UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237, “Italian
Membership”
The Italian Prime Minister (De Gasperi) to the Secretary of State
1
undated
[secret]
Aide-Mémoire
The Italian Government have always been of opinion that the steps they
have undertaken with a view to redressing the international position of
the country, when and where it was possible and proper to do so, so as
to eliminate the discriminations embodied in a peace treaty which was
imposed under political circumstances that no longer prevail, should
strive to achieve the three following major aims:
- 1—A declaration whereby it should be recognized that the
Preamble of the Treaty does not take into account the role
played by the Italian people and the Italian Government in
overthrowing Fascism and in taking part in the struggle against
the common foe.
- 2—The removal of the present limitations to Italian armaments
and production of war material. These limitations are
inconsistent
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with the
position of the country as a party to the North Atlantic Treaty
and bound, as such, to the obligations deriving
therefrom.
- 3—The admission of Italy to the United Nations in accordance
with the pledge undertaken by the signatories of the Treaty of
Peace.
The three points listed above relate to three different aspects of one
problem. It is only by realising these three aspirations as a whole that
the Italian Government feel they will have interpreted the deep and
unanimous desire of the Italian people.
It is useless to recall at this point that the admission of Italy to the
United Nations, as well as the admission of numerous other democratic
countries, has been blocked so far by the Soviet veto.
Though there is nothing that would give the Italian Government a greater
satisfaction than the simultaneous admission to the United Nations of
all the democratic countries which have been so far unjustly excluded
from it, they feel however that, from a technical standpoint, Italy’s
position is different from that of other countries.
The General Assembly, up to now, have shown a tendency to accept an
interpretation of Article 4 of the Charter in the sense that a
recommendation of the Council is an indispensable requirement for the
admission of new members. This interpretation of article 4, whatever one
may think of a text which is far from clear, was confirmed by an
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of the Hague,
rendered on the 3rd of March 1950. It should be borne in mind, however,
that, as generally admitted, a negative vote can be justified only when
specifically and exclusively based on the absence of the conditions set
forth in article 4. Any other reason would be invalid. This
interpretation has been confirmed by the International Court of Justice
of the Hague on the 28th of May 1948.
As far as the Italian position is concerned, the Soviet Delegate has
repeatedly admitted that Italy had a right to be a member of the United
Nations. While he never said this of any of the other countries, in the
case of a number of candidates he stated that, in his opinion, they did
not meet the conditions required by article 4. Therefore the veto of the
Soviet Delegate is, at least in the case of Italy’s admission, null and
void. It thus justifies an action on the part of the Assembly.
The precedents of the question, its juridical aspects and a plan to bring
about Italy’s admission to the United Nations are detailed in the
enclosed memorandum.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum on the Admission of Italy to the
United Nations
The constant opposition of the USSR from 1947 up to the present day
within the Security Council has barred Italy’s entrance to the
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United Nations. The
reasons they have advanced to justify their attitude were never
based on the established non-existence of the three fundamental
conditions indicated by article 4 of the Charter, but on political
grounds. The Soviet Delegation have in effect conditioned their
consent to the admission of Italy and of the other seven non
Communist candidates (Finland, Austria, Ireland, Portugal, Jordan,
Ceylon and Nepal) on the simultaneous admission of the five
communist candidates (Albania, Bulgaria, External Mongolia, Roumania
and Hungary).
The Italian case presents itself in a different light from that of
other countries. In comparing them, one has to bear in mind the two
following main factors: the first is the Soviet veto, and this is
common to all states which have so far been excluded from the United
Nations; the other is the explanation of the veto and this is
peculiar to the Italian case. While according to the current
interpretation (confirmed by an advisory opinion of the
International Court of the Hague of the 3rd of March 1950) the
admission of a new member is subject to the recommendation of the
Security Council in conformity with the rules that govern the voting
of that body (that is, a majority of seven votes including the
concurring votes of the five permanent members), there exists
another equally authentic interpretation (also confirmed by a
consultative opinion rendered by the same International Court on the
28th of May 1948), namely that a veto can be justified only by the
lack of one of the specific conditions indicated in article 4 of the
Charter. The opinion of the International Court reads as
follows:
“A member of the United Nations which is called upon, in virtue of
article 4 of the Charter, to pronounce itself by its vote either in
the Security Council or in the General Assembly on the admission of
a state to membership in the U.N., is not juridically entitled to
make its consent to the admission dependent on conditions not
expressly provided by paragraph 1 of the said article.”
It further affirms:
“A member of the Organization cannot, while it recognizes the
conditions set forth in that provision to be fulfilled by the
state concerned, subject its affirmative vote to the additional
condition that other states be admitted to membership in the
U.N. together with that state.”
The Italian position differs from the position of the seven other non
Communist candidates in that the Soviet Delegation has either never
expressed an opinion about them or has expressed an unfavourable one
in regard to the conditions listed in article 4. Whereas, in Italy’s
case, the Soviet Delegation never contended the (sic) she lacked those conditions to enter the United
Nations, On the contrary, the Delegation has repeatedly declared
that the Soviet Government was, on principle, favourable to Italy’s
admission.
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During the meeting of the 29th of September 1947 the Soviet Delegate
to the Security Council, Mr. Gromyko, declared:
“The Italian people and the Italian Government must know that the
USSR supports Italy’s request for admission into the U.N.
However, my Delegation considers that a favourable decision on
the Italian application can be taken only simultaneously with
favourable decisions in regard to the application of Bulgaria,
Finland, Hungary and Roumania.”
The same Mr. Gromyko, in the meeting of the 10th of April 1948 of the
Security Council said:
“Undoubtedly the Italians already know the attitude of the USSR
towards the question of the admission of Italy to the United
Nations. This attitude has been defined several times in the
past during the consideration of Italy’s application. I consider
it essential, however, to state that the Government of the USSR
is in favour of the admission of Italy to the United Nations,
but that my Government cannot agree that the admission of Italy
should be realized to the detriment of the legitimate rights of
several other states which are on exactly the same footing as
Italy.”
Lastly, the Soviet Delegate to the Trusteeship Council, Mr. Soldatov,
in the meeting that said organ held on the 23rd of February 1951,
and during which it discussed Italy’s participation to the Council,
declared:
“The United Kingdom Representative was incorrect in attributing
the fact that Italy have not been admitted to the United Nations
to the USSR veto. … This was in no way to be attributed to the
USSR, but rather to the Anglo-American Bloc.”
The situation afore described should be the basis of an action by the
Assembly in the aim of solving the problem of the admission of Italy
to the United Nations. The plan could be as follows:
- The General Assembly notes that Italy, by unanimous
recognition of the five permanent members of the Security
Council meets all the requirements specified in Article 4 of
the Charter; the same Assembly notes that the Soviet
Delegation, by opposing Italy’s admission, has violated the
rules of the Charter and has not taken into consideration
the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice
of the Hague of the 28th of May 1948; the same Assembly,
being the highest sovereign and deliberative organ of the
Organization and being the guardian of the Charter and of
the principles of the United Nations, cannot admit that this
protracted violation of the rules of the Charter by the USSR
in a field of capital and constitutional importance for the
Organization (such as the admission of new members) should
render inoperative one of the essential principles of the
Charter, namely that the Organization should be open to all
states possessing the prescribed conditions; the same
Assembly, in order to remedy the situation and to bring to
an end the violation, by the USSR, of the statutory rules,
decides to consider the application of Italy in a plenary
meeting with the object of deciding it by a two-third
majority vote.
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Obviously this action implies the existence, on the part of the three
powers, of a political will to surmount the stalemate caused by the
Soviet attitude. Indeed such a determination would constitute the
primary condition for the success of the plan. That this plan should
be feasible, provided the presence of the above condition, is proved
by a series of cases that present strong analogies with Italy’s case
and in which the Soviet veto was circumvented (enclosure A).
From what has been said, it is clear that the two necessary
conditions in order to get around the veto have been: on one side
the existence of a firm alignment of nations in favour of a free but
logical and constructive interpretation of the Charter and, on the
other, the clearly established illegal and continued failure of the
Security Council in discharging its responsibilities because of the
Soviet sabotage.
The second of these elements is obviously present in the case of
Italy’s admission. The first one certainly exists in a potential
stage. It could be reenforced and further extended through the
action of Italy’s friends in the UN.
Annex A
Previous Circumventions of the Veto
A) Reelection of the Secretary General—As it
is well known, according to article 97 of the Charter, the Secretary
General has to be elected by the General Assembly upon a
recommendation of the Security Council. This election, therefore,
follows a very similar procedure to the one provided for the
admission of new members to the U.N. This is made quite clear by the
following resolution adopted by the General Assembly during its
first session:
“… From the provisions of articles 18 and 27 of the Charter, it
is clear that, for the nomination of the Secretary General by
the Security Council, an affirmative vote of seven members,
including the concurring votes of the permanent members, is
required; and that for his appointment by the General Assembly,
a simple majority of the members of that body present and voting
is sufficient, unless the General Assembly itself decides that a
two-third majority is called for. The same rules apply to a
renewal of appointment as to an original appointment; this
should be made clear when the original appointment is made.
…”
Notwithstanding the very clear wording of the article of the Charter
and the authentic interpretation given to it by the Assembly, this
body, being confronted, on the 2nd of November 1950, by a report of
the Security Council in which it was stated that the Council had
been unable to agree on any name, adopted a resolution by which it
reelected for another three years (that is, for a shorter period of
time than the one envisaged by the Charter), Mr. Trygve Lie on whose
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name the Council was
unable to agree.2 It is
true that in this case it was a matter of confirming the same person
or of extending his term of office. Nevertheless the wording of the
proviso of the Charter was clear; it was also identical to the one
followed for the admission of new members to the United Nations. It
was necessary to make recourse to a liberal interpretation of the
Charter. In the case of Italy’s admission nothing else than this
would be necessary.
B) United action for peace (Acheson Plan)—During last November the General Assembly
adopted a resolution (United action for peace) whereby certain
functions with regard to the maintenance of peace and international
security which the Charter assigns to the Security Council were
transferred to the General Assembly.3 The
resolution provides that, should the Security Council fail to
discharge its functions, the Plenary Assembly can be convened in
extraordinary session upon request of any seven members of the
Security Council or of a simple majority of the General Assembly or
of the Interim Committee in order to investigate a threat to
international peace or an act of aggression, and recognizes to the
same Assembly the power of recommending to its members the adoption
of collective measures. The communist delegations, who also on this
occasion upheld the rigid interpretation of the letter of the
Charter, argued that paragraph 2 of article 11 ruled out the
possibility of attributing these powers to the General Assembly in
so far as said paragraph reads:
“The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security … but any such
question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the
Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after
discussion.”
The United Kingdom’s delegate, in defending the resolution, pointed
out that the General Assembly, in accordance with Article 10 of the
Charter (“the General Assembly may discuss any questions or any
matters within the scope of the present Charter …”), has an
unlimited power to examine, discuss and make recommendations on all
subjects, and affirmed that if the Security Council was not carrying
out the functions it is entrusted with in a primary but not
exclusive way by article 24 (“the members of the U.N. confer on the
Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance …”), the
limitation provided for by article 11 paragraph 2 to the powers of
the General Assembly should not be applied.
The resolution “United action for peace” has been approved by the
General Assembly against the sole opposition of the five communist
Delegations.
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C) Sanctions against China—Similar discussions
took place during the month of May on the occasion of the approval
by the General Assembly of collective sanctions against communist
China and North Korea.4 This matter also,
insofar as it entails action, should have been referred to the
Security Council in strict accordance to article 11 paragraph 2 of
the Charter.
D) The meaning of abstention or of absence of a
permanent member of the Security Council—Again in order to
circumvent the veto, the Security Council has followed the praxis of
considering the abstention from voting of a permanent member or the
absence of the same from the Security Council as insufficient for
blocking a decision or a recommendation of the Council; this
certainly represents a free interpretation of article 27, which, in
paragraph 3, provides that all decisions not having a procedural
character, should be made “by a affirmative vote of seven members
including the concurring votes of the permanent members.”
