740.5/7–2850: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State
priority
Depto 18. No distribution except as directed by Secretary’s office. Alphand called on me this morning1 at his request and, referring to Ambassador Bruce’s communication of the US Government’s proposal last week,2 stated that Prime Minister Pleven had instructed him to communicate to me the French Government’s attitude as to certain important principles relevant to the present situation.
He began by referring to our commonly agreed objective of building strength to prevent war and added that in the event of war we were united to win.
He stated that it was the French Government’s conviction that it was essential to agree on what is to be defended. Was it to be Elbe? Was it to be area between Elbe and Rhine? Was it to be a beachhead in Brittany, defense of Spain and North Africa or defense of British Isles? French Government was clear that defense must be as far east as possible. French Government found it necessary to insist all agree where line of defense should be drawn. He thought that this question had perhaps not been presented to US in this manner before.
Western Europe itself must be defended and under this principle French Government felt it necessary that actions be taken now to insure initial defense would be successful. This meant additional American and British forces must be sent to Germany to be available along with additional French forces which would be raised. Defense of Western Europe could not be effected unless American and British troops were actually there to help meet initial shock. It would be to no avail if these forces were to be sent after initial attack, because there would be nothing to defend. And, of course, forces in being and on spot would have to be reinforced in order successfully to win the battle.
Lesson of Korea was clear in minds of all Frenchmen and Prime Minister felt it absolutely essential he be able give assurances to French people with regard to aforementioned basic principles, if he [Page 149] was to be justified in calling for the additional effort and sacrifices that would be necessary.
Alphand referred to Council’s resolution adopted in May (Council resolution 4/8)3 and said French Government was convinced of necessity for listing equipment which had to be produced, for allocating production of this equipment and for dividing cost of its production. He stated it was essential to abandon perfection and take steps immediately to increase defense strength. His government proposed that initial list be made and quantities determined of those essential items of armament which had to be produced right away. Anything produced now would fall within confines of whatever plans were developed. Work must be undertaken immediately to produce essential armaments necessary to conduct initial defense. This must not be delayed because of unfinished plans as to what forces would use equipment or because of not yet clearly defined methods of financing production. His government thought that urgent items of equipment produced could be put into something of a pool and then apportioned to proper forces as they were developed and trained. But at any rate equipment must be got on spot with no delay.
When I pointed out that in lunching with Moch, Shinwell, Montgomery and Delattre I received impression latter two felt that having equipment was not the answer unless forces were in being and trained to use it, Alphand modified his statement to agree that two must come together.
Emphasizing necessity for preparing list and quantities of vital armaments to be produced immediately, Alphand referred to President Roosevelt’s list of 1942 setting forth requirements for “60,000 planes” et cetera.4 A similar list was what was needed now.
With regard to production of this equipment, each nation must undertake immediately what it can without waiting for perfected plans to be devised as to allocation. Effort initially would not be so great as to be outside bounds of whatever plans were eventually developed.
In regard to financing, French Government intended to proposer common fund be instituted, that US make initial contribution thereto, that other nations contribute as soon as possible and details be agreed later as to rules of fund, apportionment of costs, et cetera, moneys contributed immediately to be used to let contracts for producing urgently needed armaments referred to above. French Treasury officials were now working on proposals regarding common fund and he would be ready to discuss those with me shortly.
Alphand said Prime Minister felt matters which he had presented were so important and that the necessity for deciding them soon was [Page 150] so great that it might require a meeting of the heads of governments or Foreign Ministers, even before the September meeting of the Council. He thought such meeting would be most beneficial, not only because it would produce the necessary agreements but because of impression it would make on all peoples. He was prepared to go to Washington to discuss this and other matters raised.
He stated further French Government’s belief meeting referred to above should consider the possibility of establishing something in nature of an international war cabinet and executive body, which would be composed of representatives of US, UK and France, and perhaps two other nations and which would be responsible for direction of defense effort.
Turning to Indochina, Alphand said that this situation was draining life blood from France and could not be dealt with by France’s resources alone. French Army now in Indochina must be replaced to large extent with native forces who must be equipped and trained, and French officers and non-coms brought back to France to help build new French Army. This would require financial resources which, when considered from French point of view, were staggering. Since 1945 France had spent 800 billion francs in Indochina. They must have help if situation were to be maintained. Prime Minister had instructed him to inform me French Government requested financial aid for Indochina in amount of 200 billion francs for next two years. This was essential if efforts referred to above were to be carried through.
I assured Alphand substance of his statement would be reported immediately and I would let him know instructions received.5
When I inquired as to status of French Government’s deliberations on our proposals as to increased level of defense effort, Alphand said he hoped be able give me their answer first part next week.
Sent Department Depto 18, repeated info Paris 150 (eyes only Ambassador).
- July 27.↩
- Circular telegram, July 22, p. 138.↩
- Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 109.↩
- For the text of President Roosevelt’s annual message to the Congress, January 6, 1942, see Department of State Bulletin, January 10, 1942, p. 39.↩
- For documentation on U.S. policy relating to Indochina, see vol. vi, pp. 690 ff.↩