Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

IO Files

Minutes of Third Meeting of the United States Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly, Paris, November 3, 1951¹

Paris, November 3, 1951

secret
US/A/M (Chr)/190

[Here follow list of persons (42) present and discussion of a prior agenda item.]

2. Chinese Representation

Mr. Taylor said that this matter was certain to arise on Tuesday² afternoon either by way of specific proposals or on points of order. The Russians would probably spring the matter just after the speeches by French President Auriol and GA President Entezam. The delegation was checking with Cordier³ in the SYG’s office as to any communications from Chou En-Lai⁴ and the Chinese Communists.

Mr. Taylor recalled the short history of the Rau committee on Chinese Representation and how it had died with the fifth GA, the Nationalists having been seated provisionally throughout the course of that session. It was understood that the matter was not to be raised on Monday at the closing meeting of the fifth session, but no guarantee of this could be given.

The moratorium agreement, worked out with the British, to have any proposals sidetracked by postponing consideration of the matter, was outlined by Mr. Taylor. The device was simple and had worked well in some forty-odd separate cases. The US or a friendly power would move postponement. The UK would make a statement in support. The US would then state that the effect of this motion would be to seat the Nationalists. The moratorium had worked well in the past, and permitted the issue to be dealt with and shelved completely for the duration of whatever session of whichever body was considering it.

Mr. Taylor reported that it would be hard for Entezam to rule the cloture of the debate after a Russian proposal had been made. Therefore, the US was proposing alternatives to the UK to deal with the matter with the least possible difficulty. The result of both of them would be to take care of the Chinese Representation problem for the duration of the sixth Assembly. The UK, however, objected to the reference in our scheme to talk of “duration” and also to mentioning the effect of the resolution, therein, of seating the Nationalists. They had indicated their dislike of foreclosing this issue once and for all for the sixth session. The implication behind this attitude seemed to be that if an armistice were reached in Korea, they would wish to recondsider their position. The UK seemed to prefer returning to the old simple formula. If we should accept this, it was pointed out, it would be absolutely essential to have it understood that the Nationalists would be seated and that this arrangement would last throughout the whole of the sixth session.

The Secretary said that if, after considering both alternatives, Eden did not like either one of them, it would be necessary to concert on language which would have the effect of seating the Nationalists provisionally, although from a public relations point of view this would be less desirable. Mr. Taylor said that the working arrangements we have had with the UK went farther than the exchange of notes with British Foreign Minister Morrison would seem to indicate. The difficulty for the British in the past with reference to talk of “duration” had been that this beclouded the issue with the ticklish problem of defining when a period of hostilities had ended. Ambassador Austin recalled how easily the old arrangement had worked in the Headquarters Advisory Committee of which he had been chairman since its inception. A simple rule that the matter was out of order had always sufficed. If this had been challenged, it had been put to the vote immediately, and had always been sustained.

Ambassador Gross reported that Entezam had agreed to apply Rule 75 if a USSR motion to seat the Communists or unseat the Nationalists should be followed by a motion by the US or a friendly power to postpone debate thereon. In his opinion this would be a priority motion. Entezam was not so certain, however, that it would be proper if it contained words that this postponement was for a certain duration. He did not consider Rules 75 and 78 applicable to our alternatives A and B, which were, in his opinion, non-procedural motions.

Mr. Sandifer¹ answered Ambassador Austin’s question as to what the exact objective of the Department was in this regard by saying that we preferred to settle the matter by one action for the entire session. The UK, on the other hand, wanted to keep it a more open question. If there were to be an armistice, it would be much harder to deal with on a second time around. The Department felt a proper Interval should follow an armistice before the General Assembly could appropriately even consider the question of Chinese Representation. If the matter were dealt with by our alternatives A or B, it would take a two-thirds vote to reopen the question, a course which would be very difficult for the proponents of the Chinese Communists.

Ambassador Austin wondered how expedient our approach was. Mr. Sandifer replied that it might be possible to get the UK to agree, and that in any case we should push them very hard on this matter. The Secretary would see Eden and attempt to persuade him of our correctness in the matter. Assuming for the sake of argument that the UK did not agree to A or B, we should try to work out language which would omit the idea that the Assembly’s action was only temporary. This would be feasible only to the extent that it was made crystal clear that the Nationalists are to be seated with full rights for the session, so that the Credentials Committee’s report to the Plenary would not precipitate another big debate. The Secretary would undertake to use all his persuasive powers with Eden to gain acceptance of A or B, and if that attempt failed, then to get agreement on a postponement formula which would assure seating the Nationalists. This would not give any trouble in the Credentials Committee since it was pretty well understood that the functions of that group were only clerical; that is, to look at the credentials and see that no forgeries were being perpetrated upon the UN.

In suggesting a way to support the Secretary’s arguments with Eden, Mr. Nolting offered the idea that when the chips were finally down the UK would only get some seventeen votes. Thus for the UK to insist on their point of view would yield them no advantage. They were certain to lose on the vote, and the only result would be to publicize the split between us. In answer to this Mr. Sandifer said that there would be many Members who would prefer the simple UK formula, in that the acceptance of it really meant taking no position on the substance of the matter. The Secretary was inclined to agree that if the choice were put to the Assembly of a USSR motion, US alternatives A or B, or the UK formula, the last would gain the most adherents. Mr. Sandifer agreed with this estimate of the situation and said it was for this reason that we must try to get our idea accepted in place of the UK’s, so that theirs would not be offered to the Assembly. Ambassador Gross said the split would involve more than just the western world. The Arab and Eastern states, too, would be split among themselves, and the issue in many countries would require a cabinet decision to resolve it. The choice was between risking precipitating an inevitable debate, and obtaining the advantage of quick action. In some forty cases the Soviets had subsided on this matter once it had been put out of the way via the moratorium procedure. There would still be the chance that they might harass the Assembly continually on this matter.

The Secretary wondered if the delegation agreed that he should try to get Eden to agree to alternative A or B. Mr. Fisher said that the advantage of either alternative would be to clear the air after the matter was settled, since regardless of how the matter came up the Soviets would pull a big debate by some ruse or other. To settle it finally would serve well the purpose of stopping the flow after the initial onslaught. It was decided that the Secretary would approach Eden on A and B to seek his agreement. It was further decided that, if Eden would not agree to A or B, the US would not attempt to go it alone. As Ambassador Austin put it, the US, in the exercise of its great leadership in the international community today, must have somebody to lead. It can’t carry the flag so far ahead of the parade that no parade follows.

In response to various questions, the Secretary said that it was generally believed that a motion to postpone the matter for the duration of the sixth session would obtain sufficient votes. The view was expressed by Ambassadors Austin, Gross, and Sayre that it was unwise to engage the US prestige on this matter, to upset a none-too-steady applecart, or to evoke emotional reactions.

It was decided that if Eden would not accept either alternative, we would seek to get his agreement on a formula something like the moratorium agreement, but with the added assurance that the postponement would last for the sixth session’s stay in Paris and would keep the Nationalists in their seat.

Miss Bacon suggested that the reason behind the UK unwillingness as apparently indicated by the discussion could spring from a desire to bring the Communists into the UN for substantive discussions on the armistice terms.

Charles D. Cook

1. For information regarding the composition and organization of the United States Delegation, see pp. 2–10 and 37–44.
2. November 6.
3. Andrew W. Cordier, Executive Assistant to Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations.
4. Premier of the Government Administration Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China.
1. Durward V. Sandifer was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs and one of two Senior Advisers to the United States Delegation (the other was John C. Ross, Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council).