Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

IO Files

Minutes of Forty-fifth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, January 16, 1952

Paris, January 16, 1952

secret
US/A/M(Chr)/232

[Here follows list of persons (42) present.]

1. South West Africa.

Mr. Taylor stated that Mr. Ross and Mr. Allen had talked with Mr. Jooste of South Africa on this subject which would be taken up in plenary on Friday, the 18th. The Secretariat had planned that only Committee Four Items would be considered at that meeting. Mr. Allen then recalled the previous Delegation decision to seek to dissuade the South Africans from attempting to put a resolution into the plenary which would seek to declare illegal the action of Committee Four in inviting the Hereros, He reported that considerable effort had been made along these lines, with results as outlined in Delgas 983 and 1035.¹

The latest proposal made by the South Africans, according to Mr. Allen, was that they approach Padilla Nervo, Assembly President, on the question whether their proposed resolution would be in order. If he thought it were not in order and if the US and other Western Powers would make speeches critical of Committee Four Action from which some sympathy for South Africa could be inferred, then South Africa might not have to introduce the resolution, Mr. Allen thought there were four questions which the Delegation would have to consider:

1. Should US Delegation vote for plenary discussion of the South West Africa item? (This was the Union’s wish.)

2. If Padilla Nervo privately should tell the South Africans he had doubts on whether the proposed resolution would be in order, could the US Delegation make a statement along the lines mentioned by the South Africans?

3. If the question were put to a vote whether or not the South African resolution was in order, which way should the US vote?

4. On the resolution itself, if it came to a vote, which way should the US vote?

Mr. Ross saw clearly that in view of our opposition to the proposed resolution itself, and because the South Africans were trying to find a way to satisfy both their home opinion and their instructions, they would certainly make a strong speech against the Committee 4 Action, even if the resolution were not put in by them. Mr. Jooste had understood we would still support the substantive resolution on South West Africa as passed by the Committee. Mr. Ross noted that South West Africa placed more importance on who supported them, rather than on how many, on the issue of the invitation to the Hereros. In addition, in a somewhat “blackmailing” manner, Mr. Jooste had put this matter in terms of South African support for the UN in general.

In regard to hearing Rev. Scott, Mr. Ross stated that he could not approve the general practice of inviting people to come to present their unofficial views to the UN. He saw this as an unhealthy development. He felt that the resolution on South West Africa was basically sound, but the procedural action taken in connection with it was “not so good”. On balance, he felt that if the US could “raise its eyebrows” at least, it would tend to help move things along.

At Ambassador Gross’ request, Mr. Allen read from Delga 908 the proposed draft resolution of the South African Delegation and in particular the operative paragraph which would find that Committee Four had exceeded its legal competence. Mr. Tate wanted it to be clear that the question was not one of the legality of Committee Four Action but whether we should say that its legal powers had been exercised unwisely. Mrs. Roosevelt recalled that the Delegation had previously decided that Committee Four action was legal. We were now discussing the question of how to approach the South Africans and how far we could go in stating that it was unwise for Committee Four to have taken the action it did. She noted that the South Africans had stressed, in their talks with her their participation in Korea. Mr. Ross said that Mr. Jooste had not mentioned this point.

The South Africans, Dr. Tobias felt had realized from their talks with Mr. Allen the lack of wisdom in their proposed move. Mrs. Roosevelt agreed that there was no sense in their proposal. Dr. Tobias said that that was the precise reason for not attempting to aid them in their present predicament. They had refused to conform with the mandate, or heed the opinion of the International Court of Justice to report on South West Africa, but they now asked us to support them on a technicality which “evades the moral issue involved” That, to Dr. Tobias, was the sum and substance of the whole question.

The world knew that South Africa was wrong, and would be weighing our every step. Particularly was this true of colonial peoples. The basic substance of the matter was that a state was suppressing ⅘ths of its population. South West Africa had been a League of Nations mandate to which the UN had indirectly fallen heir. South Africa asked that it be left alone to administer the area in accordance with its own principles which were based on disrespect for the human rights of ⅘ths of the population.

Admitting that not much could now be done, Dr. Tobias analyzed the present situation in South Africa, He said that if discrimination were based on ignorance, it could be removed by education and study. If it were based on poverty or uncleanliness, those too could be removed. But if discrimination were based on “what a person is as God made him, it is not removeable.” It would be a very dangerous thing to support any group basing its practices on a “God-made difference”. In contrast to South Africa, conditions in the US were improving. Discriminations were yielding. For this reason, Dr. Tobias had felt able to state to the Soviet Delegate in Committee that freedom must be for all or it was not freedom.

Stressing the importance of this question, he recalled that in 1946 he had spoken to President Truman after returning from Africa, and having just heard of lynchings in Georgia. He told the President that something must be done to protect US prestige. What the US had done in the past must not be undone. No technicalities should be supported which give comfort to those in a predicament resulting from a practice whereby the government had its “foot on the necks” of ⅘ths of the population. What would the US appear to be, he asked the Delegation, if it backed a group which had been “babyish” enough to walk out when it could not stand up and answer justified criticism. Concluding, Dr. Tobias stated that he opposed any proposal, regardless of his being the Committee Four Representative, that would have the US call Committee Four to task for having sought information from various sources. If the proposal were out of order, it could be called so. But complete suppression of a population could not be supported.

Mr. Allen observed that perhaps South Africa was not bluffing when they said that if something were not done they might leave the United Nations. He had been inclined in the past to regard this as “bluffing” on their part. Now he was not so sure they did not mean it. If they did, of course, they would be the first to withdraw, and would thereby set a dangerous precedent.

Ambassador Sayre thought that the US position was quite clear on this-question. The instructions were to vote against the proposed South African resolution in the Plenary. Everyone agreed to the wisdom of that course. He sincerely hoped that the issue would not be forced in the plenary so as to cause all the Fourth Committee, and the Plenary too, to stand in favor of the Committee’s prior action. For the US to oppose the invitation would put it in an untenable legal position. It would be very unwise to place the US on the “wrong side” in the bitter struggle now going on within the UN. The Latin Americans and Arabs were so inflamed on this matter that for the US to range itself on the South Africans’ side would be politically disastrous. If the resolution were introduced, the US should definitely vote against it.

Ambassador Sayre then read from Delga 890² and the reply thereto in Gadel 628³ which approved of the position taken by the Delegation. And in Deptel 145 to Pretoria,⁴ the Department had said that the US should oppose any resolution which purported to call the Committee Four action illegal. This left us no choice on the matter. We should do everything possible to prevent the introduction of the draft resolution, but vote against it if it were tabled. South Africa was a manifest wrong-doer and should keep quiet on this matter.

Senator Cooper noted that, as he had mentioned earlier, and also during the Fifth Session of the Assembly, when he had worked on the South West African problem, his views were thoroughly in accord with those of Dr. Tobias. Mr. McKay pointed out that on the South West African issue in Committee Four it was not only the Arab-Asian-Latin American group which pushed for the action taken by the Committee, but that countries like Norway, Sweden and Denmark had also supported this action. Norway and Sweden had in fact made statements in support of the hearings. With regard to the comment just made that the action of the Committee on South West Africa had been “excessive”, he thought this a matter of opinion. He would agree that the Committee action on other problems had been “excessive”, but on the South West Africa question this year he felt that the Committee had been less extreme than might have been expected. The main resolution had been moderately phrased, and the decision to hear the Herero spokesman, although impractical under normal circumstances, was admittedly legal and could perhaps be justified by the exceptional character of the South West African case.

Mr. McKeever thought that this was a good example of the kind of dilemma the US faced in the propaganda battle going on in the world. We forced ourselves into unclear, and complex positions. Such positions could never get into the headlines, which was what was effective in the propaganda battle. Long explanations of complicated positions were not read. If we intended to oppose the South African resolution, we should do just that and not be-cloud the issue with conditions and explanations.

Mr. Maffitt noted that the US had exercised a moderating influence which made it unpopular both with the NATO colonial powers and with the Latin Americans on the other side. This moderating influence could be lost however, by supporting the “oil-on-the-waters” scheme of Mr. Jooste. For this reason he opposed such a scheme. Such opposition would preserve our delicate balance. He further speculated that perhaps South Africa was provoking UN censure by its proposed move in order to pave the way with domestic opinion for withdrawing from the UN. If it wanted to withdraw, there was not much anyone could do.

Ambassador Jessup thought there was no serious question on the substance of the resolution: the US would of course oppose it. On the broader policy level, the question was how the US could most effectively benefit the people of South Africa on behalf of the freedoms enumerated by Dr. Tobias. He hoped the US could back up the people within the Union of South Africa who might be able to effect a change in present policies. On balance, as all these matters must be measured, Ambassador Jessup felt that we had reached a point where we could not do much along the latter lines. Therefore we should not make a statement along the lines requested by Jooste which would criticize the Fourth Committee action and thereby imply sympathy for South Africa. Miss Strauss agreed with Ambassador Jessup.

Mrs. Roosevelt said that there was no question of not voting against the resolution. We had tried to keep South Africa in the UN so they could feel the pressure of world public opinion as expressed through all the delegations. She felt we must honestly tell them that we would not make a speech as requested. If this were the consensus of the Delegation nothing further need be said.

Mr. Allen noted, not in opposition to the position of the Delegation as just stated by Mrs. Roosevelt, but in the hope of knowing the full decision of the Delegation, that all his original questions had not been fully answered. He favored voting for plenary discussion on the South West Africa item, even if it meant that the South Africans would be censured. He wondered how the Delegation should vote if the question were put on whether the South African resolution were in order. Mr. Sandifer read from Gadel 628 previously referred to by Ambassador Sayre, in which it was assumed that the resolution would be in order. He stressed the purely technical nature of such a vote. Mr. Tate also felt the resolution would be in order, as pertinent to the business under discussion. Mrs. Roosevelt said that the Delegation would vote for its being in order if put to a vote. On the resolution itself we Would vote against. Senator Cooper wondered what the implications would be if the only vote taken were on whether the resolution was in order and it were voted out of order with the US on the losing side. He felt that an explanation of vote would be necessary to make clear that the US position was based purely on the technical legal ground that such a resolution could be put, without in any way supporting the resolution itself. Dr. Tobias thought that this would be the case, and that such an explanation would be an excellent idea.⁵

Charles D. Cook

1. Classified Daily Telegram Summaries No. 52 and No. 55, respectively, January 12, 1952, 5 p. m., and January 16, 1952, 1 a. m. (320/1–1252, 320/1–1652), neither printed.
2. Dated January 6, p. 719.
3. Dated January 8, 1952, 3:43 p. m. (320/1–452)
4. Dated January 7, p. 720.
5. In Paris telegram Delga 1049, January 16, 1952, 5 p. m., the Department was advised of the Delegation’s decision at this meeting not to assist South Africa in the proposed resolution (320/1–1652).