Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

751.00/12–1350

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

Paris, December 13, 1950.

[No.] 1585

Subject: Review of Political Developments During the Months of September, October and November 1950

As a supplement to the Embassy’s reporting of political developments during the last three months, there is submitted a summary and evaluation of the salient events of the period, which is designed to permit a longer-range assessment of political trends. The following analysis covers the events from the first announcement of the government’s intention to extend military service to 18 months, to the near-impeachment of Jules Moch and to Pleven’s receipt of a vote of confidence from the National Assembly on December 1. This corresponds, on the international scene, to the period from the darkest days on the defense perimeter around the tip of the Korean peninsula, to the beginning of the Chinese counter-offensive against the victorious UN army in North Korea.

1. Attitudes toward the U.S. Behind Foreign Minister Schuman’s denial on November 16, that any change in France’s foreign policy is contemplated, and behind Prime Minister Pleven’s similar denial on November 29, lay concern about something different from the “neutralism” which in the recent past had received perhaps an undue amount of attention as a major non-Communist foreign policy alternative posed to the French. The neutralist school represented by Claude Bourdet and confined largely to a coterie of Paris intellectuals had in fact become more and more characterized by an anti-American attitude and was not even unwilling, in order to advance its thesis, to treat with the Communist-front organization, the Partisans of Peace. The slow upsurge of misgivings concerning France’s acceptance of U.S. foreign policy leadership, on the other hand, to which Pleven no doubt referred when he disclaimed any “neutralist” tendencies of the government, was a pro-American and anti-Soviet phenomenon but one which might become much more important to U.S.-French relations.

The Korean war, even more than the issues of German rearmament, served to bring out this latent attitude. The crossing of the 38th Parallel, after Foreign Minister Schuman had declared September 6 that France would prefer restoration of the status quo ante, gave rise to no complaints at the time since the troops of the United Nations were moving forward in the flush of victory. When Chinese troops were first encountered, however, and later when news of the Republican election victories pointed up the emergence of a possibly more unyielding U.S. policy in the Far East, and finally when General MacArthur’s offensive toward the end of November was first stalled and then transformed into a retreat—all those developments served to build up an attitude of fear that France might be committed to a major war; a feeling that some brakes should be put on the “impetuous” leadership of the U.S.; and that the moderating or mediating role, which French opinion has contemplated nostalgically from time to time in the past, might after all be one that France should play. In discussions of this kind, however, there was no question of dissociating France from its allies: The developing attitude, rather, which as yet was not sharply defined, was one of friendly and somewhat worried advice to a much-needed friend.

This attitude which is not the same as “neutralism” was not confined, as apparently in Britain, to leftist elements and to the leftist press. It was in fact best exemplified by the rightist (Radical Socialist, Gaullist-sympathizing) newspaper Aurore which on November 23, before the Chinese counter-offensive, expressed concern about the alleged U.S. “hostility” to the idea of a buffer zone between Korea and Manchuria; found disquieting the alleged U.S. intention of letting General Mac Arthur settle the Korean conflict “by military means alone;” and criticized Mr. Dulles’ endorsement of Nationalist China’s complaint against the Soviet Union. The paper came out for admission of Communist China to the U.N. and “besought” the U.S. “to follow the path of diplomacy.” Along a different line, Foreign Minister Schuman himself, in the Council of the Republic on November 16, spoke of the need to “reassure” Russia about the peaceful intentions of the West.

It is against this background that one must also view the form taken by the initial reaction here to the Soviet proposal for four-power conversations on German disarmament. Although no less suspicious of Soviet motives and intentions than the other Western countries, French public opinion was well satisfied when Foreign Minister Schuman’s published remarks turned out to be less negative than those of either Foreign Secretary Bevin or Secretary Acheson. The difference has been aptly described as that between saying “yes, but” and saying “no, unless.” This less negative reaction of Foreign Minister Schuman was close to the prevailing mood of the Government, the Assembly, and (as far as can be determined) the French people. A similar harmony is much more difficult to establish when it comes to the issue of German rearmament.

2. German rearmament. The controversy on the nature, timing and extent of Germany’s contribution to Western defense, which resulted in France’s proposal for the immediate establishment of a European army, can be viewed as consisting of four separate stages during the period under review: The first stage might be called one of slow drift toward acceptance of the idea of an eventual German contribution. This stage was distinguished by statements on the part of Prime Minister Pleven (September 2) and Foreign Minister Schuman (September 6) to the effect that the question of a German contribution was “one of priorities,” and the view of former Prime Minister Bidault, likewise publicly expressed (August 26), that West Germany would certainly have to receive authorization to arm and equip its “police” to the same extent as Eastern Germany was being armed and equipped.

The second stage was the freezing of the French government’s position in the face of a request for consent in principle to a German contribution to Western defense, which posed a question that no French government could answer affirmatively in principle. This stage, which gradually led to doubts as to whether France’s position was not perhaps unreasonable and in the long run untenable, continued until October 25 when the government ushered in stage three by presenting to the National Assembly what it considered the only formulation susceptible of marshalling a majority: the call for a European Army into which would be integrated national units “of the smallest possible size.” The government’s proposal specifically opposed the establishment of a German national army or general staff and called for the creation of the post of a European defense minister, answerable to an as yet non-existent European political body. With respect to units of division size, although the Assembly resolution did not refer to them, the government in the debate on October 24 and 25 placed itself so squarely and insistently on record as opposing German divisions that it was difficult to see how its position could be modified in the near future. Stage three, the presentation of the thesis of the European Army, finally gave way to the fourth stage, which was distinguished by a general feeling of malaise at the failure of Defense Minister Jules Moch in Washington to persuade his colleagues in the NATO to accept the French formula, and an increasing belief that the French government, and Moch in particular, had gone too far, had been too rigid, and would eventually have to compromise. (The difficulties in which Moch found himself in the National Assembly at the end of November, while they are in part traceable to the general feeling that he had done badly in Washington, were not primarily related to the German rearmament question.)

The French attitude toward German rearmament, as formulated by the government on October 24, accommodated two important factors in French public opinion: Fear of Germany as a military power, and a willingness to give up a portion of French sovereignty in return for a closer association with other European countries, including Germany, by which France’s security would benefit. With respect to the first of these factors, the Assembly in all likelihood trailed somewhat behind public opinion, which had gravitated toward acceptance of the necessity for a German contribution to the defense of the West. It is worth noting, however, that as shown by the Assembly debate of October 24 and 25, it was much less fear of German aggression against France than distrust which motivated most speakers against German rearmament, and specifically feelings that Western Germany (a) might embroil France in an irredentist war with the East, and (b) might some day forsake an alliance with the West.

As of the end of November, the problem, far from moving toward an early solution, was becoming further complicated by indications that the trend in Germany itself was toward increased opposition to participation in Western defense unless entirely different conditions were met. As far as the French position was concerned, certain possible concessions to the American (but not necessarily the German) point of view were looming up, among them the idea that the political features of the French plan might be left for gradual rather than immediate implementation, and that the size of units to be integrated into the European army might be considered a technical question to be solved by technical experts. At the end of November, it appeared that a compromise along such lines might be arrived at by the NATO deputies in London.

3. State of the coalition. Up to the last week of November, the coalition held together well on all substantive matters of importance: On Indochina, on the extension of military service, and on the question of German armament, the MRP, Socialists and Radicals in the Assembly voted substantially together. Nevertheless, as the period drew to a close certain fundamental differences between the naturally disparate coalition partners asserted themselves, among them most notably the difference over electoral reform. The fantastic parliamentary maneuver on November 28, which nearly resulted in the impeachment of Defense Minister Moch and which prompted Prime Minister Pleven to offer his resignation (which was not accepted), was in fact closely related to the electoral reform question—even though the size of the secret vote against Moch was due to a number of factors among which the MRP’s fear of electoral reform was only one. (The personality of Moch, whose tactlessness and sarcasm have made him many enemies, undoubtedly was a factor, although if the MRP had desired to preserve discipline, this factor might have been overcome.)

The attempt to impeach the French Defense Minister was a Communist maneuver which on the face of it was only a minor move incidental to the long overdue winding-up of the Revers–Mast affair.² An estimated 40 MRP deputies (out of a total of 145), however, availed themselves of the secrecy of the vote to join the Communists and Gaullists in voting against Moch and thus, perhaps unwittingly, against the very existence of the government in which their party participates. Smoked out into the open by Prime Minister Pleven’s demand for a vote of confidence, the MRP closed its ranks again, allowing the government to triumph by 347 to 184, with a majority larger than that which Pleven had received at his investiture. The fact remains, however, that the breaking of the government’s ranks not only resulted in ill-feeling and suspicion between the coalition partners, but also brought already existing feelings of distrust and insecurity, largely on the part of the MRP, out into the open.

[Here follows a discussion of the positions of the various political parties on the question of electoral reform and on other domestic issues.]

As long as the Far Eastern crisis weighed upon France as heavily as it did when Pleven received his vote of confidence, the coalition appeared reasonably firm. What needed to be defined and adjusted before the elections and perhaps before the end of the year, however, was the basic mutual relationship of the coalition partners—& question that has as yet never received a satisfactory answer and for which in fact there is perhaps no answer.

4. Factors bearing on France’s defense potential. Aside from the question of Communist strength in France, which is discussed further below in connection with labor developments, the three months under review brought certain notable developments tending to increase France’s military power. Under the impact of the Communist aggression in Korea, the military budget, fixed at 420 billion francs in 1950, was first to be increased to 500 billion francs and then (following extensive negotiations concerning U.S. assistance) to 740 billion francs, which figure takes into account MDAP supplementary aid amounting to $200 million (70 billion francs). The French armament effort was thus considerably increased, though some doubt existed as to whether the increase was as large as originally understood at the time when financial assistance was sought from the U.S. The question therefore arises to what extent the additional effort of France represented a political sacrifice.

From the point of view of internal French politics, the government’s decision to ask for some 200 billion francs in additional taxes was undoubtedly a difficult one to make. [Here follow discussions of taxation and of the extension of military service to 18 months.]

5. Labor, and the Communist potential. Outwardly, the malaise within the Communist Party continued to manifest itself during the last few months: The circulation of its newspapers continued to drop, attendance at party meetings sagged in some places, and the Communist-dominated CGT was under orders to concentrate to such an extent on political slogans (peace, against 18 months military service, etc.) that the non-Communist labor unions, notably the FO and CFTC, managed to achieve a fair amount of success with France’s labor force by negotiating minor wage increases, in many cases under the noses of CGT majorities. At the same time, the Communists’ capacity to make trouble was seemingly narrowed down by dismissals of prominent agitators in certain key enterprises (such as Renault, Michelin, Ford, Air France) and by the replacement of some 33 Communist mayors in the Paris area.

Nothing would be more unwarranted, however, than to conclude that the Communist Party’s capacity to commit armed or unarmed mayhem and sabotage at a critical moment in France has proportionately suffered, or even suffered at all. The emphasis within the party has been on an expansion and hardening of the cadres for such an eventuality. Moreover, there was no reliable evidence that the Communist voting strength in France was on the decrease. In fact, one poll, conducted by the fairly reputable Institut Français d’Opinion Publique, even charted a slow rise in Communist voting strength during the last summer, leading to an all-time high in August (32%).

If Communist potential voting strength actually failed to decline, it was probably do [due] in part to the relative success of the party’s “peace” line, but doubtless also due to the continual, creeping advance in the cost of living. Due to seasonal factors, rises on world raw materials markets and due also to the absence of effective deterrents to profiteering, the Paris retail price index between August 1 and November 30, 1950 rose from 1,825 to 2,055 (1938 being 100), or by no less than 12.9%. (The retail price index accords a heavy weight to food items, whose rise was to an important extent seasonal.) No great outcry greeted the rise in living costs, except initially in the Communist press, but since the CGT did not appear willing to join a major battle for wage increases and since the field was left to the quiet workings of the non-Communist unions who for political reasons were not prepared to call for strikes, the price question, however important it might be to the average family, peculiarly enough did not become a major political issue during the period under review. The readjustments in the wage structure attendant to the recent setting of a national minimum wage scale, moreover, brought many money wages to a higher level so that on the whole it might be said that about two-thirds of France’s workers merely saw their recent gains wiped out, or had their gains consist in catching up to the position that they held before. In any event, whatever grievances existed prior to the setting of the minimum wage schedule in August 1950 were equally valid three-and-a-half months later, as of the writing of the present report. Those workers who had not fallen behind were at the selfsame level of hardship that had been theirs before.

Summary and conclusion. The trends that could be singled out for analysis during the period under review do not add up to any one resultant conclusion. With respect to foreign policy, a trend might be discerned in the direction of having France attempt again to play a moderating role in the councils of the West. With respect to German rearmament, in particular, no major trend could be discerned as of the end of the period, although there was a willingness to entertain limited compromise proposals. With respect to the internal stability of the government, the trend appeared to be in the direction of somewhat lessened coherence, with new crises and difficulties a distinct possibility. Militarily, an improvement of France’s position was foreshadowed by the increases in its budget and in the period of military service. Surface manifestations appeared to point to a lessened popularity of the Communist Party, but available evidence tended to raise doubts as to whether the party’s voting strength had suffered. On balance, the period from the end of August to the beginning of December did not bring significant progress toward the consolidation of military strength, social equilibrium and political unity toward which the majority of Frenchmen profess to strive.

David Bruce

1. This despatch was drafted by Martin F. Herz, Second Secretary, and was initialed for the Ambassador by Philip W. Bonsal, Counselor of Embassy. Copies were sent to the American Embassy in London and to HICOG at Frankfort.
2. On November 24 the French National Assembly had received and discussed the report of a special commission of inquiry concerning the “affair of the generals,” involving certain charges against Gens. Georges Revers and Charles Emmanuel Mast in connection with leakage in 1949 of information on the situation in Indochina.