USUN Files
Memorandum by Mr. James N. Hyde, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly1
Subject: Italian Membership Application
We have raised with the State Department the question of whether we should not step in with a request for an advisory opinion in the Security Council should Quevedo be inclined to rule that a Soviet negative vote on Italy’s application is not a veto.
Vallat (UK Legal Adviser) and I feel that the question to the Court should be very carefully formulated. We are putting to the Court the question of interpreting Article 27 of the Charter and, therefore, interpreting the scope of the veto. In general, we will therefore want to phrase the question narrowly to avoid any attacks by individual judges on what we think to be the proper scope of the veto. Also, we want to phrase the question in such a way as to get favorable replies from our own point of view from a majority of the Court. In this connection, we can probably expect the Latin American judges to take a pretty strong line on limiting the veto. Of course, Judges Ugon and Rau may well disqualify themselves in this case.
From the point of view of narrowing the question down, it is of course better to frame the question in terms of the exact issue before the Court on the question of Italian membership. This is done in alternative a. On the other hand, there might be some tendency in the Court not to render an opinion on what would thus seem to be a purely political question.
Alternative b attempts to state the question precisely but in general terms, although not specifically mentioning Italy’s application. This is in line with the 1948 majority opinion of the Court which stated that an abstract statement of the question precludes a purely political interpretation of it so that the Court might properly render an opinion. The Court cited this language of the 1948 opinion at page 7 of its 1950 opinion, stating that when framed in abstract terms a request to the Court to undertake the interpretation of a Charter provision is essentially a judicial task to which one should not attribute a political character.
Both formulations of the question recognize that in the 1950 opinion the Court specifically pointed out that it was not deciding what the effect of a negative vote in the Security Council is. It was proceeding on the theory that the Security Council had decided that such a negative [Page 408] vote constitutes a veto. That very question which the Court purposely avoided is the precise one we wish to put before it here.
A separate tactical question in the Security Council arises about whether we would want to request an advisory opinion even if Quevedo assured us that he would rule a negative vote to be a veto. To request an advisory opinion in this situation would be to keep the question in suspense in the General Assembly in order to prevent the Latin Americans attempting to vote Italy in. However, before deciding this we would need to evaluate what the practical chances are of a two-thirds vote on such a proposition.