UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, “Italian Membership”
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)1
Subject: Italy’s Membership in United Nations
| Participants: | Gastone Guidotti, Minister, Italian Embassy |
| Mario Luciolli, Counselor, Italian Embassy | |
| John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary, United Nations Affairs | |
| Joseph N. Greene, WE | |
| Paul B. Taylor—UNP |
When Prime Minister De Gasperi saw the Secretary he undertook to study carefully an aide-mémoire and memorandum which De Gasperi gave the Secretary, even though we had at that time given our preliminary reactions. The present conversation resulted from a message from Zoppi, through our Embassy at Rome, that he felt he had not presented the Italian proposals on membership adequately and would like Guidotti to discuss the matter further with me. Guidotti called last week on Mr. Ross and Mr. Hyde; through USUN I offered to see Guidotti here or in New York.
I began by reviewing the record of consideration of Italy’s membership application in the United Nations and I outlined the basic Charter difficulties which we see in the action which is suggested in the Italian aide-mémoire. I pointed out that in the Advisory Opinion of March 3, 1950 the International Court of Justice concluded that under the Charter, the General Assembly cannot admit a state to membership when the Security Council has made no recommendation for admission; and that while we certainly agree that the Soviet vetoes of Italy have not been based on Charter grounds it does not follow that an improper exercise of the veto right is null and void. Nor does it follow that the General Assembly can take action implying that these votes are ineffective—the idea that is at the basis of the Italian plan. I pointed out again that the USSR does not even need to give any reasons whatever for its veto; but the veto nevertheless is effective.
I outlined briefly the difficulties we see in the plan of Belaunde (Peru) to have applicant states submit proof of their qualifications and to provide for an Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice on the adequacy of these qualifications.
I then said that, desiring to do everything we possibly could to advance Italy’s membership, we were inclining toward consideration of Italy’s application by the Security Council as a special case during the period while the General Assembly is meeting in Paris. We would not, I said, take this action if Italy opposed it. I pointed out further that we were prepared to vote for an amendment of Article 86 of the Charter to give Italy voting rights in the Trusteeship Council, and to favor an arrangement for Italy’s participation without voting rights in the main committees of the Assembly, if the Italians desired these arrangements.
In the discussion that followed, Count Guidotti first emphasized very strongly his belief that the Soviet reply to the Tripartite Declaration had clearly excluded any possibility of a non-forcible method of securing Italy’s admission. He considered that the series of conditions set up by the Soviet Union went far beyond what had been offered before and amounted to blackmail against Italy and against the whole group of free nations. He said he was quite ready to admit that there was no juridical way which could be found to bring Italy in. It was, [Page 364] he said, a matter of “power”. Experts had worked on the problem for five years and had found no legal or procedural device to secure Italy’s admission. He argued that what was needed was a drastic “political will” which would create a juridical procedure.
Count Guidotti questioned the political desirability of raising the Italian application once more in the Security Council. In this connection and at various points throughout the conversation he argued that the Italian people expect that a substantial change in the situation would be brought about by the Tripartite Declaration. Everyone knows, he said, there is no clear juridical avenue to membership under present circumstances. What the Italians expect is the creation of something new, and the nature of what that new procedure could be is illustrated by our previous actions in the United Nations in the extension of the term of the Secretary General, in the resolution on Uniting for Peace, and in the developments on the veto. He feared that if it were once more demonstrated that the Western Powers were unable to secure Italy’s admission and that everything depended on the triumphant Soviet veto, the political effect in Italy would be very bad. However, he would report the matter carefully to his Government and let us know its views.
To Count Guidotti’s review of the previous instances in which the Charter had been “stretched” I pointed out—in addition to the usual arguments—that one difficulty about the membership problem is that there has been so much practice in the United Nations, including judicial opinion, during the past five years that a sudden reversal of this constitutional practice would be impossible. In closing I noted that Guidotti had not commented upon the suggestion that Italy be invited to take a seat in the main committees of the General Assembly, and said that I had assumed his omission of this had been intentional. Both he and Luciolli replied that when I mentioned it to Luciolli some months ago the response of the Italian Government on the matter had been negative and they believed it was still “90%” negative.
- Drafted by Paul B. Taylor of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.↩