USUN Files
Department of State Position Paper, Prepared for Use in Conversations With the Italian Prime Minister (De Gasperi)
IPM D–5a
Admission of Italy Into UN
problem
The Italian Prime Minister would like to know the intentions of the United States concerning the question of Italy’s admission into the United Nations.
united states objective
That Italy be admitted into the United Nations as soon as possible.
probable position of the italians
The Italian Government and people are extremely anxious that Italy become a Member of the United Nations. In a number of instances Italian representatives have pressed us on this question, and have indicated their belief that some way could be found to interpret the Charter so as to make Italy’s admission possible despite the Soviet veto in the Security Council. In an Aide-Mémoire handed to the Secretary by the Italian Prime Minister at Ottawa, the Italian Government argues that, since the Soviet Union has never questioned Italy’s qualifications for membership, its vetoes of Security Council recommendations to admit Italy are null and void; and that the General Assembly should therefore disregard the Soviet vetoes and consider action to admit Italy to membership. In support of the suggestion, the Aide-Mémoire mentions the Uniting for Peace Resolution and the action of the General Assembly in November, 1950 in continuing Secretary General Lie in office as illustrations of how the veto has been circumvented through “liberal interpretation” of the Charter.
Short of membership, the Italians may desire that efforts be made to give Italy, as Administering Authority for the former Italian Somaliland, a vote in the Trusteeship Council. Italy now sits with the Trusteeship Council and participates without voting rights in all relevant work. The question of the full participation of Italy in the Council will arise at the next General Assembly session.
position to be presented
- 1.
- The United States has consistently and strongly supported the admission of Italy to the United Nations and will continue to do so. Our efforts, however, have always been blocked by the veto of the Soviet Union.
- 2.
- The suggestion in the Italian Aide-Mémoire is at variance with our understanding of the pertinent provisions of the United Nations Charter and we see basic difficulties in putting it into effect. However, we will study the Aide-Mémoire carefully and consult further with Italy and other interested countries, exploring all possible courses of action by which Italy’s admission might be achieved.
- 3.
- We would be prepared to propose reconsideration of Italy’s application by the Security Council provided this was felt to be a practicable step. We are consulting with other Governments on the advisability of such a proposal, notwithstanding the strong possibility that the reconsideration at this time would involve reconsideration of all the 14 pending applications, including the five Cominform applications (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Mongolian People’s Republic and Rumania), and result in the usual Soviet vetoes.
- 4.
- The United States could not accept any Soviet omnibus proposal under which, in return for the admission of the qualified applicants, we would vote for the Cominform applicants despite our strong objections to their admission based on the Charter.
- 5.
- As long as Italy is not a Member of the United Nations, the only legal way of granting Italy a vote in the Trusteeship Council would be to amend Article 86 of the Charter. The United States would be prepared to vote for an amendment giving Italy full voting rights in the Trusteeship Council if desired by the Italians. However, such an amendment seems to us impractical and unsatisfactory from the Italian point of view since the amendment process is cumbersome and is subject to the same disability as Italy’s admission because the amendment could not come into effect unless ratified by the Soviet Union.
- 6.
- There has also been some discussion of more limited arrangements such as participation by Italy without vote in the main committees of the General Assembly. We would favor such a move if Italy desired it. However, we have been given to understand that Italy is not interested in any such arrangement.
comment
The Aide-Mémoire handed by the Italian Prime Minister to the Secretary is a further indication that Italy’s interest lies only in admission to membership and not in some form of participation short of membership.
We see Charter difficulties in the suggestion contained in the Aide-Mémoire that the General Assembly proceed to act on Italy’s application despite the Soviet veto in the Security Council, difficulties which have led us to refrain from proposing anything along the lines suggested. In an advisory opinion rendered on March 3, 1950, the International Court of Justice concluded that under the Charter the General Assembly cannot admit a state to membership when the Security [Page 347] Council has made no recommendation for admission either because of the failure of a candidate to obtain the required majority or because of a veto of a permanent member. We agree with the Italians that the Soviet vetoes of Italy’s application have not been proper since they have not been based on Charter grounds. However, it does not follow (and despite a citation in the Aide-Mémoire to an earlier opinion of the International Court of Justice, the Court has never suggested) that an improper exercise of the veto right is, because of its impropriety, null and void as is argued in the Aide-Mémoire. Moreover, even if the Italian thesis were accepted, the Soviet Union could easily thwart the procedure suggested merely by raising the question of Italian membership in the Security Council, casting its veto, and this time offering “Charter” grounds as the reason.
The continuation in office of the Secretary General and the Uniting for Peace Resolution are not, in our opinion, analogous to the action suggested. In the first resolution, the General Assembly merely extended the term of Secretary General Lie and did not appoint him; a recommendation of the Security Council being necessary for an appointment but not for an extension of term. In the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the Assembly simply exerted its own powers in the field of the maintenance of international peace and security. Under the Charter, the Assembly can in proper circumstances make recommendations in this field independently even though the Charter gives primary responsibility in this regard to the Security Council.