731.56/7–1351
The Acting Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the
Secretary of State
top secret
Washington, July 13, 1951.
Dear Mr. Secretary: The Commander in
Chief, Caribbean (CIN-CARIB)
has forwarded an Agreement Document resulting from joint planning
talks with the Chief of Staff of the Venezuelan Armed Forces, held
at Quarry Heights, Canal Zone, 19–23 March 1951 (Appendix “A”).
It should be noted in the Agreement Document that the Venezuelan
conferees pointed out that Venezuela is able and willing to pay for
the equipment and urged that their requirements, submitted through
diplomatic channels in late 1950 and early 1951, be made available
With the least possible delay. The status of U.S. Government action
on such equipment requests as of 25 June 1951 is summarized in
Appendix “B”. It is considered that further military conversations
in Caracas and on-the-ground joint United States-Venezuelan survey
of the entire security problem would permit an accurate assessment
of the implications of the total Venezuelan requirements.
It should also be noted that Venezuelan conferees emphasized that
Venezuela asks that the United States make no decisions or
arrangements affecting the defense of Venezuela without previous
consultation with that government.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the Agreement Document is
acceptable as a basis for further close collaboration and planning
with the Venezuelan military authorities, subject to the following
revisions:
-
a.
- From subparagraph 2 c (1), delete
the words “United Nations police action or”.
-
b.
- In subparagraph 2 g, after the
first sentence, insert a new sentence reading: “It is
understood that where specific types and models of equipment
are listed in subparagraphs 2 g (1),
(2) and (3) below and
[Page 1627]
in Annexes “A”, “B” and “C”,1 they are
mentioned as examples only, and that any similar and
equivalent types of equipment can be substituted as
requirements.”
In view of the fact that the Agreement Document recommends, in
paragraph 3, that the points of agreement be submitted to the
Governments of Venezuela and the United States for approval, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it necessary that, in further
discussions with military representatives of Venezuela, CINCARIB inform them that the
requirements enumerated under subparagraph 2 g of the Document should not be construed as a commitment
by the United States Government to furnish such equipment and
assistance. The purpose of this reservation is not to question the
need for equipment assistance from the United States, but rather to
point out the fact that the United States must balance Venezuelan
equipment requests against the equipment demands for the Korean
War,2 for the expansion of the United States armed
forces, and for other foreign commitments.
This Department is prepared to approve the Agreement Document, when
modified as above, and after deletion of reference to the
Organization for American States from paragraph 2(c), as an acceptable basis for further close collaboration
and planning with the Venezuelan military authorities. Before any
additional talks are held, however, I would appreciate receiving
your advice as to whether recent developments with respect to the
availability of Iranian oil3 should be considered
in determining the policy of this Government concerning the
provision of military equipment for Venezuela.
Faithfully yours,
top secret
23 March 1951.
Results of Planning Talks Between the
Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces of Venezuela and the
United States Commander in Chief Caribbean at Quarry
Heights, Canal Zone—Period 19–23 March 1951
1. Included herein are the results of planning talks which were
held between the Chief of Staff of the Venezuelan Armed Forces
and the
[Page 1628]
United
States Commander in Chief, Caribbean, at Quarry Heights, Canal
Zone, during the period 19–23 March 1951.
Agreement
2. Agreement. The Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of Venezuela and the United States Commander in
Chief, Caribbean, have reached mutual agreement on the following
points as developed in their joint planning talks:
a. Purpose. The planning talks include:
- (1)
- All the strategic military aspects of the security of
the entire oil industry and other strategic materials in
Venezuela, including external aggression and internal
sabotage.
- (2)
- The military requirements incidental to the security
of the oil and the other strategic materials of
Venezuela.
b. Key Terminology. For the purposes of
this conference, the following definitions apply:
- (1)
-
Internal Security. Maintenance of
law and order and the control of the civilian population
within an area.
- (2)
-
Local Defense. Protection, of a
specific, limited area and/or installation (s) from the
action of enemy armed forces or subversive
elements.
- (3)
-
Over-all Defense. Protection of a
large area, included installs tions and lines of
communication, from action by enemy, or enemysponsored,
forces. Over-all defense generally requires both
offensive and defensive action by the defender.
c. Assumptions. All planning for the
security of strategic materials in Venezuela herein included is
based upon the following assumptions:
- (1)
- In the event that either Venezuela or the United
States is attacked, or participate in United Nations’
police action or open warfare, the provisions of the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance5 and the
Organization of American States will be effective.6
- (2)
- The major threats to Venezuela are:
- (a)
- Sabotage or subversion conducted by subversive
elements.
- (b)
- Overt enemy action to include:
- 1.
- Submarine attacks on sea lines of
communication.
- 2.
- Sneak air or guided missile attacks.
- 3.
- Raiding action.
- (3)
- The Venezuelan Government is capable of
suppressing any domestic disorder which may arise
in Venezuela.
- (4)
- The fundamental problems included herein are
applicable to the Venezuelan oil fields and
installations, and in general to those related to
other strategic materials.
- (5)
- Without the augmentation of the military means
now available to Venezuela, the security of the
strategic material areas will be limited.
d. Vital Installations and Facilities.
The vital installations and facilities related to the strategic
materials of Venezuela are:
- (1)
- Oil refineries
- (2)
- Power plants
- (3)
- Pipelines and pumping stations
- (4)
- Loading terminals
- (5)
- Water supply
- (6)
- Maracaibo Bar
- (7)
- Lagunillas Dyke
- (8)
- Communications
- (9)
- Replacement equipment and supplies
- (10)
- Fields and installations related to other strategic
materials
e. Security Measures. The implementation
of the following measures is essential to the security of the
strategic materials of Venezuela and their vital installations
and facilities:
- (1)
- Determination and detention of subversive
elements.
- (2)
- Efficient guard forces with adequate authority.
- (3)
- Fire fighting teams organized and trained in modern
techniques.
- (4)
- Coordination of emergency plans for the combat of
fire, disorder, civil disturbances, and sabotage.
- (5)
- Effective communications between strategic areas to
prevent inter alia the
suppression of information relative to serious uprisings
or civil disturbances in isolated strategic
areas.
- (6)
- An adequate and uniform employee identification
system.
f. Defense Responsibilities. The
responsibilities for defense and security of the strategic
materials of Venezuela and their vital installations and
facilities are as indicated below:
- (1)
-
Internal Security. The Venezuelan
military authorities with the cooperation of the
respective industries are responsible for the internal
security of the areas and vital installations associated
with the production of strategic materials.
- (2)
-
Local Defense. The Venezuelan
military authorities are responsible for the local
defense of Venezuelan territory to include the oil
fields, vital installations, lines of communications,
and all other installations, of military
significance.
- (3)
-
Over-all Defense. The United
States Commander in Chief, Caribbean, will coordinate
with the Venezuelan military authorities in the defense
of the sea and air lines of communication adjacent to
Venezuela to insure a coordinated effort in the
protection of these lines of communication.
[Page 1630]
g. Need for Material Assistance. In
accordance with the foregoing, there exists at the present time
a requirement for the following equipment and assistance which
is in addition to that currently available to Venezuela, in the
areas of mutual interest and strategic importance.7 Field surveys and further studies may indicate a need
for additional material assistance. (See Enclosure)*
(1) Army. (For detailed discussion see
Annex “A” to Enclosure)*
- (a)
- Equipment for two Transportation Truck
Companies.
- (b)
- Additional transportation and communications
equipment, gas masks, and riot type chemical
ammunition.
- (c)
- Equipment for one Engineer Combat Battalion.
- (d)
- Prefabricated structures similar to the Quonset hut
type (amount and capacity to be subsequently
determined).
- (e)
- Fire fighting equipment.
- (f)
- A limited amount of antiaircraft equipment.
- (g)
- Service support in the way of medical, ordnance,
quartermaster, and signal equipment to support the
program outlined above, and to facilitate the planned
reorganization of Venezuela’s regular military
establishment.
- (h)
- Retention of the U.S. Army Mission to Venezuela and an
augmentation thereof with technical specialists when
required.
(2) Navy. (For detailed discussion see
Annex “B” of enclosure)*
- (a)
- Six coastal destroyers of about 320 tons.
- (b)
- Six 80’ sub-chasers.
- (c)
- Equipping of three corvettes with sonar and radar and
installing armament presently available in
Venezuela.
- (d)
- Equipping of two 83’ patrol boats with engines (total
of four engines).
- (e)
- Two minesweepers, AMS type.
- (f)
- Furnish two 400 HP engines for one cutter (R&D[I?]).
- (g)
- One salvage tug completely equipped for fighting oil
fires (maximum draft 9’).
- (h)
- Six launches, Eureka type.
- (i)
- Anti-torpedo net for protection of dock areas at
Puerto La Cruz and Las Piedras.
- (j)
- Effective mining of Boca del Dragon.
- (k)
- Radars—Three Air-Search Radars.
Three
Surface-Search Radars
- (l)
- Sixteen short-range voice radio sets.
- (m)
- Equipment for gunnery training center and technical
assistance in its installation. (See paragraph VI. Annex
“B”)†
- (n)
- Naval Base, including United States technical
assistance in its planning.
- (o)
- Solution of the problem of construction of six coastal
destroyers and six 80’ sub-chasers shown as items (a) and (b)
above. (See paragraph IV, 15. a., Annex “B”)†
- (p)
- Overhaul sonar equipment in two 83’ patrol
boats.
- (q)
- Retention of the U.S. Naval Mission to Venezuela and
an augmentation thereof with technical specialists when
required.
(3) Air. (For detailed discussion see
Annex “C” of Enclosure)†
- (a)
- One Transport Squadron composed of twelve C-47s or
Super DC–3s.
- (b)
- One Patrol Squadron composed of twelve Neptune P2V
aircraft or one squadron of twenty-four aircraft of a
type suitable for coastal antisubmarine patrol.
- (c)
- Four H–5 helicopters for Search and Rescue.
- (d)
- Three squadrons of twenty-four jet interceptors each
and three long-range early warning radar sets. AN/CPS–6
complete, or equivalent. With regard to the three
interceptor squadrons, two alternatives are presented:
[See Note following subparagraph
g]8
- 1.
- Two squadrons of U.S. jet interceptors plus
seventeen more British Vampires.
- 2.
- Three squadrons of U.S. jet interceptors of
twenty-four aircraft each.
- (e)
- Completion of the military air bases at Palo Negro, El
Jaguito, and Maturin; and establishment at the Maracay
base (Palo Negro) of depot maintenance facilities and a
one-year stock level of supplies and spare parts for
aircraft to be provided.
- (f)
- Each military base would require two 400-watt
transmitters of the T4/FRC type with two Hammerlund
SuDerpro receivers BC 779, four VHF BC 640 transmitters
and BC 639 receivers, and one BC 329 transmitter.
- (g)
- Retention of the U.S. Air Force Mission to Venezuela
and an augmentation thereof with technical specialists
when required.
-
Note: Although three jet
interceptor squadrons would be required to provide
minimum air defense for the strategic areas of
Venezuela, the probability of an air attack is
considered slight at this time. Accordingly, it is
recommended that interceptor aircraft and control radar
facilities be allocated in conformance with established
U.S. priorities. It is to be noted that should the first
alternative be adopted, U.S. assistance in procurement
from the British is necessary.
- (h)
-
Additional measures. In addition,
the following measures should be mutually undertaken:
- (1)
- Exchange of appropriate classified military
intelligence between the Venezuelan military
authorities and the United States Commander in
Chief, Caribbean.
- (2)
- Participation as required in a technical
advisory capacity of the principal commercial
companies engaged in the production of the
strategic materials of Venezuela.
- (3)
- Establishment of the means of communications
between Venezuelan military authorities and the
United States Commander in Chief, Caribbean, in
peacetime for utilization in time of
emergency.
- (4)
- Subsequent surveys by the Venezuelan
Government with the assistance of the United
States, if required, in order to assure the close
coordination of military plans for security in
areas of strategic materials industries.
- (5)
- Designation of non-resident liaison personnel
between Venezuelan military authorities and the
United States Commander in Chief, Caribbean, if
desirable.
- (6)
- Subsequent planning talks to develop close
coordination in the military plans for the
security of the strategic materials industries is
desirable: It is recommended that the place of the
next planning talks be Caracas.
- (i)
- It is understood that the Venezuelan Government is
prepared to reimburse the United States Government for
provision by the latter of military assistance and
equipment.
Recommendation
3. Recommendation. It is recommended that
these points of agreement as set forth by the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of Venezuela and the United States Commander in
Chief, Caribbean, be submitted to the Governments of Venezuela
and the United States for approval.
W. H. H. Morris, Jr
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
U.S. Commander in Chief,
Caribbean
Felix R. Moreno
Tonel. Jefe
del Estado
Mayor General
Appendix “B”
Status of U.S. Government Action on Venezuelan Equipment Requests to
Date
1. Naval gunnery materiel, navigational equipment and certain
survey and aiming instruments for 155 mm howitzer battery,
approximating $50,000, has already been funded for and is in
supply action.
2. Pricing and availability lists for engineer, chemical, signal,
medical and quartermaster items for 1–105 mm Howitzer Battalion,
1 Engineer
[Page 1633]
Combat
Battalion, 2 Truck Companies and 1 Medical Company, plus
accessories and spare parts for F–47D aircraft, approximating
$500,000, were presented to the Venezuelan representatives in
Washington on 4 May 1951.
3. The Air Force is preparing to deliver approximately
$419,000.00 worth of spares for B–25 and F–47D aircraft,
including bombsight parts, to the government of Venezuela which
has deposited with the Department of State the necessary funds
to pay for purchase and delivery of the equipment.
4. Pricing and availability studies are currently under
preparation with respect to Venezuelan requests for equipment
for 1 Light Tank Battalion; ordnance and heavy items for 1–105
Howitzer Battalion, 1 Engineer Combat Battalion, 2 Truck
Companies and 1 Medical Company; and parachute and aerial
delivery equipment and supplies. It is estimated that the
foregoing equipment will cost approximately $17,000,000. It is
expected that these lists will be offered to the Venezuelans
within the next 30–90 days.
