S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 83 Series

Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)1

secret

NSC 83/1

The Position of the United States Regarding Irish Membership in NATO and Military Assistance to Ireland Under a Bilateral Arrangement

Reference: NSC 832

The enclosed Statement of Policy on the subject, prepared by the NSC Staff pursuant to the request of the Secretary of Defense contained in NSC 83, is submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council and the Secretary of the Treasury. Also enclosed is an NSC Staff Study prepared for the information of the Council in this connection.

It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed Statement of Policy, it be submitted to the President for consideration with the recommendation that he approve it and direct its implementation by all appropriate executive Departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State.

James S. Lay, Jr.
[Page 1478]
[Enclosure 1]

Draft Statement of Policy Prepared by the Staff of the National Security Council

secret

The Position of the United States Regarding Irish Membership in NATO and Military Assistance to Ireland Under a Bilateral Arrangement

The United States should:

a.
Continue its present policy of maintaining an attitude of readiness to welcome Ireland as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, at this time leaving the initiative to Ireland.
b.
Avoid discussion of bilateral arrangements for a military assistance program outside NATO.3

[Enclosure 2]

Study Prepared by the Staff of the National Security Council

secret

The Position of the United States Regarding Irish Membership in the NATO and military assistance to Ireland under a bilateral Arrangement

problem

1. To review U.S. policy on the relationship of Ireland to the North Atlantic Treaty, and toward Irish interest in bilateral arrangements for military assistance.

analysis

2. The Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum dated September 8, 1950,* suggested a review of U.S. policy on Ireland’s relationship to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and introduced the question of U.S. military assistance to Ireland under bilateral arrangements outside the treaty.

3. Strategically located, Ireland affords valuable sites for air bases and naval and anti-submarine operations, supplemental to and in support of bases available in the British Isles including North Ireland. [Page 1479] To a limited extent Ireland is a potential source of combat units in the event of war. Without question Ireland could make a valuable contribution to the collective defense of the North Atlantic community. Its unqualified adherence would be both logical and desirable, and would give further evidence of the solidarity of the free nations of the North Atlantic area.

4. Despite strong anti-communist sentiments, the Irish Government for domestic political considerations still adheres strongly to its traditional policy of neutrality which was militarily embarrassing to the Allies in World War II. In a war against communism, a policy of Irish neutrality undoubtedly would be more benevolent to the Western Allies than in World War II and less useful to the Soviet Union, which has no diplomatic representatives in Ireland, than Irish neutrality was to the Axis. Nevertheless, there are no indications that the Irish would abandon neutrality even if by so doing a strong contribution to the anti-communist forces would be made. There is no Communist Party in Ireland.

5. The United States would welcome use of Ireland’s port facilities and the air bases which could be developed there, although they are not considered essential at this time. The advantages to be gained from Irish bases might make their acquisition desirable, provided this could be accomplished in a manner consonant with our other commitments and without prejudicing collective arrangements. Should such bases or facilities become desirable, negotiations can be undertaken with the Irish as the then existing circumstances warrant. These bases or facilities would be complementary to those already available to North Atlantic forces in this area through the adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The denial of Ireland to enemy forces is already encompassed in existing NAT commitments.

6. In the early development of NATO, the United States Government made a study of the above factors and concluded that although Ireland’s military potential was by no means an element essential to the success of NAT, Ireland should be given an opportunity to Join the organization. An aide-mémoire of January 7, 1949, invited Ireland to become one of the original signatories.4

7. Irish aide-mémoire of February 8, 1949 and May 25, 19495 stated that their participation was impossible as long as partition existed, and advanced the argument that Irish acquience to partition would be implicit in Irish membership. They requested the “assistance and [Page 1480] mediation” of the other participating states in creating a situation wherein the problem could be discussed.

8. The United States replied to the Irish Government to the effect that NAT was not a suitable framework within which to discuss a problem solely the concern of the United Kingdom and Ireland, and that we failed to see any connection between partition and NAT, which was not intended to provide a new forum for the settlement or discussion of long-standing territorial disputes. All other signatories took similar positions.

9. Since Irish rejection of NATO membership, the United States has continued to maintain an attitude of readiness to welcome Ireland as a member of NATO, but without any strings.

10. The way is open for Ireland to seek admission at any time. The Irish Government, however, refuses to separate the question of adherence to NATO from the partition issue, and this, in effect, puts a price on its adherence. Various Irish officials, contending that partition blocks their further consideration of North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership, have informally suggested that a bilateral arrangement, making Ireland eligible for U.S. military assistance, would be mutually beneficial. Presumably Ireland would seek, in such a bilateral arrangement, to avoid commitments it would have to undertake if it became a member of NATO.

11. An approach to Ireland to reconsider membership in NATO would encounter the same Irish objections and conditions that were advanced at the time of our initial effort. For the United States to take the initiative would create the false impression that there is a real military need for Irish participation in the defense of the North Atlantic area. Rather than influencing Ireland to join NATO, it seems as logical to assume it would only serve to strengthen an apparently developing Irish belief that the United States is susceptible to an approach for bilateral arrangements. In view of the virtual certainty of an Irish rebuff and a reiteration of all their objections to partition, towards which our position remains unchanged, reopening the question would be desirable only under the stress of military necessity. This necessity does not exist. No new element in the international situation has developed since the earlier approach to the Irish which would justify a change in the position the United States took in 1949.

12. The considerations which preclude our initiative in a reopening of the question of Irish adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty are strengthened and multiplied in relation to the question of bilateral defense arrangements with Ireland. Such an arrangement would be in conflict with the concept of the collective defense of the North Atlantic area based upon undertakings of collective mutual aid as pledged by NAT signatories. United States-Irish bilateral arrangements would [Page 1481] create friction and resentment among the NAT signatories who have assumed collective mutual assistance obligations. It would derogate from the basic principles underlying the North Atlantic Treaty, and would invite increased pressure for bilateral arrangements with other countries which are not included in regional defense plans or systems. Unilateral extension of U.S. military assistance could be justified only on the basis of extreme military necessity and then only after the possibility of Irish adherence to NAT had been fully explored and rejected. This necessity does not exist.

conclusion

13. It would be desirable to continue to maintain an attitude of readiness to welcome Ireland as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. However, it would be undesirable, and in all likelihood fruitless, for the United States again to take the initiative to encourage Ireland to enter NATO and it would be even more undesirable to extend military assistance to Ireland under a bilateral arrangement outside of NATO.

  1. Attached to the source text were the following documents, none printed: a cover sheet; a memorandum, dated January 21, 1963, by Bromley Smith, the Executive Secretary of the Council at that time, which stated that President Kennedy had authorized the rescission of NSC 83/1; a memorandum by Lay, dated November 10, 1960, which stated that on November 1, 1960, NSC 83/1 had been reviewed by the NSC Planning Board which considered that it did not need updating; a second memorandum by Lay, dated June 1, 1953, which stated that a copy of NSC 83/1 was presumed to be lost; and a third memorandum by Lay, dated November 3, 1950, which stated that on that day President Truman had approved the statement of policy contained in NSC 83/1 and “directed its implementation by all appropriate Executive Departments and Agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State.”
  2. Regarding NSC 83, see Johnson’s memorandum supra and footnote 2 thereto.
  3. In a memorandum to Secretary Acheson, dated October 31, not printed, which was attached to another copy of NSC 83/1, George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, stated that “NSC 83/1 is essentially a State Department paper which has been accepted by the NSC staff assistants and the NSC staff without material modifications or impairment of the Departments position on these two questions.” (S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 83 Series)
  4. Reproduced in NSC 83. [Footnote in the source text.]
  5. Not printed; for documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.
  6. Neither printed.