740.5/5–550: Telegram
The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Acting Secretary of State
1842. In discussing in general terms objectives forthcoming London meeting NAT Ministers, FonOff officials have indicated to us Italian Government intensely interested promotion practical means immediate strengthening political as well as economic collaboration NAT countries. While FonOff has not as yet formulated any specific proposals of own, they feel there is real need immediate, dramatic forward step [Page 92] in increasing and publicly emphasizing political solidarity NAT powers.
FonOff officials have expressed conviction intensified and continuous consultation on political level needed to promote common and coordinated approach in solution common problems and objectives NAT and believe some permanent organization in political field can and should be established to further this objective. At present, inclined favorable consideration a French proposal establish consultative top level political body. However, officials we have talked to say Sforza,1 who is out of Rome until later this week, has no firm ideas as to best approach this problem and will probably wait until he has heard US views.
FonOff informs us Sforza seriously considering proposing at London as one concrete step greater NAT solidarity, move toward establishment “common” NAT Army with fullest possible standardization and real unified command.
Embassy is impressed by deep feeling top Italian officials desire Italy play more responsible role in closer collaboration US, UK and France in formulation and implementation objectives NAT. While it would be wrong to say responsible officials harbor actual resentment at continued Italian exclusion from inner councils, there is some discouragement at feeling that perhaps in some quarters London and Paris, Italy still being considered with some distrust and treated as an unreliable and junior partner, this despite most earnest efforts government to pursue faithful and positive pro-West policy in face of daily Parliamentary and press attacks not only from extreme left and right opponents, but also from more moderate nationalist and isolationist elements.
While there absolutely no reason doubt leaders present government will continue staunch supporters NAT policies, failure their acceptance as equal partners with US-UK-French leaders in formulation those policies will in long run weaken them in eyes both of their followers and their enemies. It must further be borne in mind that in present Italian Government leaders US has friends who, in loyalty and cooperativeness, it would be difficult if not impossible replace even from among like-minded members same parties. Therefore every encouragement that they can be given and every policy and gesture on our part which will strengthen their positions cannot help but rebound to our own benefit.
While there is as yet no serious trend toward neutrality in Italy it would seem prudent to take every possible action forestall such tendency (which although presently dormant, has vocal and eminent [Page 93] advocates such as Gronchi, Orlando and Nitti,2 support from the neo-Fascist nationalists, and of course party-line support from the Communists). Every indication of Italian isolation from leading Western Powers, within NAT, will therefore not only discourage Italian leaders, but at same time encourage advocates of neutrality and Italian isolation from cold war.
Without regard to broad problem of Italy’s place in NAT, and in more general European and world political scene, in relation to US, UK and France. I strongly urge consideration possibility at this stage taking Italy into closer confidence and fuller partnership at least in connection common problems of direct and vital interest to Italy. I believe that such a gesture would pay good dividends through even closer coordination and surer support our overall and specific problems. It would also give well deserved encouragement and gratification to personalities who can be counted on to continue to fight courageously for the same purposes and ideals which motivate our own policies.
Sent Department 1842; repeated Paris 223 for the Secretary, London 265 for Perkins.