310.2/12–2751
The Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Ambassador in Italy (Dunn)
Dear Jimmy: I have been waiting to answer your letter of December 27, 1951, concerning the Soviet resolution on membership, [Page 453] until the Security Council acted on this resolution. Since you have the telegram setting forth our position on the Soviet proposal and you have undoubtedly read a number of our statements on this matter, I will not go into too many details here. I would, nevertheless, like to review with you some of the considerations which led to our decision to oppose the Soviet “package deal”.
First, I would like to say that all of us constantly had in mind the importance, both to Italy and to ourselves, of Italian membership in the United Nations and the political significance of this matter within Italy. We fully realized, moreover, that the Soviet resolution offered the only present hope for Italy’s early admission, and that our opposition to the Soviet resolution might have unfortunate political repercussions in Italy.
At the same time, as you well know, there were other considerations which we had to weigh carefully. Since 1946 we have consistently taken the position that under the Charter each membership application should be considered separately on its merits. It has also been our position that in present circumstances the Soviet applicants are unqualified for membership. We believed that at this time the American people would support no other view, and I felt confident that failure on our part to oppose the Soviet resolution recommending the admission of the Soviet as well as non-Soviet candidates would be utterly incomprehensible to the American public, especially in view of the recent incident involving our fliers in Hungary.
We also had to take into account the possible outcome in the General Assembly if the Soviet resolution were approved by the Security Council. We were not certain that the General Assembly would refuse to admit the Soviet applicants, especially if the United States were to give its tacit approval to the Soviet resolution in the Security Council. Another real problem that we had to consider was the fact that the Soviet proposal omitted the Republic of Korea while including the Mongolian People’s Republic. Further, we realized that Security Council approval of the Soviet resolution would decrease our bargaining power regarding future applicants, like Japan, to whose admission we attach great importance.
Some members of the Department contended that the arguments against the Soviet resolution were so overriding that we should vote against it in any event, even if our negative vote constituted a veto. Those who supported this view believed that the policy we have reiterated in the past not to veto membership applications should apply to a vote on single applications only. At the same time, there were others who felt that the United States, if it opposed the Soviet proposal, might bear responsibility for killing the best hope for achieving Italy’s admission, and urge that we use no influence against the resolution and abstain if it should receive seven affirmative votes, [Page 454] explaining after the vote that we abstained because of our policy not to veto membership applications and stating clearly that we would oppose, in the General Assembly, the admission of applicants we consider unqualified.
The position which we finally decided upon—to oppose the resolution in the Security Council but not to veto—represented a middle course between these two positions. I myself believed that we had no other alternative than to oppose the Soviet resolution and to cast a negative vote if it received less than seven votes. However, I also thought that it would be most unfortunate if we should use our first veto to block a membership resolution, and while I was confident there was little or no likelihood the resolution would receive seven votes as long as we opposed, I agreed that we should abstain in the event we were faced with the veto problem.
Looking back at the situation now that the Security Council debate and vote has taken place, it would seem that regardless of our position, there was never too much likelihood that the resolution would receive seven votes. Furthermore, I think there is also the possibility that if there had been a chance that the resolution would pass, the Soviet Union might have itself blocked approval in the absence of a commitment from ourselves and others to agree to the admission of the Soviet candidates in the Assembly.
We all, of course, deeply regret the continued exclusion of Italy from the United Nations, and can well understand the bitter disappointment of the Italians over the failure of the Security Council to make a favorable recommendation. However, I hope their disappointment will not obscure the fact that the real blame for Italy’s exclusion lies in the arbitrary use of the veto by the Soviet Union rather than in the opposition of the United States and other Security Council members to the Soviet “package deal”.
My warmest regards to Mary and yourself.
Sincerely yours,