Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

357.AB/12–2050: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

confidential
priority

London, December 20, 1950—6 p. m.

3558. In absence Scott and Murray¹ (who are on leave), we saw Lloyd and Olver² today on Department’s 3110, December 19.³ In response, Lloyd informed us present UK intention is to send telegrams to Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers informing them of UK willingness for whole range Indian-Pakistani problems, including Kashmir, to be explored behind scenes during Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ conference in January within context Communist threat to Asia and with UK in informal mediatory role. Message would make clear UK would not consider such efforts as substitute for SC action but as part of whole effort resolve differences. Final decision on messages will be taken tomorrow in meeting Attlee, Bevin and Gordon-Walker.⁴

Lloyd said latest messages from Karachi indicated GOP now quite anxious have Kashmir problem aired at Commonwealth conference. Lloyd and Olver believed, and they were confident Ministers would concur, that any action by SC would be interpreted by Nehru as attempt put pressure on him and could only be prejudicial to talks on Indian-Pakistani matters at time Commonwealth meetings. They were sure UK could not sponsor any such proposals as suggested by Department and said that if they were taken up by SO, UK would undoubtedly feel it necessary take most neutral position possible towards them.

In view UK’s probable decision tackle Kashmir during Prime Ministers’ meeting in serious effort now foreshadowed in message to two Prime Ministers, they wondered if Department would still consider action suggested reftel necessary or desirable. They did not think it would be desirable hold up UK’s messages to Liaquat and Nehru and did not think such action material to Department’s proposal since in any event UK had already made up its mind to try to have India and Pakistan discuss differences during Commonwealth meeting. Lloyd thought that with Attlee, Bevin and Gordon-Walker working on two Prime Ministers there was more than 50–50 chance that Indian-Pakistani atmosphere could be improved.

We promised relay foregoing information to Department at once and again emphasized, as we had at beginning conversation, that reason why Department thought early SC action necessary was fear that unrest over Kashmir and Pakistan was reaching critical stage, Lloyd and Olver made quite clear that FonOff and CRO did not attribute same degree of seriousness to agitation in Pakistan. They said that FonOff naturally quite concerned about Liaquat’s attitude in matter, but did not consider that public unrest in Pakistan was in any sense at point of crisis. They discounted tale [talk] of Jehad, saying such talk endemic in Pakistan and while perhaps more serious in tone at moment than hitherto, they wondered whether GOP leaders might not be stimulating agitation to gain better bargaining position in negotiations. As evidence Pakistan prepared wait until after Prime Ministers’ meeting for further SC action, they cited Mohammed Ali’s statement to the press on arrival in Karachi that SC would not take up Kashmir problem again until after Commonwealth meeting.

In short, (a) UK seems clearly have no fear that seriousness of situation in Pakistan has reached point where action in SC of even limited nature Department proposes is necessary; and (b) it would consider that this or any other action by SC now would only be harmful, and perhaps seriously so, to efforts now proposed here during Prime Ministers’ meeting.

Would appreciate Department’s early reaction to foregoing.⁵

Sent Department 3558; repeated information Karachi 34, New Delhi 89; Department pass USUN 55.

Holmes

1. Robert H. Scott and James D. Murray, Superintending Under Secretary and Head, respectively, of the Southeast Asia Department, British Foreign Office.
2. John O. Lloyd, Assistant, Southeast Asia Department, and Stephen J. L. Olver. Officer for India, Pakistan, French and Portuguese India, and Ceylon, Southeast Asia Department, British Foreign Office.
3. Telegram 3110 to London, not printed, referred to Pakistan’s dissatisfaction with the Security Council’s, failure to solve the Kashmir problem (790C.00/12–1850).
4. Patrick C. Gordon-Walker, British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.
5. Telegram 986 from New York, December 21, not printed, stated that in view of the British inability, as reported in telegram 3558, to associate itself at this time with any Security Council action deprecating the Kashmir national conference resolution, USUN felt the choice of whether there should be a Security Council meeting on Kashmir before mid-January should be left strictly up to the British (357.AB/12–2150). Telegram 3140 to London, December 22, not printed, said that the Department agreed with the UK position expressed in telegram 3558 and was hopeful that every effort would be made at the Commonwealth Conference to make progress on the Kashmir problem (357.AB/12–2050).