310.2/9–2651: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

secret

380. Italy—UN membership. Coulson (UK)1 asked for a meeting with French, Canadian and US dels to continue subject of Italy’s membership in UN in light of FonOff instructions just received. He presented them as indicating FonOff desire to put forward Italian application in SC “to see what happens”. He requested French to sponsor Italian application, since this wld be difficult for UK considering commitments to Ceylon. Application wld be put forward separately as a special case and thereafter UK wld put forward Ceylon and other candidates.

FonOff legal adviser had suggested as possible tactic that in the light of ICJ advisory opinion that members are not entitled to attach conditions to membership other than those contained in Article 4, it cld be argued that Soviet negative vote in SC is illegal. Coulson commented that the Italians have made the same suggestion. Alternatively, president of SC cld refer case to ICJ to determine whether Soviet [Page 350] negative vote need be regarded as a veto. Coulson frankly stated his doubts about this tactic.

During subsequent discussion no conclusion or consensus was reached. Gross was not aware of nature of current conversations between De Gasperi and Secretary. However, he emphasized our obligation in light of tripartite declaration re peace treaty to make every effort on membership question. He thought it might well be desirable to take Italian application to SC even though a veto results and he did not foreclose further thinking about legal tactic suggested by Italians and FonOff. He realizes that previous precedents wld need to be carefully examined to see how SC president had ruled on Soviet negative votes on Italian application. He thought we might do something with article of Italian peace treaty dealing with membership. However, he recalled Tarchiani’s view that a veto might be disadvantageous to Italy as demonstrating Soviet strength and weakness of Italy’s friends. On this point Coulson commented that Guidotti feels that any effort is better than none.

An earlier suggestion of Gross that there be consultation with the Russians, preferably at a high level, at beginning of GA was sympathetically received by Lacoste (France),2 although not by Coulson. It was suggested by Coulson that Soviet objection and basis for new veto of Italian application wld be on theory that Italy is not a peace loving state in the light of current efforts to revise the peace treaty. By changing its position thus the Soviet Union wld avoid charge of illegal condition as a basis for its vote. Gross felt that if USSR were so to shift its position even though there were a veto it wld be propaganda defeat for USSR and a challenge to basic Italian foreign policy.

Lacoste saw the issue as whether we want to work with the USSR, in which case we must pay in some way for its support of application, or whether we want to fight them, in which case we wld be writing Article 4 out of the Charter. He felt that we cannot afford to sacrifice the principle that membership must be based on a recommendation of the SC in order to obtain Italy’s admission. For that reason, he liked Gross’ earlier suggestion for a consultation with the USSR and thought that it might be by one of us rather than a Big Five consultation. He and Gross agreed that even if consultation failed, it wld lay a better basis for us from propaganda point of view if USSR subsequently vetoed application. Coulson commented that the FonOff feels that such consultation wld not be worthwhile but personally he wld be willing to see French undertake it. Coulson also thought that approaching USSR on heels of tripartite declaration is unfortunate.

[Page 351]

George (Canada)3 quoted Pearson4 as recently favoring the universality principle by admitting all applicants with possible exception of Outer Mongolia. Canadian approach to UN is more and more to make it the universal organization and bridge between USSR and free world with controversial subjects between two groups handled in NATO. Coulson cld not see how we cld support Soviet candidates in light of Article 4 and Gross commented that really Canadian proposal was to amend Article 4.

Coulson thought taking Italian application to SC wld prevent movement in GA toward “half way house of associate membership” to which UK is much opposed unless possibly Italy wld indicate desire for such status. At the end of the above discussion there was no attempt to summarize or formulate agreed position since only UK had instructions.

Austin
  1. J. E. Coulson, British Minister, Permanent Delegation of the United Kingdom to the United Nations.
  2. Francis Lacoste, French Minister, Permanent Delegation of France to the United Nations.
  3. J. George, a staff member of the Permanent Delegation of Canada to the United Nations.
  4. Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs.