320/12–751: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)1
priority
Gadel 417. 1. We have been seriously concerned re developments Greece-Byelorussia contest SC seat, especially since LA defection became apparent because of unfortunate ICJ slates problem. Since last week’s deadlock we have been considering how far we cld usefully go to assist Greeks and what tactics wld be most appropriate, bearing in mind Delgas 559 and 560.
2. We appreciate fact Greece has been innocent victim circumstances. We trust Del’s estimate that Greeks will gain five votes from LA states when voting resumed Dec 13 correct, but we realize LA shift alone cannot at best bring about Greece’s election.
3. Key to situation, in our opinion, therefore remains UK together with WE states which are strongly influenced by UK position. Like Greeks, we were misled into belief UK wld shift support to Greece after first ballot. We have approved strong and repeated representations made by Gifford to Eden, but recognize there is only very slight chance these or any others will be effective.
4. Given these unexpected difficulties, problem is whether to engage US prestige beyond point already reached in effort secure election Greece. Our thinking on this point is colored by several factors:
- (a)
- We have made honest effort bring about defeat Sov satellite and, as Greece emerged as principal anti-satellite candidate, to bring about its election. USDel cannot be reproached for failing in any way meet its commitments.
- (b)
- We foresee little prospect that extraordinary measures which might be undertaken by Dept—i.e., representations to Ambs or circulars to field suggested Delga 559—will have decisive impact on recipients. All of them already know what our position is and why we [Page 121] hold it. We have considered various further approaches to LAs including suggestion Delga 560 and have concluded there is nothing further that cld usefully be done.
- (c)
- Pressure tactics undertaken on large scale may generate reverse effect. They may be resented as attempt restrict freedom of action small states at one of their most sensitive points, right to cast secret ballot in accordance with their own views on bloc representation. (While not agreeing, we believe many states sincere in their protestations that attempt cut down representation any bloc will ultimately endanger position their own.)
- (d)
- Moreover, other states will be unable understand why we make extraordinary efforts gain their support on an issue which does not seem to them of first rank substantive importance. In their view, presence or absence of Sov satellite to echo its master’s voice will not markedly affect functioning of SC. As we have observed, it is difficult convince others that presence of a satellite may on occasion rob us of crucial seventh vote on closely contested issues.
- (e)
- Failing to understand basis our anxiety, other states may regard our efforts as indication we do not feel secure in our leadership. This may affect their confidence in our judgment and, in some cases, may lead to attempts trade off support for Greece in exchange concessions from us on unrelated subjects. This we cld not permit.
5. Our conclusion is that we shld not make further extraordinary efforts pressure other states into support of Greece. We do not mean by this to imply you shld not follow line set forth in Delga 581, Dec 10, maintaining Dels strong support for Greece. However, if impasse continues through next balloting, we doubt desirability completely foreclosing possibility compromise candidate. We continue strongly to desire defeat of satellite and election of Greece, but are convinced that undue pressure tactics will at this stage push us past point of diminishing returns, considering our position in the largest sense.
- Repeated for information to London as 2873 and Athens as 2803.↩