Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

320/12–651: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

Paris, December 6, 1951—1 p.m.

Delga 526. Re: Italian Membership—Tactics in SC. Further Delga 463,¹ Quevedo (Ecuador)² has raised with Gross question US attitude if as SC pres he shld rule that Sov negative vote on Ital membership application is not a legal veto, assuming that USSR rep rested his negative vote on grounds ICJ declared improper in 1948 opinion.

If Pres shld so rule, USSR might walk out of SC, which we do not consider likely, might challenge the ruling, or might declare ruling illegal. If there was a challenge, on legal grounds it wld be difficult for US not to vote with USSR to support it. Politically this wld be considered a vote against Italy and it is not certain that seven votes to over-rule the chair wld be forthcoming. Sitn has been tentatively discussed with Coulson (UK) who personally is sympathetic to fol analysis:

1. Itals regard GA action on Fourth Comite Res as “only the beginning”. Wide Latin Amer support exists for this view, led by Colombia, Peru, Argentina, Venezuela and Uruguay. This is basis pressure on Quevedo as SC Pres.

2. When application is put to vote in SC:

(a). USSR might vote in favor or abstain. We discount either possibility as most unlikely. Either wld lead to desirable result of Italy’s admission.

(b). USSR might vote against application giving no reason. Krylov³ in ‘48 ICJ dissent stated USSR might do this and that such a negative vote is not “subj to control”. It wld be most difficult for SC Pres to rule that Sov negative vote is illegal and not a veto if no reasons were given by USSR, which after the vote cld use device of explanation. We feel that if Pres attempts to rule such a vote with no previous explanation illegal, US shld not support it.

(c). USSR might cast negative vote on specific ground of art four (1) that Italy is not peace loving on account of NATO membership. Again it wld be difficult for Pres to rule this negative vote is not a veto and it wld be difficult for US to support such presidential ruling.

(d). Real problem wld be created for US by Sov negative vote in the language of Sov note of October 11 in reply to Tri declaration. This language was restated by USSR Rep in Fourth Comite debates, i.e., that it voted against Italy because of discrimination against Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

3. Possibility (d), and to a less degree (c), cld present US with a sitn where a presidential ruling that a Sov vote is illegal wld create serious and dangerous precedent.

(a). It has always been the position of US that vote on membership applications is a substantive matter. This was agreed among permanent members and by San Francisco Conf.⁴ Vandenberg res of June 11, 1948,⁵ in para 1, is based on this conclusion. Also 14 Sov negative votes treated by SC president as vetoes.

IC and GA consideration of veto recognized this fact with Argentina and several others dissenting.

(b). We have all recognized, however, that abuse of veto by USSR can be limited and have agreed to do so through double veto procedure in certain cases where the vote is on a question which the Charter of Part I of San Fran statement⁶ indicate is procedural in character. In doing so the risk was recognized of allowing a device which USSR unwittingly invoked in Czech case, of challenge of President’s ruling under SC rule 32, to be invoked to decide whether a question is substantive or procedural.⁷

(c). Quevedo’s suggestion, shared by Argentina and Peru, pushes this procedure a long step further by suggesting that on a vote admittedly on a substantive question the Chairman shall be given the power to determine the legality or illegality of the vote. The consequence of this is that any seven members of SC can decide on the legal consequences of a negative vote of a permanent member, i.e., whether or not it is a veto. It goes far beyond any step US has previously taken. In the present case, there is ICJ opinion of 1948 clearly relevant which wld give added color of legality to SC president’s position. It opens an entirely new approach to limitation of the veto.

(d). These legal considerations wld lead US to oppose such ruling by the chair. If made, we wld be in dilemma of having to vote to challenge it, thus admitting that it can stand unless challenged, or of denying right of Pres to rule and see decision stand. Also, we wld have polit opprobrium of having contributed by it to prevent Italy’s admission to UN.

In this connection, we do not attempt to evaluate possibility of Sov withdrawal from SC or UN on this issue, but we wld feel Sov attitude is more likely to be conditioned on over-all strategic considerations.

4. In the light of these considerations, we feel it important not to find ourselves in position described in two (c) and (d). Considering Latin Amer coolness toward our views and zeal for Ital membership, we recommend that US be prepared with proposal directly after SC vote and before ruling of Pres to refer to ICJ ques of legality of Sov vote and suspend ruling of Pres until advisory opinion is obtained on the question whether Ital application has or has not been recommended. There is likelihood that ICJ wld not entertain request regardless of how framed on grounds there is pending polit issue involved. On the other hand, we wld buy time by this tactic and also have some more legal basis for eventual action by SC. Of course, if USSR vetoed res to go to the court, GA cld request opinion.

Similar suggestion was made by UK and reported in USUN 380, September 26, and while Dept was then cool to idea (Deptel 177, October 4, to USUN) we request its reconsideration in preparation for SC consideration if USSR casts negative vote on improper theory of discrimination against other states.

Austin

1. December 1, not printed.
2. Antonio Quevedo of Ecuador was President of the Security Council during the month of December.
3. Sergei B. Krylov, eminent Soviet jurist and Soviet member of the International Court of Justice (in 1948).
4. For documentation regarding the Conference on International Organization, held at San Francisco, April 25–June 26, 1945, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. i, pp. 1 ff.
5. For text of the U.S. Senate resolution of June 11, 1948 reaffirming United States support of the United Nations (“the Vandenberg Resolution”), see Department of State Bulletin, June 18, 1948, p. 79.
6. For text of the Statement by the Delegations of the Four Sponsoring Governments on Voting Procedure in the Security Council, June 7, 1945, issued by the United ‘States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China; and subscribed to by the Delegation of France, see Department of State Bulletin, June 10, 1948, p. 1047. For documentation dealing in detail with U.S. policy regarding this pronouncement (known variously as the Four Power Statement, the Five Power Statement, the Declaration by the Four Sponsoring Governments, and the San Francisco Statement), see Foreign Relations, 1946, Vol. i, pp. 251 ff.
7. The “Czech case” involved changes in the representation of Czechoslovakia at the United Nations in March 1948, following the coup in Prague; for U.S. policy regarding this matter, see ibid., 1948, vol. i, Part 1, pp. 167 ff.