357.AB/12–1550

Memorandum for the Secretary of State, Prepared in the Office of South Asian Affairs1

confidential

Kashmir

problem

Pending Security Council Action on Kashmir.

discussion

The members of the Security Council are so engaged in the Korean issue that it appears untimely for the Security Council to take up Kashmir in December. India favors delay in the Security Council and has given its approval to a move by Sheikh Abdullah to set up electoral rolls for a Kashmir Constituent Assembly. Such a body would most likely provide by unilateral action the semblance of popular support for the entire State’s accession to India. On December 14 the Pakistan Foreign Minister (Sir Zafrulla) addressed a letter (Tab A)2 to the President of the Security Council formally protesting this Indian-supported action and stating it was a violation of the January 5, 1949 Security Council Resolution agreed to by both parties. The United States, while recognizing the Korean issue as a justifiable cause for delay, appreciates Pakistan’s great concern and is desirous of obtaining action in the Security Council at the earliest opportunity, consistent with developments with respect to Korea.

The UK and US Delegations have drafted a resolution (Tab B)3 which (1) deals with the Sheikh Abdullah’s move and, (2) proposes that the Security Council appoint a prominent jurist to interpret earlier Security Council resolutions, determine wherein the countries have failed in implementing them, and recommend what remains for each country to do. London does not favor inclusion of both items in a single resolution and has proposed that they be treated separately, [Page 1442] agreeing to co-sponsor the latter proposal, but refusing to co-sponsor the former as it implies criticism of the Indian action. Likewise, the UK opposes hearings until late January or early February, after the meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London.

recommendations

1.
Should Mr. Bevin raise the Kashmir issue4 it is recommended that you state the Department believes a single resolution is preferable because:
(a)
A single resolution would be somewhat less objectionable to the Government of India because the implied condemnation aspect of the clauses regarding the Kashmir National Conference activity would be combined with specific recommendations for advancing the settlement of the Kashmir issue.
(b)
A separate resolution covering only the Kashmir National Conference which the UK did not sponsor, and which the US consequently would not sponsor, would have the effect of undermining the resolution and of further encouraging the Government of India to move ahead with plans for a Constituent Assembly and the absorption of the State.
2.
You also might wish to say that further delay on the part of the Security Council beyond the present timetable suggested by the UK of late January or early February would be a matter of considerable concern to us.
  1. Prepared by T. W. Simons and F. D. Collins.
  2. Not printed. The letter, referring to the Kashmir National Conference resolution of October 27, was printed as Security Council Document S/1942. It was tabled and discussed in the 532d meeting of the Security Council on February 21, 1951; see Security Council Official Records, Sixth Year, 532d Meeting.
  3. Not printed. The work on this resolution was not carried through to completion.
  4. Reference here is to Bevin’s scheduled participation in the December Foreign Ministers gathering in Brussels for a North Atlantic Treaty meeting. Documentation on the NATO meeting is printed in volume iii .