USUN Files
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James N. Hyde, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly
Subject: Italian Membership
Present: Count Guidotti, Italian Observer
Messrs. Vorys, Fisher,
Nolting, Hyde—US Delegation
Guidotti called at our request and went over all the familiar ground in arguing Italy’s case along the lines of the Italian aide-mémoire and de Gasperi letter.
He denied, although none of us had suggested it that Italy feels that the tripartite declaration commits us to an illegal course. In restating the entire argument of the Italian aide-mémoire, he stressed the fact that no “juridical way” can be found to obtain Italy’s admission, that action to circumvent the veto is necessary and he thought that such action had been agreed to in the light of the fact the last Soviet veto was illegal.
He went on to say that all that is necessary is a political decision and a political will on the part of the US, UK and France and from this will flow the necessary legal maneuvers which the Legal Advisers would then be instructed by the Foreign Ministers to provide. He thought his reading of the tripartite declaration was correct that it committed us to something more than the dead end of another veto or a propaganda debate in the Assembly.
Mr. Vorys commented that of course he understood that Italy wanted to come into the UN by any legal method we could discover but he felt Italy would not want to enter by the exercise of a power play in disregard of the very Charter under which Italy wanted to undertake obligations. Mr. Fisher commented that there is probably not so sharp a distinction between the legal and political aspects in that some political courses are not possible unless legal ways to accomplish them can be discovered. In other words, as Mr. Vorys added, it does not follow that where there is a will there is a way.
Guidotti went on to say that of course he was aware of what he termed the Anglo-French draft resolution. He had told Broustra that Italy would approve it and that he thought it was very good as far as it went in providing the frame into which a picture would later be placed. As Guidotti put it, after the application again goes to the SC, is vetoed and returned to the GA, he expected that the Assembly would then itself take action on the application. He had been surprised and disturbed when the French had told him on Nov 15 for the first time that the idea of a resolution taking the case to the SC is all that [Page 395] was intended. This put the procedure in a very different light. He had telegraphed his government for instructions. He had recommended Italy’s acceptance none the less of such a resolution, because he felt that Italy would have freedom of action in considering next steps. He expects a reply by Monday, November 19.
Mr. Vorys commented that he thought our thinking about a resolution sending the application to the SC was that it was the picture itself and not merely the frame. He added that it was rather a question of whether this course is what Italy wants and would help her, not a question of whether Italy would object or agree to it.
In response to our questions, Guidotti reacted strongly that of and by itself another trip to the SC would be extremely bad from the Italian point of view in that it is bound to result in a veto, probably based on the claim Italy is not peace loving because of her membership in NATO. He felt this would depress the just hopes of the Italian people which have been fed by the optimism of current newspaper articles. For his part, unless his government thought that a lot of noise was useful, he would prefer to see nothing done other than a general laudatory debate on Italy in the Assembly rather than undertaking this useless action.
Assuming, however, that we were to persist in this course, he pointed out that in the SC it would be possible for the President to rule that this is a procedural issue and in so doing he would act in accordance with the findings of the Interim Committee and thus avoid a Soviet veto. Hyde pointed out that neither the IC nor the GA had ever taken the position that a SC vote on membership is procedural. Guidotti also felt that the double veto technique might be used to support this tactic in the Council.
Then he went on to state the Italian thesis that since the 1949 Soviet veto is illegal, the GA might by a vote take Italy into the UN on the ground that there exists a recommendation of the SC, the Soviet negative vote being illegal. Mr. Vorys commented that he had very great difficulty with the concept of overlooking the need for a SC recommendation in the light of the two advisory opinions of the Court, particularly the 1950 one. He suggested that Italy would not want to put herself in the position of coming into the UN by a device which might be challenged as sound Charter interpretation. He asserted that we all have the strongest political will to see Italy a member. In this connection, speaking personally, Mr. Vorys wondered whether the Assembly might put to the ICJ for an advisory opinion the question of whether the Soviet vote in 1949 is a veto or an illegal vote in violation of the rule contained in the 1948 opinion of the Court. He thought this possibly might lay a foundation for improving Italy’s position and even a negative decision by the Court would not do any particular [Page 396] harm. Guidotti replied that he had never thought of this idea but off hand he was opposed to it and thought that it would be the final nail in the coffin.
Having pursued this line to the end, Guidotti then suggested that the SC might recommend every present and future applicant in sight and by a selective process let each applicant argue its case before the Assembly on the theory that the satellites could not possibly get a ⅔ vote. He added that he could see no moral difficulty with this, because some UN members are just as bad as some of the applicants. He had advised his government against urging this course, however, because he thought it would be politically impossible for the US. Mr. Vorys was glad Guidotti had urged his government against this course, because he could not see how we could possibly agree and it was hard for him to understand how Italy could want to enter the UN in the same category as various gangster states.
We then raised the possibility of participation without a vote in all the main committees and subcommittees of the GA. Mr. Nolting recalled that this question had been mentioned by the Secretary to Ambassador Quaroni earlier in the day. Guidotti’s reaction was definite and negative. He stated he could reject the idea without consulting his government further; it involved second class citizenship in the UN; it had been thoroughly discussed in Washington and his own experience in the Trusteeship Council showed that a state could have no prestige without a vote. He saw no useful purpose in preparing the suggestion in writing to be transmitted to the Foreign Office as Quaroni had suggested.
That brought him to the conclusion that he was very disappointed in what we had to offer, considering the language of the tripartite declaration and the statement in the acknowledgment of de Gasperi’s letter that the State Department appreciates the political problem present and the necessity for finding a solution. He added that he felt he saw strong sentiment in the GA not to allow the situation of “veto, veto, veto” to continue. Is it right, he inquired, for an ally in NATO to be separated from the majority of the other NATO members and prevented in the foreseeable future from any hope of UN admission? He had stated that the realization of this would be very difficult for his government but when Mr. Vorys asked a few questions about what the Italian domestic political problem was on this issue, Guidotti did not go into detail. As he left he said that he would be more discouraged but for the fact that the Italian position had been thoroughly rejected previously. We made it clear that our own thinking is all in the direction of trying to find a way to solve the problem, acting within the Charter and in accordance with Italy’s views.