310.393/2–2851
The British Embassy to the Department of State 1
Copy of Message From Mr. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks2
In my absence Mr. Younger saw the United States Ambassador on 23rd February and explained to him why we felt that it is unlikely that any procedural method can be found to bridge the gap which exists between the United States and the United Kingdom attitudes on the question of Chinese representation.
It should be said at the outset that the latest information which we have received from our representative at Lahore leads us to believe that there will in all probability be a majority in the E.C.A.F.E. in favour of ruling out of order or of postponing a decision on any Soviet resolution directed towards securing the presentation of the Central People’s Government. The United Kingdom vote is therefore considered unlikely to be crucial on this occasion.
For a proper appreciation of the reasons which have led us to the conclusion that no procedural method can be found of bridging our differences in the Commission it is essential to know and understand the principles upon which our whole policy towards the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations is based, and it is therefore proposed to restate them briefly here. As Mr. Acheson said in his message, this problem is not limited to the E.C.A.F.E. but will arise repeatedly in other bodies in the near future.
Our attitude on this question is as follows. Although it has political implications the question of Chinese representation remains in our [Page 238] view in essence and in form a question of credentials. Certain organs of the United Nations appear from their constitutions and rules of procedure to be competent to decide for themselves on questions of this sort. These include the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, the Specialized Agencies, the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund and the E.C.A.F.E. Other, subsidiary bodies (committees etc.) do not appear to have this power and should therefore properly await the decision of the appropriate parent body. The Committee on Disarmament is an example of a subsidiary body of this sort and it was for this reason that the United Kingdom representative voted on the same side as the United States representative when the Soviet delegate attempted to raise the question of Chinese representation in this body on 14th February.
It will be clear from the above that we do not consider that there is any legal justification for the view that the decision of the General Assembly in this matter can bind the other competent organs. We made this clear in the course of the debate on the recognition of the representation of a member state and we voted against the Assembly resolution of 14th December because we could not agree with the assumptions upon which it appeared to be based. Even so it will be recalled that resolution does no more than recommend “that the attitude adopted by the General Assembly or its Interim Committee concerning any such question should be taken into account in other organs of the United Nations and in the Specialised Agencies”. The weight which any competent organ decides to give to the attitude of the Assembly appears to us to be entirely for that organ to decide in the normal way by a majority vote and the United Kingdom vote is cast in accordance with the view that a competent organ should take its own decision regardless of whether or not the Assembly has taken up an unequivocal attitude for itself. It was for this reason that we would now find it necessary to oppose any move to postpone the decision in E.C.A.F.E. on the lines, for example, of the Thai amendment adopted last year and were therefore unable to fall in with the United States suggestion that we might abstain on such a motion.
Your3 message referred also to the Assembly resolution of 1st February which, inter alia, condemned the aggressive activities of the Central People’s Government in Korea. In adopting that resolution the General Assembly has expressed very properly a moral condemnation upon the action of that government. But that does not in our view alter the fact that that government is in substantial control of China. As you4 are aware we consider the recognition of a government [Page 239] involves no more than the recognition of a state of fact and it was for this reason that we accorded recognition to the Central People’s Government of China when it became clear to us that they were in fact the controlling Government of China, In our view similar considerations should govern the question of representation of member states in the United Nations. The present case is not one of admitting to the United Nations a new member (in which event the qualifications laid down in Article 4 (1) of the Charter would have to be fulfilled). The State of China has always been a member of the United Nations and is moreover specifically mentioned in the Charter as a permanent member of the Security Council. That being so it seems to us that the only relevant consideration in this context is which government is in fact in a position to represent the State of China and to carry out so far as China is concerned the decisions arrived at in the United Nations. Moral considerations seem to us to be irrelevant in this context. After all we regard with abhorrence many of the activities of the Soviet Government, but we do not for that reason attempt to exclude its representatives from the United Nations.
On a purely political plane we feel that there is everything to be gained by our not allowing this question of Chinese representation to be magnified beyond reasonable proportions. If a satisfactory peaceful solution is to be found in Korea it must surely involve an attempt to reach also satisfactory solutions with regard to other outstanding problems foremost among which will be the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. The more firmly the United Nations commits itself to the line that the representation of the People’s Government is a matter in which great moral issues are involved, the greater is the likelihood that the eventual solution of the problem in a sense satisfactory to the People’s Government will appear in the eyes of the world to be a concession on the part of the United Nations. Our own attitude would be that no concession is involved since each member state is entitled as of right to be represented in the United Nations by the government which is in a position to speak for it.
It is hoped that the foregoing will make plain the attitude of His Majesty’s Government in this matter. This attitude has been publicly announced on several occasions and it receives by and large the support of public opinion in this country, both in Parliament and outside. It is therefore hoped that it will be appreciated why we are led to the conclusion that it would be impossible radically to alter this attitude without compromising principles which we have frequently affirmed. This question was discussed during Mr. Attlee’s visit to Washington last year and our two governments agreed to differ. We were also equally determined to prevent these differences of view from interfering with our united effort in support of our common objectives.
[Page 240]It is widely known that a difference of view exists between our two governments on the question of Chinese representation and that this reflects similar differences of opinion honestly held by several member states of the United Nations. The United Nations is itself based on democratic principles and on the respect for majority decisions. We do not complain that a majority has, in most organs of the United Nations, not yet seen fit to endorse our own view on this subject. Similarly the United States representative has, it is understood, announced that his government will abide by any majority decision which may eventually be taken in the Security Council on this question and will not wish to exercise the right of veto. If a similarly dispassionate treatment of this question could be evolved in every organ in which the question is raised it is our belief that the question would cease to provide opportunities for those who would rejoice to see a serious divergence between United States and United Kingdom policies. Treated in this way the question could be raised and disposed of on its merits without engendering excessive political or emotional heat. While the Central People’s Government persist in their present deplorable behaviour it is likely that those member states to whom behaviour is a criterion of recognition will maintain their opposition to the change in Chinese representation, and it is therefore unlikely that our view, based on the criterion of effective control, will be shared, in most organs, by the majority of members. We should be prepared to accept this situation while it lasts, provided that we are not ourselves expected to contribute to its prolongation by any action involving a sacrifice of principle. We will certainly abide by the majority view in each competent organ.
It is therefore suggested that our respective delegations might with advantage be instructed to approach the problem in this spirit in an effort to minimize the harm which might otherwise result from this difference of view which we both frankly acknowledge and which we are both determined to render as innocuous as possible.
- Delivered to the Department of State by the Counselor of the British Embassy (Tomlinson) on February 28. Repeated to the London Embassy in airgram A–1544, March 2 (310.393/3–251).↩
- A marginal notation on the source text reads: “See subsequent corrected draft of this message.” This refers to an “Amended Copy” of the Bevin message, which the British Embassy dated March 5 (340.290/3–551). The amended text was identical with the original except for two stylistic changes which are indicated in footnotes 3 and 4 below.↩
- In the amended March 5 text, the word “Your” was replaced by “Mr. Acheson’s”.↩
- In the March 5 communication the words “As the United States Government” were substituted for the words “as you”.↩