It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed Statement of
Policy, it be submitted to the President for consideration with the
recommendation that he approve it and direct its implementation by all
appropriate executive Departments and agencies of the U.S. Government
under the coordination of the Secretary of State.
[Enclosure 2]
Study Prepared by the Staff of the National
Security Council
secret
[Washington, October 17, 1950.]
The Position of the United States Regarding
Irish Membership in the
NATO
and military assistance to Ireland under a
bilateral Arrangement
problem
1. To review U.S. policy on the relationship of Ireland to the North
Atlantic Treaty, and toward Irish interest in bilateral arrangements
for military assistance.
analysis
2. The Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum dated September 8,
1950,* suggested a review of U.S. policy on Ireland’s
relationship to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and
introduced the question of U.S. military assistance to Ireland under
bilateral arrangements outside the treaty.
3. Strategically located, Ireland affords valuable sites for air
bases and naval and anti-submarine operations, supplemental to and
in support of bases available in the British Isles including North
Ireland.
[Page 1479]
To a limited
extent Ireland is a potential source of combat units in the event of
war. Without question Ireland could make a valuable contribution to
the collective defense of the North Atlantic community. Its
unqualified adherence would be both logical and desirable, and would
give further evidence of the solidarity of the free nations of the
North Atlantic area.
4. Despite strong anti-communist sentiments, the Irish Government for
domestic political considerations still adheres strongly to its
traditional policy of neutrality which was militarily embarrassing
to the Allies in World War II. In a war against communism, a policy
of Irish neutrality undoubtedly would be more benevolent to the
Western Allies than in World War II and less useful to the Soviet
Union, which has no diplomatic representatives in Ireland, than
Irish neutrality was to the Axis. Nevertheless, there are no
indications that the Irish would abandon neutrality even if by so
doing a strong contribution to the anti-communist forces would be
made. There is no Communist Party in Ireland.
5. The United States would welcome use of Ireland’s port facilities
and the air bases which could be developed there, although they are
not considered essential at this time. The advantages to be gained
from Irish bases might make their acquisition desirable, provided
this could be accomplished in a manner consonant with our other
commitments and without prejudicing collective arrangements. Should
such bases or facilities become desirable, negotiations can be
undertaken with the Irish as the then existing circumstances
warrant. These bases or facilities would be complementary to those
already available to North Atlantic forces in this area through the
adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland. The denial of Ireland to enemy forces is already
encompassed in existing NAT
commitments.
6. In the early development of NATO,
the United States Government made a study of the above factors and
concluded that although Ireland’s military potential was by no means
an element essential to the success of NAT, Ireland should be given an opportunity to Join the
organization. An aide-mémoire of January 7,
1949, invited Ireland to become one of the original
signatories.4
7. Irish aide-mémoire of February 8, 1949 and
May 25, 19495
stated that their participation was impossible as long as partition
existed, and advanced the argument that Irish acquience to partition
would be implicit in Irish membership. They requested the
“assistance and
[Page 1480]
mediation” of the other participating states in creating a situation
wherein the problem could be discussed.
8. The United States replied to the Irish Government to the effect
that NAT was not a suitable
framework within which to discuss a problem solely the concern of
the United Kingdom and Ireland, and that we failed to see any
connection between partition and NAT, which was not intended to provide a new forum for the
settlement or discussion of long-standing territorial disputes. All
other signatories took similar positions.
9. Since Irish rejection of NATO
membership, the United States has continued to maintain an attitude
of readiness to welcome Ireland as a member of NATO, but without any strings.
10. The way is open for Ireland to seek admission at any time. The
Irish Government, however, refuses to separate the question of
adherence to NATO from the
partition issue, and this, in effect, puts a price on its adherence.
Various Irish officials, contending that partition blocks their
further consideration of North Atlantic Treaty Organization
membership, have informally suggested that a bilateral arrangement,
making Ireland eligible for U.S. military assistance, would be
mutually beneficial. Presumably Ireland would seek, in such a
bilateral arrangement, to avoid commitments it would have to
undertake if it became a member of NATO.
11. An approach to Ireland to reconsider membership in NATO would encounter the same Irish
objections and conditions that were advanced at the time of our
initial effort. For the United States to take the initiative would
create the false impression that there is a real military need for
Irish participation in the defense of the North Atlantic area.
Rather than influencing Ireland to join NATO, it seems as logical to assume it would only serve
to strengthen an apparently developing Irish belief that the United
States is susceptible to an approach for bilateral arrangements. In
view of the virtual certainty of an Irish rebuff and a reiteration
of all their objections to partition, towards which our position
remains unchanged, reopening the question would be desirable only
under the stress of military necessity. This necessity does not
exist. No new element in the international situation has developed
since the earlier approach to the Irish which would justify a change
in the position the United States took in 1949.
12. The considerations which preclude our initiative in a reopening
of the question of Irish adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty are
strengthened and multiplied in relation to the question of bilateral
defense arrangements with Ireland. Such an arrangement would be in
conflict with the concept of the collective defense of the North
Atlantic area based upon undertakings of collective mutual aid as
pledged by NAT signatories. United
States-Irish bilateral arrangements would
[Page 1481]
create friction and resentment among the
NAT signatories who have assumed
collective mutual assistance obligations. It would derogate from the
basic principles underlying the North Atlantic Treaty, and would
invite increased pressure for bilateral arrangements with other
countries which are not included in regional defense plans or
systems. Unilateral extension of U.S. military assistance could be
justified only on the basis of extreme military necessity and then
only after the possibility of Irish adherence to NAT had been fully explored and
rejected. This necessity does not exist.
conclusion
13. It would be desirable to continue to maintain an attitude of
readiness to welcome Ireland as a member of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. However, it would be undesirable, and in all
likelihood fruitless, for the United States again to take the
initiative to encourage Ireland to enter NATO and it would be even more undesirable to extend
military assistance to Ireland under a bilateral arrangement outside
of NATO.
