780.5/12–2151: Telegram
The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State
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Delga 780. No distribution GADel or Embassy for eyes only Berry and Jones (NEA) from Ross.1 Fawzi Bey sent for me very urgently this afternoon. He said he wanted to discuss a non-GA matter with me. He then went on, with considerable intensity of manner, to suggest the possibility of Azzam Pasha seeing Eisenhower informally. The basic purpose of such interview wld be to compare notes and develop an up-to-date picture of the present situation as seen from both sides. By both sides Fawzi Bey explained he meant (a) relationships within the free world family and (b) between the free world and the other side, that is the problem of defense.
In making this suggestion Fawzi said that there has been a very confused situation during recent weeks, in particular since the “untimely” presentation of the 4 power proposals for MEC. The “untimely” presentation plus certain unfortunate features of the substance thereof put a “spoke in the wheel” and caused existing confusion to become more confused.
I asked Fawzi Bey what he meant by unfortunate features and he referred in reply to the way in which the proposals were presented, the preamble and part relating to Sudan. Fawzi emphasized that “we cannot allow existing confusion to stand in the way of the vital necessity of our working together”.
By way of further background Fawzi said that Salaheddin was suffering from frustration. He wanted to remain a friend of the US but felt frustrated because he felt his overtures met with rebuffs. Fawzi said Salaheddin was sincere and truthful in this feeling and also sincere and truthful in the feeling of wanting to be a friend “even with the UK”. He said Salaheddin had no illusions and no connection of any kind with Moscow.
On the other hand Fawzi went on, Salaheddin has a clearcut but not an obstinate concept of what his country is entitled to not only for the good of Egypt but for the good of the free world.
Fawzi said we must get over the hump which keeps us from seeing things eye to eye. He said this hump is the antiquated approach of “imposition from the outside instead of comradeship”. He said that without an approach based on comradeship none of us can be strong [Page 256] or safe. On the basis of comradeship, however, Egypt and the other Arabs will be prepared to put “millions” in the field in def of freedom and our common interests.
Fawzi then said he wanted to tell me something “very confidentially” which had not been true until today. He said “we accept withdrawal of the Brit on a gradual basis. For local polit purposes it wld have to be stated that withdrawal was immed but it wld be a scheduled withdrawal”. This wld be possible Fawzi said if agreement cld be reached upon a system of common def and on the build up of the econ of the area which is the backbone of the defense of the area. Fawzi said they had a realistic appraisal of all we are doing and of all our difficulties but he said we have come to a time when all of us must “stretch ourselves a little further”.
Fawzi said it wld not do simply to return to consideration of the MEC proposals. He said there shld be a real straightforward and not a “tricky” overhauling of these proposals. By “overhauling” it seemed clear Fawzi meant discussion. I asked him what he meant by use of the word “tricky” which seemed a little unfortunate. He said he did not mean tricky in that sense but rather in the sense of vague or diplomatic. He said “let’s not try to be clever in regard to such matters”.
Against the foregoing background Fawzi said he thought that a talk between Azzam and Eisenhower “cld be helpful” before the Churchill-Truman-Eden-Acheson conversations.2 At least it wld not be harmful.
Fawzi said they had no idea at all of working behind the backs of the UK or of making things difficult before the Washington talks. On the contrary he said they wld be very happy if agreement cld be reached in the Washington talks on a new approach. He said we must try again and if one thing did not work to keep on trying again.
I asked Fawzi whether I had understood correctly that he was suggesting that Azzam see Eisenhower alone or that Azzam and Salaheddin shld see Eisenhower together. Fawzi said that he was suggesting that Azzam see Eisenhower alone and that this was with the “clear understanding and agreement of Salaheddin”. He said that if Eisenhower shld prefer seeing Azzam and Salaheddin together, that, of course, cld be arranged. He went on to say that if Azzam saw Eisenhower it wld thereafter be a good idea for Azzam to have an opportunity to talk with some of Eisenhower’s aides.
Referring to all of the foregoing I told Fawzi I was not in a position to make any comment but that I wld commit myself to mention one or two points. First, I observed that since Fawzi had suggested that the purpose of the proposed interviews wld be to compare notes on [Page 257] relationships within the free world and between the free world and the other side, there were, of course, the usual diplomatic channels available for discussion of such matters. Second, Eisenhower was of course a very busy man. Third, I did not know whether Eisenhower wld consider that it was within his competence to discuss the matters ref to by Fawzi.
Fawzi observed that the last 2 points were of course considerations we wld have to take into account. On my first observation, however, Fawzi said that we cld of course put on frockcoats and deal with matters in that way. He then stressed that he had in mind a mtg of “a very informal character”.
I made no further comment. Fawzi asked me to think over his suggestion and said he wanted to keep in close touch with me during next few days.3 [Ross.]
- This telegram was subsequently sent by the Department of State to Cairo and London. (780.5/12–2151) John C. Ross was Senior Adviser to the United States Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly.↩
- Scheduled to be held at Washington in January 1952.↩
- In telegram 941 to Cairo of December 22, G. Lewis Jones, signing for Secretary Acheson, requested comments on Fawzi’s proposals, adding “Depts reaction is that affirmative response Fawzi suggestion wld be further build-up of Salaheddin and wld therefore be contrary to efforts bypass him. Moreover, we doubt very much Eisenhower cld involve himself in question so far removed NATO competence. Subject your comments Dept feels Fawzi shld receive no encouragement on this idea and shld be told that usual Dip channels are available for such discussions Egypts may wish to have or proposals Egypt may wish to make” (780.5/12–2151). Ambassador Caffery replied in telegram 938 from Cairo of December 24 that he concurred in the Department’s reaction to the proposed Eisenhower–Azzam meeting (780.5/12–2451). In telegram Gadel 552 to Paris, December 26, Samuel K. C. Kopper, signing for Acheson, informed Ross that in view of Cairo’s concurrence with telegram 941, Fawzi should be “tactfully discouraged from pursuing Eisenhower–Azzam Mtg” and Kopper proceeded to make the same subsequent points to Ross as had been made by Jones in telegram 941 to Cairo (780.5/12–2451).↩