795B.5/5–2851: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil

top secret

900. For Amb from Miller. If import FonMin comments re proposed trip to US Góes Monteiro1 is that decision and public announcement Braz troops Korea would be delayed until after trip,2 suggest you emphasize to Fontoura fol considerations:

Almost two months already elapsed since question first raised with Braz del here;
Several months will necessarily elapse after any decision sent troops before their actual participation Korea due to equipping, training and transport requirements;
US public, press, and Congress becoming increasingly critical disproportionate US share total UN responsibility in Korea. Specific ref made LA and it is anticipated this question will be raised in Congressional Comtes examining proposed Pt IV and mil aid proposals for LA in few weeks time;
In view foregoing, highly desirable this matter expedited fullest extent possible,3 and it is hoped recent UN successes Korea will improve atmosphere in Braz;
Not clear your communications that Vargas has adopted definite position this matter, and it is hoped therefore that you will have opportunity discuss matter with him personally.

  1. Gen. Pedro Aurélio Góes Monteiro, Chief of the General Staff, Brazilian Armed Forces.
  2. In telegram 1526, from Rio de Janeiro, May 24, 1951, Ambassador Johnson had reported that President Vargas had approved a trip to the United States by General Góes Monteiro, and that Foreign Minister Neves da Fontoura had “intimated main purpose Monteiro’s visit US wld be discuss ‘with Gen Marshall’ and high mil auths extent, nature and time Braz mil participation.” (795B.5/5–2451)
  3. In telegram 1558, from Rio de Janeiro, May 31, 1951, Ambassador Johnson stated in part the following: “I think it in our interest go slowly for short time, giving Fontoura full opportunity make his case with Pres in conjunction mil authorities, who already, according FonMin’s statements, support his thesis subject to prior assurance Braz’s internal security. … We have powerful leverages particularly in econ field which cld be called into play but wld be greatly our advantage for Vargas admin come to decision without any appearance pressure from US.” (795B.5/5–3151). In telegram 916, to Rio de Janeiro, June 1, 1951, the Secretary indicated that the Department agreed with the Ambassador’s views (795B.5/5–3151).