Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

795B.5/4–1251

Memorandum by the Director of the Staff, Inter-American Defense Board (Sibert) to the Director of the Office of Regional American Affairs (White)

secret

Washington, April 12, 1951.

Subject: Memorandum of Conversation between General Carlos Iríbar Inspector General of the Uruguayan Army; Rear Admiral Alfredo Aguiar, Inspector General of the Uruguayan Navy, and Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert, Director of the Staff, InterAmerican Defense Board.

In compliance with oral instructions from General Bolté¹ I arranged for an informal interview between the Inspectors General of the Uruguayan armed forces and myself, on 10 April 1951, at 2600 Sixteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. I opened the conversation by outlining to General Iríbar and Admiral Aguiar the legal position of the United States with regard to the furnishing of arms and military equipment to a foreign country. I also explained to them the relative priority enjoyed by Latin American countries in the present world situation. I told these gentlemen of our desire to have their country participate with the other United Nations forces in the present action in Korea, and suggested that a regimental combat team would be an appropriate size unit.

I also made clear to the Uruguayan representatives what the Department of Defense was prepared to do in the way of assistance, in case a unit were offered. I told them that we were prepared to complete the equipment of the unit in question, assist in its training, transport it to the theater of operations, supply and maintain it there, and return it to its home land upon the cessation of hostilities. General Iríbar and Admiral Aguiar both stated that they were entirely in accord with the United States point of view and would do everything possible to produce an offer from their country for an RCT for service in Korea. They said that the principal obstacles were in the legislature, in public opinion, and, to a lesser extent, in the opinion of the armed forces. They outlined the general situation in Uruguay as set forth below.

The Uruguayan representatives pointed out that the armed forces of their country have no direct contact with the administrative and legislative branches of their Government, and do not have channels for affecting public opinion in Uruguay. The point was made that connection between the armed forces and the legislative branch, for example, was much more tenuous than in the United States where Congressional committees may call on any military leader. Most of the difficulty in Uruguay with respect to gaining support for the sending of an expeditionary force outside the country rests on the fact that this cannot be done without legislative approval. While the general climate of public opinion in Uruguay is definitely pro-United Nations and pro-United States, the internal political situation is such that it is difficult to give expression to this sentiment. There are two political parties in Uruguay, the Colorados and the Blancos. The differences between these parties are so slight as to be almost unnoticeable, except in the field of political competition. The Colorados have been in power, by a not too large majority, for 85 years. As a political move, and solely as such, the Blancos have appealed for the support of Peronista elements.² Since, vis-à-vis the international situation, the Peron Government of Argentina has adopted a “third position,”³ the Blanco party, chiefly through the agency of only three or four leaders, finds itself formally committed to the “third position”. This is less a sincere belief of the party membership than a political expedient. To state the matter in a different way, this attitude of the Blancos is more a result of politics than a motivation of politics. Indeed, the Uruguayan representatives said, if the position of the parties were reversed, it is likely that the same situation would obtain, but in reverse Uruguay has almost no problem of communism. Indeed the problem might be simplified if there were a real communist threat, since the country would be in large part opposed. As it stands now, however, the situation is one of political commitments, in a way that might be easily compared with the Republican-Democratic competition in the United States.

The Uruguayan representatives made it clear that while there was no question of armed intervention in Uruguay by Argentina, there was a very serious and troublesome economic or commercial connection—one that placed great difficulties in the way of Uruguay’s operating freely in accordance with its real beliefs. Emphasizing that Uruguay had not come to the Meeting of Consultation⁴ to ask for dollars, and did not wish to do so, the Uruguayan representatives made the following explanation: Argentina and Uruguay have similar products, e.g., beef, grain, leather, etc. Since the Argentine production greatly outstrips the Uruguayan, it becomes obvious that the prices for these products are set by the Argentines. The result is that Uruguay finds itself “tied to the Argentine chariot” in the commercial field. The result is a constant, unwilling, dependence of Uruguay on Argentina, and a constant struggle to free itself from this situation.

It was also pointed out that Uruguay has always taken a pro-democratic and pro-cooperation stand in inter-American conferences, and Uruguayan leaders keenly feel the inconsistency in their not cooperating by sending forces outside the Hemisphere to resist aggression. Indeed, many urge the necessity of so doing, as a moral and practical commitment. Uruguay, especially the large segment of thought represented by General Iríbar and Admiral Aguiar, clearly understands and sympathizes with the position of the United States. They interpret this to be a need for other democratic countries, and particularly those of Latin America, to support the United States in deed as well as in words. They understand how important this moral and practical support is to the United States in its struggle with Russia.

In summary, General Iríbar said that Uruguayan leaders and public opinion favor strong and practical support of the United States in the terms discussed above, but that the political situation as it is, and the economic situation, with its implications for the political situation, put very definite obstacles in the way. Concerning the provision of an RCT for Korea, General Iríbar stated that his position would be strengthened were we to offer equipment for a unit larger than the one to be provided, in order that a majority of this equipment could be devoted to national defense purposes. He made a suggestion very similar to the one made by General Morla⁵ of Peru that if we were to supply arms, less critical items, for a division, the first RTC [ RCT ] of this division might possibly be offered for service abroad. He stated emphatically that this was an exploratory suggestion, and one with no official standing whatsoever, but that those terms might strengthen his position in urging the contribution in question, upon his return home.

With respect to the personal opinions of the Uruguayan participants in the conversation, it was stated that the Uruguayan Government favored sending an expeditionary force to Korea, but that the legislative majority was small enough that it would be too dangerous, for political reasons, to make this move.

In strictest confidence, General Iríbar and Admiral Aguiar stated that they personally, as Chiefs of the armed forces, had sent a joint memorandum to the proper governmental authorities urging the moral necessity of Uruguay’s contributing to the defense of democracy and pointing out that if Uruguay, in the background of its stand on inter-American cooperation, could not, in the moment of danger, make a practical contribution, it could not in the future count on reciprocal action by free American countries in case of Uruguay’s need. The officers also said that they had in mind to bring the full story of their visit to the United States, and of the present conversation to an Uruguayan senator, an ex-Minister of Defense. Indeed, Admiral Aguiar had already sent an appropriate letter. The purpose would be to urge this legislator to do everything possible to affect public opinion. It was also pointed out that one desirable, though obviously rather impossible, action would be to eliminate from the press the unfavorable stories originating in the United States—stories which gave the Uruguayan public a wrong impression of the climate of opinion in the United States. The problem in this respect obviously lies in the tendency of newspaper reporting to select the most sensational material. The Uruguayan representatives estimate that 80 percent of the press in Uruguay is favorable to the United States, where only some 20 percent is responsive to Russian propaganda.

The Uruguayan representatives stated that, in spite of the pessimistic tone of all the above, which they felt obliged to state honestly, they personally were optimistic as to the outcome of the situation. In addition, they stated they both were returning home with a much better and clearer impression of the United States, of why the latter has a moral need for practical support in the present situation, and of the firm determination of the United States to defend itself and other democratic countries.

With respect to the means of effecting what is wished by the United States, the Uruguayan representatives referred to the manner in which public opinion was swayed in the last war. This was accomplished chiefly through the Embassies of the free countries. It was suggested that the possible manner of swaying public opinion in the present case would be through the same channels, for example, the present Ambassador of the United States,⁶ they said, is well thought of in Uruguay, and, more to the point, has very good contacts with elements in the Blanco party. If the Department of State of the United States would initiate a carefully planned campaign to sway Uruguayan public opinion through its Embassy, the prognosis would be very favorable.

In the economic and commercial aspect, Uruguay did not ask for dollars or “charity”. However, if in some way the United States could help Uruguay to free itself from its commercial dependence and almost automatic link with the Argentine economy, it would greatly strengthen Uruguay’s determination, and more important, enable it to act in accordance with its real ideals. General Iríbar used the phrase: “If there were some way to help us get out of this mud hole”.

At the conclusion of the discussion, it was agreed that if the various efforts to obtain approval ill Uruguay for the sending of an expeditionary force should bear fruit, the official procedure should be as follows: To request, through diplomatic channels, equipment of such and such a type and such and such quantity, to be used in connection with an RCT for service in Korea.⁷

Edwin L. Sibert

Brigadier General, USA

1. Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolt, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, U.S. Army, and Chairman, Inter-American Defense Board.
2. Reference is to the followers of Juan Domingo Perón, President of Argentina.
3. For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1079 ff.
4. Reference is to the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States, which met at Washington, March 26-April 7, 1951. Documentation on the meeting may be found on pp. 925 ff.
5. Manuel Morla Concha, Chief of the General Staff of the Peruvian Army.
6. Christian M. Ravndal.
7. In telegram 115, from Montevideo, dated September 19, 1951, Ambassador Ravndal reported that the Uruguayan Cabinet “unanimously approved offering two destroyer escorts about to be purchased” from the United States for service in Korea, and also “unanimously approved organizing, equipping, training regimental combat team [of] ground troops for UN service”. As of October 17, 1952, however, Uruguay made no formal offers of military or naval assistance to the United Nations Command for Korea; for further information, see United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1952 (New York, 1953), pp. 214–215.