the United States part prior to discussions with the other proposed founding countries. The proposed Working Group “would study the practical problems of a politico-military character which will have to be faced and formulate recommendations as to the position which the United States should take” (780.5/12–1951).
2. Ante, p. 238.
3. Reference is to the discussions on the MEC during the meetings of the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Rome, November 24–28, 1951; for documentation, see vol. iii, pt. 1, pp. 693 ff.

4. Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett replied to the Secretary of State in a letter dated February 11, 1952, in which he expressed general agreement with the suggestions for the early establishment of a Middle East Command headquarters. He emphasized, however, that it was the Department of Defense position that establishment of a Middle East Command “must not be allowed to jeopardize the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty.” As for the details of effecting coordination of effort between a Middle East Command and contiguous NATO commands, he stated, they could not be determined until Greece and Turkey had become members of NATO. “Any arrangements which tend toward integration of the two commands (the British ‘two-hat’ concept) should be opposed.”

   Secretary Lovett concurred in the proposal to establish an informal State-Defense Working Group to study the problems connected with the establishment of a Middle East Command, for which the Joint Chiefs of Staff would provide the Department of Defense representation, but he objected to notifying the British:

   “Prior to the time that a United States position on the matter of the Middle East Command Headquarters is reached, I do not agree with your suggestion that the United Kingdom be informed of the establishment of the Working Group. When the United States position is reached, it is agreed to use Defense channels to advise the United Kingdom of this Working Group.” (780.5/2–1152)