742.13/6–1251
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State
confidential
[Washington,] June 12, 1951.
Subject: Discussion with Canadian Minister for External
Affairs Pearson on June 13.
Mr. Pearson is leaving for England at the end of the week. He is to
receive an honorary degree at Oxford and also plans to see a number of
British and Western European officials while he is on his trip in
addition to taking a holiday. In view of the fact that he will be
talking to a number of Western Europeans, we think it is likely that he
intends to talk with you at dinner Wednesday1 largely on European
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questions in order to get the benefit of your
current thinking on these problems.2
Tab A3
contains a reference to the Far East and the U.N. which we recommend
that you raise with Mr. Pearson inasmuch as potential differences in
this area constitute, in our opinion, the only important source of
disagreement with Canada on foreign affairs.
Under Tab B4 is
included a list of some of the questions which Mr. Pearson may well
raise concerning our European policy. Since there are few points of
actual difference between the two countries with respect to European
policy, this list merely contains questions in which the Canadians have
shown considerable interest. The annex does not attempt to brief you on
these questions as they comprise our major European problems with which
you are familiar, and as the talk on both sides will almost certainly be
in the nature of an exchange of background views.
Tab C5 contains for
your background information certain observations with respect to the
present status of U.S.-Canadian relations in general.
[Annex]
Memorandum Prepared in the Department of
State
confidential
[Washington, June 12, 1951.]
Background Information Concerning Status of
United States-Canadian Relations
1. Attitudes in the Department of
External Affairs
Since the end of the war, many Canadian officials in the Department
of External Affairs have viewed the relative decline in British
economic and military power as an opportunity, and even as a
compulsion, for Canada to assume a new role of leadership in the
Commonwealth and in international organizations generally. These
officials, headed by Mr. Pearson himself, and Mr. Arnold Heeney, the
Under Secretary, and supported by many junior officers, now stress
the independence of Canada’s decisions in international matters and
her increasingly important role in multilateral negotiations. On the
reverse side of the coin, they have a tendency to play down the
effects of Canada’s bilateral ties with the U.S., to insist on the
inviolateness of Canadian
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territory and to become easily irritated over what they consider our
lack of appreciation of Canadian interests and views. This attitude,
while strongest in External Affairs, is not uncommon in Canadian
intellectual circles. It is responsible in some measure for the
importance which Canadian External Affairs officials attach to
problems with the United States, particularly in regard to
cooperation in joint defense projects. The tendency in External
Affairs to exaggerate the sensitivity of the Canadian public creates
difficulties and delays in the implementation of various defense
measures, even though the arrangements have been approved by the
Permanent Joint Board on Defense.
2. Pearson’s speech of April 10,
1951
In this speech, Mr. Pearson reflected clearly the attitude mentioned
above. He foresaw the end of relatively “easy and automatic
political relations” with the United States due to the growing
importance of multilateral contacts for both countries. The speech
generally emphasized the points of difference between the U.S. and
Canada rather than the points of agreement. Mr. Pearson has
attempted to explain the speech as a means of preparing Canadian
public opinion for feared further public differences with the United
States in the UN on the Far East. It
has caused some government officials in Canada, both in External
Affairs and in other Departments, to view questions with the U.S.
not simply as problems to which solutions should be found, but as
international incidents involving Canadian prestige. The
Department’s policy has been to ignore the speech completely, and,
by giving it little publicity, to contain its effects. It is
suggested that the Secretary treat the speech with a minimum of
comment.
3. Attitude of the Canadian Public
Towards the United States
The attitudes prevailing in External Affairs do not appear to be
shared to any appreciable extent by other Canadian Government
Departments or by the public at large. As has been the case for many
years, there does exist in Canada a moderate amount of feeling
against the United States compounded of frustration, envy, and fear
of absorption. There is little indication that this feeling is much
stronger now than previously. However, ill-considered criticisms of
United States policy by Canadian Government leaders and unfavorable
action by the Congress on the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power
Project,6
which has wide support among the Canadian people, could create in
Canada considerable public irritation against this country.
