731.56/7–1351

The Acting Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Dear Mr. Secretary: The Commander in Chief, Caribbean (CIN-CARIB) has forwarded an Agreement Document resulting from joint planning talks with the Chief of Staff of the Venezuelan Armed Forces, held at Quarry Heights, Canal Zone, 19–23 March 1951 (Appendix “A”).

It should be noted in the Agreement Document that the Venezuelan conferees pointed out that Venezuela is able and willing to pay for the equipment and urged that their requirements, submitted through diplomatic channels in late 1950 and early 1951, be made available With the least possible delay. The status of U.S. Government action on such equipment requests as of 25 June 1951 is summarized in Appendix “B”. It is considered that further military conversations in Caracas and on-the-ground joint United States-Venezuelan survey of the entire security problem would permit an accurate assessment of the implications of the total Venezuelan requirements.

It should also be noted that Venezuelan conferees emphasized that Venezuela asks that the United States make no decisions or arrangements affecting the defense of Venezuela without previous consultation with that government.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the Agreement Document is acceptable as a basis for further close collaboration and planning with the Venezuelan military authorities, subject to the following revisions:

a.
From subparagraph 2 c (1), delete the words “United Nations police action or”.
b.
In subparagraph 2 g, after the first sentence, insert a new sentence reading: “It is understood that where specific types and models of equipment are listed in subparagraphs 2 g (1), (2) and (3) below and [Page 1627] in Annexes “A”, “B” and “C”,1 they are mentioned as examples only, and that any similar and equivalent types of equipment can be substituted as requirements.”

In view of the fact that the Agreement Document recommends, in paragraph 3, that the points of agreement be submitted to the Governments of Venezuela and the United States for approval, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it necessary that, in further discussions with military representatives of Venezuela, CINCARIB inform them that the requirements enumerated under subparagraph 2 g of the Document should not be construed as a commitment by the United States Government to furnish such equipment and assistance. The purpose of this reservation is not to question the need for equipment assistance from the United States, but rather to point out the fact that the United States must balance Venezuelan equipment requests against the equipment demands for the Korean War,2 for the expansion of the United States armed forces, and for other foreign commitments.

This Department is prepared to approve the Agreement Document, when modified as above, and after deletion of reference to the Organization for American States from paragraph 2(c), as an acceptable basis for further close collaboration and planning with the Venezuelan military authorities. Before any additional talks are held, however, I would appreciate receiving your advice as to whether recent developments with respect to the availability of Iranian oil3 should be considered in determining the policy of this Government concerning the provision of military equipment for Venezuela.

Faithfully yours,

Robert A. Lovett
[Appendix “A”]4
top secret

Results of Planning Talks Between the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces of Venezuela and the United States Commander in Chief Caribbean at Quarry Heights, Canal Zone—Period 19–23 March 1951

1. Included herein are the results of planning talks which were held between the Chief of Staff of the Venezuelan Armed Forces and the [Page 1628] United States Commander in Chief, Caribbean, at Quarry Heights, Canal Zone, during the period 19–23 March 1951.

Agreement

2. Agreement. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Venezuela and the United States Commander in Chief, Caribbean, have reached mutual agreement on the following points as developed in their joint planning talks:

a. Purpose. The planning talks include:

(1)
All the strategic military aspects of the security of the entire oil industry and other strategic materials in Venezuela, including external aggression and internal sabotage.
(2)
The military requirements incidental to the security of the oil and the other strategic materials of Venezuela.

b. Key Terminology. For the purposes of this conference, the following definitions apply:

(1)
Internal Security. Maintenance of law and order and the control of the civilian population within an area.
(2)
Local Defense. Protection, of a specific, limited area and/or installation (s) from the action of enemy armed forces or subversive elements.
(3)
Over-all Defense. Protection of a large area, included installs tions and lines of communication, from action by enemy, or enemysponsored, forces. Over-all defense generally requires both offensive and defensive action by the defender.

c. Assumptions. All planning for the security of strategic materials in Venezuela herein included is based upon the following assumptions:

(1)
In the event that either Venezuela or the United States is attacked, or participate in United Nations’ police action or open warfare, the provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance5 and the Organization of American States will be effective.6
(2)
The major threats to Venezuela are:
(a)
Sabotage or subversion conducted by subversive elements.
(b)
Overt enemy action to include:
1.
Submarine attacks on sea lines of communication.
2.
Sneak air or guided missile attacks.
3.
Raiding action.
(3)
The Venezuelan Government is capable of suppressing any domestic disorder which may arise in Venezuela.
(4)
The fundamental problems included herein are applicable to the Venezuelan oil fields and installations, and in general to those related to other strategic materials.
(5)
Without the augmentation of the military means now available to Venezuela, the security of the strategic material areas will be limited.

d. Vital Installations and Facilities. The vital installations and facilities related to the strategic materials of Venezuela are:

(1)
Oil refineries
(2)
Power plants
(3)
Pipelines and pumping stations
(4)
Loading terminals
(5)
Water supply
(6)
Maracaibo Bar
(7)
Lagunillas Dyke
(8)
Communications
(9)
Replacement equipment and supplies
(10)
Fields and installations related to other strategic materials

e. Security Measures. The implementation of the following measures is essential to the security of the strategic materials of Venezuela and their vital installations and facilities:

(1)
Determination and detention of subversive elements.
(2)
Efficient guard forces with adequate authority.
(3)
Fire fighting teams organized and trained in modern techniques.
(4)
Coordination of emergency plans for the combat of fire, disorder, civil disturbances, and sabotage.
(5)
Effective communications between strategic areas to prevent inter alia the suppression of information relative to serious uprisings or civil disturbances in isolated strategic areas.
(6)
An adequate and uniform employee identification system.

f. Defense Responsibilities. The responsibilities for defense and security of the strategic materials of Venezuela and their vital installations and facilities are as indicated below:

(1)
Internal Security. The Venezuelan military authorities with the cooperation of the respective industries are responsible for the internal security of the areas and vital installations associated with the production of strategic materials.
(2)
Local Defense. The Venezuelan military authorities are responsible for the local defense of Venezuelan territory to include the oil fields, vital installations, lines of communications, and all other installations, of military significance.
(3)
Over-all Defense. The United States Commander in Chief, Caribbean, will coordinate with the Venezuelan military authorities in the defense of the sea and air lines of communication adjacent to Venezuela to insure a coordinated effort in the protection of these lines of communication.

[Page 1630]

g. Need for Material Assistance. In accordance with the foregoing, there exists at the present time a requirement for the following equipment and assistance which is in addition to that currently available to Venezuela, in the areas of mutual interest and strategic importance.7 Field surveys and further studies may indicate a need for additional material assistance. (See Enclosure)*

(1) Army. (For detailed discussion see Annex “A” to Enclosure)*

(a)
Equipment for two Transportation Truck Companies.
(b)
Additional transportation and communications equipment, gas masks, and riot type chemical ammunition.
(c)
Equipment for one Engineer Combat Battalion.
(d)
Prefabricated structures similar to the Quonset hut type (amount and capacity to be subsequently determined).
(e)
Fire fighting equipment.
(f)
A limited amount of antiaircraft equipment.
(g)
Service support in the way of medical, ordnance, quartermaster, and signal equipment to support the program outlined above, and to facilitate the planned reorganization of Venezuela’s regular military establishment.
(h)
Retention of the U.S. Army Mission to Venezuela and an augmentation thereof with technical specialists when required.

(2) Navy. (For detailed discussion see Annex “B” of enclosure)*

(a)
Six coastal destroyers of about 320 tons.
(b)
Six 80’ sub-chasers.
(c)
Equipping of three corvettes with sonar and radar and installing armament presently available in Venezuela.
(d)
Equipping of two 83’ patrol boats with engines (total of four engines).
(e)
Two minesweepers, AMS type.
(f)
Furnish two 400 HP engines for one cutter (R&D[I?]).
(g)
One salvage tug completely equipped for fighting oil fires (maximum draft 9’).
(h)
Six launches, Eureka type.
(i)
Anti-torpedo net for protection of dock areas at Puerto La Cruz and Las Piedras.
(j)
Effective mining of Boca del Dragon.
(k)
Radars—Three Air-Search Radars.
Three Surface-Search Radars
(l)
Sixteen short-range voice radio sets.
(m)
Equipment for gunnery training center and technical assistance in its installation. (See paragraph VI. Annex “B”)
(n)
Naval Base, including United States technical assistance in its planning.
(o)
Solution of the problem of construction of six coastal destroyers and six 80’ sub-chasers shown as items (a) and (b) above. (See paragraph IV, 15. a., Annex “B”)
(p)
Overhaul sonar equipment in two 83’ patrol boats.
(q)
Retention of the U.S. Naval Mission to Venezuela and an augmentation thereof with technical specialists when required.

(3) Air. (For detailed discussion see Annex “C” of Enclosure)

(a)
One Transport Squadron composed of twelve C-47s or Super DC–3s.
(b)
One Patrol Squadron composed of twelve Neptune P2V aircraft or one squadron of twenty-four aircraft of a type suitable for coastal antisubmarine patrol.
(c)
Four H–5 helicopters for Search and Rescue.
(d)
Three squadrons of twenty-four jet interceptors each and three long-range early warning radar sets. AN/CPS–6 complete, or equivalent. With regard to the three interceptor squadrons, two alternatives are presented: [See Note following subparagraph g]8
1.
Two squadrons of U.S. jet interceptors plus seventeen more British Vampires.
2.
Three squadrons of U.S. jet interceptors of twenty-four aircraft each.
(e)
Completion of the military air bases at Palo Negro, El Jaguito, and Maturin; and establishment at the Maracay base (Palo Negro) of depot maintenance facilities and a one-year stock level of supplies and spare parts for aircraft to be provided.
(f)
Each military base would require two 400-watt transmitters of the T4/FRC type with two Hammerlund SuDerpro receivers BC 779, four VHF BC 640 transmitters and BC 639 receivers, and one BC 329 transmitter.
(g)
Retention of the U.S. Air Force Mission to Venezuela and an augmentation thereof with technical specialists when required.
Note: Although three jet interceptor squadrons would be required to provide minimum air defense for the strategic areas of Venezuela, the probability of an air attack is considered slight at this time. Accordingly, it is recommended that interceptor aircraft and control radar facilities be allocated in conformance with established U.S. priorities. It is to be noted that should the first alternative be adopted, U.S. assistance in procurement from the British is necessary.
(h)
Additional measures. In addition, the following measures should be mutually undertaken:
(1)
Exchange of appropriate classified military intelligence between the Venezuelan military authorities and the United States Commander in Chief, Caribbean.
(2)
Participation as required in a technical advisory capacity of the principal commercial companies engaged in the production of the strategic materials of Venezuela.
(3)
Establishment of the means of communications between Venezuelan military authorities and the United States Commander in Chief, Caribbean, in peacetime for utilization in time of emergency.
(4)
Subsequent surveys by the Venezuelan Government with the assistance of the United States, if required, in order to assure the close coordination of military plans for security in areas of strategic materials industries.
(5)
Designation of non-resident liaison personnel between Venezuelan military authorities and the United States Commander in Chief, Caribbean, if desirable.
(6)
Subsequent planning talks to develop close coordination in the military plans for the security of the strategic materials industries is desirable: It is recommended that the place of the next planning talks be Caracas.
(i)
It is understood that the Venezuelan Government is prepared to reimburse the United States Government for provision by the latter of military assistance and equipment.

Recommendation

3. Recommendation. It is recommended that these points of agreement as set forth by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Venezuela and the United States Commander in Chief, Caribbean, be submitted to the Governments of Venezuela and the United States for approval.

W. H. H. Morris, Jr

Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
U.S. Commander in Chief,
Caribbean
Felix R. Moreno

Tonel. Jefe
del Estado
Mayor General

Appendix “B”

Status of U.S. Government Action on Venezuelan Equipment Requests to Date

1. Naval gunnery materiel, navigational equipment and certain survey and aiming instruments for 155 mm howitzer battery, approximating $50,000, has already been funded for and is in supply action.

2. Pricing and availability lists for engineer, chemical, signal, medical and quartermaster items for 1–105 mm Howitzer Battalion, 1 Engineer [Page 1633] Combat Battalion, 2 Truck Companies and 1 Medical Company, plus accessories and spare parts for F–47D aircraft, approximating $500,000, were presented to the Venezuelan representatives in Washington on 4 May 1951.

3. The Air Force is preparing to deliver approximately $419,000.00 worth of spares for B–25 and F–47D aircraft, including bombsight parts, to the government of Venezuela which has deposited with the Department of State the necessary funds to pay for purchase and delivery of the equipment.

4. Pricing and availability studies are currently under preparation with respect to Venezuelan requests for equipment for 1 Light Tank Battalion; ordnance and heavy items for 1–105 Howitzer Battalion, 1 Engineer Combat Battalion, 2 Truck Companies and 1 Medical Company; and parachute and aerial delivery equipment and supplies. It is estimated that the foregoing equipment will cost approximately $17,000,000. It is expected that these lists will be offered to the Venezuelans within the next 30–90 days.

  1. None printed.
  2. For documentation relating to this subject, see volume v .
  3. For documentation concerning United States policy with respect to the Korean situation in 1951, see vol. vii, pp. 1 ft.
  4. The initial two pages of this enclosure, not printed, comprised a letter from the Commander in Chief, Carribean, to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, dated March 27, 1951, transmitting the enclosure and listing the participants in the planning talks.
  5. For text of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro, September 2,1947, and entered into force for the United States, December 3, 1948, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1838, or 62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1681.
  6. The Secretary of Defense on September 19, in advising the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he concurred in their view that the “agreement document” was acceptable as a basis for further joint planning with the Venezuelans, directed that subparagraph 2c (1) be amended to read as suggested by the Secretary of State in his letter of August 14, printed on p. 1647. Later, to facilitate talks with the Venezuelans, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the informal concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, on November 9, deleted the entire subparagraph 2c (1) and renumbered the succeeding subparagraphs.
  7. On September 19, the Secretary of Defense concurred in the addition of a new sentence after the first sentence of subparagraph 2g as proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see paragraph b. on p. 1626). To meet Venezuelan objections, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the informal concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, on November 9, amended the added sentence to read:

    “It is understood that where specific types and models of equipment are listed in subparagraphs 2g (1), (2), and (3) below and in Annexes ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C,’ they are mentioned as examples only, and that any similar and equivalent types and models of equipment requested by Venezuela can be substituted for other types and models at the discretion of the United States but with prior approval and agreement of Venezuela.”

  8. Contained in this Appendix. [Not printed. Footnote in the source text.]
  9. Contained in this Appendix. [Not printed. Footnote in the source text.]
  10. Contained in this Appendix. [Not printed. Footnote in the source text.]
  11. Contained in this Appendix. [Not printed. Footnote in the source text.]
  12. Contained in this Appendix. [Not printed. Footnote in the source text.]
  13. Contained in this Appendix. [Not printed. Footnote in the source text.]
  14. Brackets in the source text.