Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/7–2250: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices ¹

top secret   u.s. urgent

Washington, July 22, 1950—1 a. m.

1. The President has proposed a large increase in the US military effort. He has expressed the view that other free nations will also undoubtedly want to increase their defenses and has expressed our willingness to give them further assistance to help them to make their maximum contribution to the common defense. For NAT countries such a program wld be developed in cooperation with them. He will ask Congress for additional funds necessary to “attainment and maintenance of our common strength at an adequate level as soon as it is possible to determine what each nation will need to do.”

2. To carry out the major additional US effort which the President has called for, he has proposed an expenditure of 10 billion dollars for US defense, the imposition of substantial additional taxes, and an extensive system of domestic controls. It is our view that the world situation calls for action by other NAT countries which reflects a similar sense of urgency.

3. In order to take advantage of the present momentum and to get started immediately on a program whose execution will of necessity take considerable time, extra efforts will be required of all NAT govts and of entire NAT org.

4. Washington preparing justification for US end item program. Hope to be able to provide tentative estimates of amounts of major eqpt items in US proposed program if required for planning purposes in London as guidance in estimating size and type of production job in Europe. Urgently require by Aug 5 firmest possible statement from European countries [especially UK and Fr who we believe are already working on problem]² of nature and extent of increased effort, in terms of increases in both forces and military production, they propose to undertake. Also desire if at all possible some illustrations of major additional production programs they will initiate and for which US assistance will be requested.

5. The increased emphasis required for NAT defense will be discussed by Spofford at July 25 mtg of Council of Deps, which we expect to sparkplug this program.

6. You are requested to convey substance of above at highest level in country to which you are accredited and to urge the great importance of beginning immediately to consider the effort which can and shld be made in the light of present international situation, and to examine what the US can do to help.

7. There has been no change in our conviction that our major long-run purpose must be to achieve security, cohesiveness, prosperity and stability in the Western World, and thereby fundamentally and permanently to strengthen it against subversion and aggression. In the short-run, continued, though less rapid, economic recovery is necessary not only to this long-run purpose but also to the immediate objective of increased military strength. Although rearmament will require economic sacrifices and slow the pace of recovery, we do not regard military strength as a different objective, in conflict with these constructive purposes, but, in the light of the current international situation, an essential element in their eventual achievement.

8. As guidance to planning officials you may indicate present Executive Branch thinking is along following lines. This should of course be conveyed in such manner as to avoid any impression that we are attempting to dictate to our friends the action they shld take.

a. Present US military thinking is that there is sufficient information in the NATO military planning to permit firm governmental steps to be taken now to increase military forces during the next year or two, which wld be in line with refined final requirements for 1954. FYI Spofford will have available for background use in discussions with reps of other govts if necessary the latest JCS thinking on NAT force requirements.

b. If plans are to be realistically implemented all eqpt for forces required in 1954 shld be in hands of those forces in advance of that date. The sooner the better. In view of the time required between the placing of contracts and final delivery, particularly for the heavier items of eqpt, it is important to place contracts now to the maximum extent possible.

c. It seems to us that each country may need:

(1) To think and act in terms of an effort over the next two years, limited only by (a) its ability to recruit, train, and maintain qualified manpower to meet its requirements under NAT planning, and (b) the necessity for maintaining during the rearmament phase a tolerable level of consumption and rate of capital investment. We recognize that an excessive diversion of resources to war purposes could undermine the foundation of military strength, but we believe all countries will have to accept lower levels of consumption than wld otherwise be possible and will have to divert resources from investment in peacetime production to other purposes.

(2) To plan for the maximum military production effort it can make to meet its own requirements, and also those of other countries assigned to it by the MPSB in accordance with its program for concentrating production in the most efficient locations.

(3) To disregard normal financial criteria. We hope further US assistance will facilitate development of a satisfactory arrangement for inter-country transfers.

(4) To make every effort with the cooperation of all govts to put into production the most modern weapons available with the broadest possible areas of standardization, but not to delay the initiation of quantity production.

d. To support the additional forces to be organized and to pay for the military production required to equip them, the following sources of funds may need, in our view, to be called upon:

(1) The maximum possible addition by each country to its own military budgets, by increased taxes, transfer of funds from non-military to military purposes, curtailment of investment programs of a peacetime nature, etc.

(2) The US will provide a substantial volume of the same type of end item eqpt as is currently being provided under MDAP.

(3) The US might be prepared to consider requesting Congress for assistance to maximize the effort of the European countries, particularly in the field of military production, by means beyond those permitted in present MDAP legislation. For example, in addition to the present AMP type program, assistance might be proposed for loss of exports because of conversion to military output, for production in one NAT country for the use of another, and perhaps even to supplement local currency funds directly.

(4) In calculating their dollar resources, countries shld assume the availability of presently planned levels of ECA assistance through 1952 and shld not rule out the possibility that assistance beyond 1952 might be available if their military effort makes it necessary to the maintenance of their economy at acceptable levels.

9. If we are to be of most effective help to them in getting the required job done, countries shld initiate forthwith the preparation of programs of what they can and will do, and of how much US assistance they will need, and for what purposes.

10. While this telegram reflects Executive Branch opinion and cannot commit the Congress, you shld also make clear that the feeling of urgency on the part of the American people is such that, given a vigorous effort on the part of other countries, we are confident that the requisite US action will be forthcoming. You shld emphasize the extreme importance of immediate action.

11. You and your MDAP staff with help of ECA mission shld consider immediate application above principles to development program for your country, particularly with regard to increased military production in your country.

12. Repeat all future messages this subject to London for Spofford.

Acheson

1. Sent to London (passed to Spofford), Paris (passed to Isaac Stokes, OSR), Brussels, The Hague, Copenhagen, Oslo, Lisbon, Rome, Luxembourg, Ottawa, Reykjavik (for information only), and Frankfort (McCloy, eyes only and information only).

   This additional paragraph was included in the message to Ottawa only:

   “13. You shld adapt above to Canadian situation. No special US military assistance of MDAP type for Canadian defense effort now contemplated.”

2. The bracketed sentence was included in the messages to Paris and London only.