CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 152: File—SFM Meeting Minutes
United States Delegation Minutes, Third Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, New York, Waldorf Astoria, September 13, 1950, 3 p. m.
Mr. Acheson (US)
Mr. Schuman (Fr)
Mr. Bevin (UK)
|Mr. Jessup||M. Bonnet||Sir Oliver Franks|
|Mr. Perkins||M. François-Poncet||Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick|
|Mr. McCloy||M. Alphand||Sir Pierson Dixon|
|Mr. Byroade||M. de la Tournelle||Air Marshal Sir William Elliott|
|Mr. McGhee||M. Roland de Margerie||Sir F. Hoyer-Millar|
- Displaced Persons
- Foreign Trade
- Foreign Affairs
- Termination of War
- Turkish Request
- Medium Term Defense Plan
- European Defense Force
Mr. Acheson raised the question of the Agenda for the afternoon. He proposed that the Foreign Ministers consider the Report of the Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany1 and the Berlin question and then discuss Greece and Turkey, and finally, if time permitted and if the papers were prepared, consider the draft resolutions of the Deputies. This was agreed.
Mr. Acheson said that in order to assist in discussing the Report of the Intergovernmental Study Group he had had prepared a paper by his staff which summed up the important issues involved.2 He had circulated this paper for the benefit of the other delegations. He [Page 1210] called their attention to the fact, however, that the paper was intended as a briefing document for the American side and asked their indulgence in regard to some of the comments that might not be appropriate in a Conference document.
Mr. Acheson said that he had been advised that much of the Report had been agreed and that there were three actions required: (1) to approve the agreed portions of the Report; (2) to decide the disagreed items and in the event no decision was reached, to refer the items for further study; (3) to approve the entire report as finally completed.
Displaced Persons. In regard to the agreed items he stated that he wished to reopen the position in regard to DP’s and Refugees. He said he regretted the necessity of reopening an issue which had already been settled among the Governments but the position had been reexamined by the United States Government as a result of representations that had been made by various groups who were interested in this problem, in particular Jewish and Catholic groups.
Mr. Jessup said that the feeling was that at the present time with the programs that are now going forward it would be desirable to retain the reserved power until the Federal Government had taken certain actions, rather than terminate the power on the basis of assurances given by the Federal Government. He said that in the light of these representations, the United States felt that the Foreign Ministers should not confirm the decision made in London3 but should leave it open for further discussion for the time being.
Mr. Bevin asked how long a delay was requested.
Mr. Acheson thought the matter might be discussed among experts this evening and that a proposal might be made to the Ministers the next day.
M. Schuman said that as he understood it we were agreed in principle to give up the reserved powers in this field and turn the responsibility for action over to the Germans but require the Germans to give assurances as to the treatment they would afford these persons.
Mr. Bevin said that he was agreeable to looking at the problem again and allowing the experts time to discuss it.
Restitution. Mr. Acheson said that with regard to restitution, it was suggested to him that this subject be referred back to experts for discussion.
Mr. Bevin said that he thought the question was what was the best way of completing the restitution program. Should the powers be abandoned or should they be retained by the Allies?[Page 1211]
Mr. Acheson said that he had been assured by the U.S. High Commissioner that the Germans in fact did not want this particular power turned over to them.
Mr. McCloy said that in his view the Germans required prodding. The question of restitution was politically difficult for them and it was necessary to retain the leverage of reserved powers.
Mr. Bevin asked which restitution was under discussion.
Mr. McCloy said he was referring to both internal and external restitution.
M. Schuman said that he thought that it was necessary as soon as possible to reach the point where the reserved powers would be given up, particularly with regard to treatment of German nationals. It was his feeling that it was desirable that the German Government should have full responsibility for the treatment of its own nationals. There was a somewhat different problem concerning the treatment of foreign nationals and it was desirable for the occupying powers to see that foreign interests were properly treated. Even as concerned foreign nationals, however, it was his feeling that it would be desirable to rely on normal channels for their protection and to abandon reserved powers as rapidly as possible.
Mr. Acheson said he thought it might be desirable instead of rewriting the paper concerning the Occupation Statute,4 to work out agreements with the German Government in regard to these matters. These agreements would take the place of the Occupation Statute and would be a substitute for the reserved powers.
Foreign Trade. Mr. Acheson said that there was an issue concerning foreign trade which he regarded as being very minor and he proposed that this was a problem which the High Commission should settle.
Mr. Bevin said that the foreign trade issue concerned the exercise of the reserved power in the event that the Federal Government withdrew from GATT. It seemed to him that we were under an obligation to see that Germany lived up to GATT principles since our Governments had already committed themselves to the support of these principles and therefore we should not let the Germans slide out of their obligations. However, he agreed that it could be considered by the High Commission.
Mr. McCloy said that in his view it would be satisfactory to have the High Commission deal with this problem, provided they were allowed to settle it among themselves. The question is whether there would be an appeal to Governments in the case of disagreement. He [Page 1212] suggested that the matter be settled by the High Commission by majority vote with the understanding that there would be no appeal to Governments from such a decision.
Mr. Bevin said that he agreed.
Foreign Affairs. Mr. Acheson said that he wanted to bring their attention to an important issue which he understood was raised in the ISG Report, namely, the one in the field of foreign affairs concerning diplomatic representation. He was told that this was an issue which the Ministers should consider.
Mr. Bevin said that as he understood the problem, the UK position was that the Allies would hand over foreign affairs to the Germans with the right to intervene only in certain specified reserved matters, whereas the US and French position contemplated that there would be a right to intervene in anything the Germans did in that field.
Mr. Acheson said that we had in mind three separate stages. We are now approaching the second stage. The first stage was the period of Military Government and of the Occupation Statute now in effect. In the second stage we propose to turn over additional powers to the Germans but retain sovereignty. In the third stage we would consider turning sovereignty over to the Germans on the basis of contractual agreements and on that basis we could exchange Ambassadors. Even as concerns the third stage, however, if the agreements were to break down, we would retain the right to resume sovereignty and start over again.
Mr. Bevin said that he didn’t think they were discussing the same point. He said he agreed that the right should be retained to resume powers in the event of emergency. He felt, however, the powers should not be resumed in the absence of emergencies. The question in this case was whether in the field of foreign affairs we would reserve the right to intervene in the absence of an emergency.
M. Schuman said there seemed to be a misunderstanding. He felt that the three Foreign Ministers were much nearer agreement than appeared in the discussion. In principle it was agreed that the Germans should manage foreign affairs and that intervention on the part of the Allies should in principle be reserved for exceptionally serious cases. This would be the reverse of the present procedure. It was his understanding that this new procedure would be applied not only in the field of foreign affairs but in other fields and would be a new step in our relationships with Germany.
Mr. Acheson said that there seemed to be substantial agreement. In the first place there was agreement that a broad underlying power would be retained. There was also agreement in the Report of the ISG as to what would be done in practice in terms of exercising the [Page 1213] reserved power in the field of foreign affairs. The only problem was whether the article of the Occupation Statute would be redrafted or whether the article would be left intact but that the exercise of powers under it would be modified.
Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick said that as he understood the U.S. proposal, it was intended to keep a string on foreign affairs in addition to that provided under Paragraph 3 of the Occupation Statute.5
M. Schuman suggested that the Paragraph on foreign affairs6 be redrafted to read as follows:
“Foreign affairs, insofar as they deal with international agreements made by or on behalf of Germany and with the establishment of diplomatic relations”.
Mr. Bevin said that this sounded satisfactory to him.
Mr. Acheson said that this raised the question as to whether we should now undertake to re-write the Occupation Statute. It was our thought that we would have more flexibility by reaching agreement on the exercise of our reserved powers, rather than by attempting to redraft the Statute. As a solution it seemed to him possible to adopt the suggestion made by Dr. Adenauer in his letter to the Foreign Ministers.7 The report of the ISG could be used as a guide for working out what Dr. Adenauer suggested. Dr. Adenauer did not suggest that the Occupation Statute be rewritten but that the practice under the Occupation Statute be changed through agreements with the Federal Government. It should be noted that the report of the ISG was already out of date. In his view the High Commission should work out these matters with the German Government, taking into account the altered situation.[Page 1214]
Mr. Bevin said that he felt that instead of going forward we seemed to be going backward. Instead of giving up powers to the German Government in the field of foreign affairs, we were putting in a lot of persnickety things which would hold the German Government down. He said that constant intervention was undesirable. It would depend on whether the intervention was directed by the head or by the liver. It would seem undesirable to have persnickety things used as a basis for intervention.
Mr. Acheson said that some formula had to be found for retaining the power to control German relations with the Soviet Union. It was difficult to spell out such a reservation of power publicly. That was the problem. It was his feeling that the High Commissioners could get together and make a proposal on this but in order to allow the High Commissioners to reach agreement it would be necessary to clear up the question of Ambassadors.
Mr. Bevin said that he understood that the U.S. and French Governments did not want German Ambassadors in Washington or Paris. He said the British Government didn’t mind having one in London, although it had collared the German Embassy and had taken it over for the Foreign Office.
Mr. Acheson said he didn’t see why Ambassadors were needed in the capitals of the occupying powers. The status of Ambassadors would be anomalous. The relations of the Occupying Powers with the Federal Government should be handled through the High Commission.
Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick said that the point was that we want the best men sent to the capitals of the occupying powers and not elsewhere. The occupying powers would have difficulty in explaining to the German Chancellor why his representatives in their capitals had a lower standing than the Austrian minister, although Austria also had a High Commission and no peace treaty.
M. Schuman intervened and said he thought that Austria stood on a different footing. It was true that there was no peace treaty as regarded Austria, but the Allies had agreed to treat Austria as if a peace treaty had in face been concluded.
Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick said that this took all the jam and butter off the bun we were extending to the Germans. The accumulation of restrictions we were piling up in the field of foreign affairs cancelled out the concessions we were attempting to make.
Mr. Bevin said that he felt that this might be worked out if it were done on a temporary basis. He thought it was difficult, however, to ask the Germans to assume responsibility for the defense of Europe and at the same time impose derogatory arrangements concerning their relations with the occupying powers.[Page 1215]
Mr. McCloy said that in the delicate period when the relationship of Germany to the common defense was being worked out it would be extremely awkward to have German ambassadors at the capitals working out their own relationships with the three governments and interfering with the negotiations which would take place between the High Commission and the German Government.
Mr. Bevin said that he recognized the problem but felt that it would be necessary to give Mr. Adenauer some assurance that the restriction in question was only temporary and that we would be prepared at an appropriate time to discuss a further solution with him. It seemed to him that our defense and foreign affairs theories were not properly synchronized and it was necessary to keep both ideas in mind as we approach these problems.
Mr. Acheson said that he fully agreed with what Mr. Bevin had said and that the matter was referred to the High Commission to work out with Mr. Bevin’s remarks as a guide.
Mr. Acheson then referred to the agreed papers, and said that it was not necessary for the Ministers to go into these, since the High Commissioners would know how to negotiate with the Germans from these papers.
M. Schuman asked what would happen if the negotiations with the Germans were unsuccessful, and if the Germans should refuse to give the undertakings that were being asked. Would we then return to the status quo, or would we transfer the matter to another authority? He said he was afraid of the status quo, and that we could not accept it, because it must be improved. He pointed out that the Germans might force the occupying powers into immobility by refusing to accept the solutions that were offered, on the theory that the worse it was for them the better it would be for them. We should, therefore, retain the right to impose on the Germans the improvements which were to be made in their favor.
Mr. Acheson said that he agreed with this.
Mr. McCloy said what it came to was that if the Germans did not agree to accept the improvements, we would force them to do so.
Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick pointed out that there were two categories of modifications in occupation controls. One is the group of restrictions, such as the power over foreign affairs, which would be lifted without an undertaking in return from the Germans; the other consists of restrictions, such as the power over decartelization, which cannot be lifted except in return for undertakings from the Germans, and, as to these, if the Germans will not give the undertakings, there is no action we can take.[Page 1216]
Mr. Bevin pointed out that the negotiations would be something like a continuation of the Petersberg Agreement,8 but he did not wholly like the word “negotiate”.
Mr. McCloy said the important thing was that for the first time we would sit down with the Germans and discuss directly with them the means of eventually withdrawing the Occupation Statute.
M. Schuman said there was an analogy with the Petersberg Agreement in that the new arrangements would be partly on a contractual basis.
Mr. Acheson then raised the question of terminating the state of war. He pointed out that the British and French had greater flexibility in this matter than the United States, and that more time was required by the American Government. He thought, however, it would be a good idea to have the termination of the state of war brought about by the three powers at the same time.
Mr. Bevin said that the date could be adapted to the legislative requirements of the three powers.
Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick pointed out that it would be desirable to issue now a declaration of intention of terminating the state of war.
Mr. Acheson agreed that there should be such a declaration now.
Mr. Bevin asked how the Governments would be advised concerning the termination, whether through the High Commission or diplomatic channels. He suggested that a communiqué be prepared by the High Commissioners for approval by the Ministers, and this was agreed.
M. Schuman said that a declaration of intention to terminate the state of war should be issued jointly, but that legislative details would necessitate delay in the case of each country.
Mr. Acheson said the matter could be worked out. As for claims, the Prohibited and Limited Industries Agreement, and shipbuilding, those matters should go over for a definitive report to the Ministers tomorrow. He asked who should be delegated to assist the High Commissioners in their work tonight.
Mr. Bevin suggested that each High Commissioner could bring any assistants he might need.
M. Schuman agreed to this.
Mr. Acheson then raised the question of Berlin, and there was distributed a list of points relating to Berlin prepared by the U.S. Delegation for the Ministers to consider (Document 27, September 13, 19509). He suggested that the question of the communiqué be deferred until later.[Page 1217]
Mr. Bevin said he thought it would not be wise to issue a separate communiqué concerning Berlin, but that Berlin should be covered in a section of the communiqué on Western Germany.
Mr. Acheson agreed to this.
Mr. Acheson then mentioned the first point in the paper, which is a proposal that the Soviets be made to understand that armed aggression against Berlin might mean general war.
M. Shuman pointed out that aggression by the Volkspolizei might not mean general war.
Mr. Acheson said this was considered in Points 7 and 8 of the paper, which are concerned with holding the Soviet Union responsible for action by Eastern Germany. He said that what the United States had in mind was that the Soviets might move out of Eastern Germany and pretend it was independent, thereby preparing for another situation like that in Korea. They might then assert that any trouble in Germany was an internal German revolution. We should, however, state in advance that we would hold the Russians responsible for any trouble that might arise.
M. Schuman pointed out that this responsibility on the part of the Russians still might not be the cause of a general war.
Mr. Bevin asked whether points 1 and 2 should be announced (these have to do with making the Soviets understand that armed aggression against Berlin might lead to war and that any interference with Berlin transport would have the most serious consequences).
Mr. Acheson said that it should not be put in a public statement that these eventualities might produce a general war.
Mr. Acheson then referred to point 6, which has to do with strengthening Allied forces in Berlin and authorizing the formation of German auxiliary forces. He said it was his understanding that the auxiliary forces were already being formed, and that the United States view was that one additional American regiment should be stationed there. He hoped that the British and French would be able to take some corresponding action. He pointed out that in Korea we have been careful not to penetrate the Russian disguise, but that in the case of Germany we should have to do so because the matter would be too serious.
It was agreed that the Ministers should study the paper tonight and discuss it later.
It was then agreed to have a short recess and take up the subject of Turkey afterwards.
Mr. Acheson opened the second half of the third session of the Foreign Ministers Meeting by reading a U.S. draft directive to the [Page 1218] Defense Committee of the NAC (Int. Doc. 3110) which, if approved by the Ministers, would be submitted to the NAC in connection with the Turkish request for admission into the NAT.
Mr. Bevin began the discussion by mentioning that perhaps the situation regarding Turkey might be met if the UK and France reaffirmed their treaty with Turkey and the U.S. gave a strong guarantee to support of Turkey in case of aggression. The UK had been consulting confidentially with certain members of the Commonwealth concerning the part they could play in the event of hostilities in the Near East. South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand might play a role in this area. While India has not given any indication regarding participation in joint defense efforts, it has indicated a strong interest in the area around the Persian Gulf. The participation of Turkey in planning for the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean, as contemplated by the document under consideration, might disturb the relationship of the Dominions to the defense of the Near East. In view of this complication, Turkey might best be provided for by a U.S. declaration. This was just a thought—not a proposal.
Mr. Bevin added that he hoped the Truman Doctrine would continue to be operative since it had done more than anything else to prevent aggression in the Near East. It had prevented Greece from being gobbled up and it had been instrumental in stopping the war of nerves against Turkey.
M. Schuman stated that he had no objection to the U.S. proposal.
Mr. Acheson replied to Mr. Bevin’s remarks by saying that it was not possible for the U.S. to go any further in the support of Turkey short of a contractual agreement. The U.S. is over-committed now. It requires a certain amount of flexibility. The U.S. would probably act in case of aggression against Turkey but it is not willing to make a treaty commitment at this time.[Page 1219]
Mr. Acheson did not understand Mr. Bevin’s point about the complications with the Dominions. The Turks want not only an assurance of support in case of aggression but also definite planning as to the action to be taken in the event of a hostile act such as mining of the Straits. Turkey could participate in planning for action to be taken in case of such an eventuality without interfering with UK Dominion relationships.
Mr. Acheson gathered that all the Ministers were agreed not to admit Turkey into the rights and obligations of the Treaty at this time. It might be possible to give Turkey the encouragement, however small, provided by the proposed directive (participation in Mediterranean defense planning).
Mr. Schuman said he supposed that the proposed directive would have to be approved unanimously in the Council.
Mr. Acheson replied that he presumed so. He wanted to make sure that the Turks received a unanimous answer from the Council to their request for admission into the Pact. Otherwise they would probably say that only the U.S. was keeping them out.
Mr. Bevin asked what would happen, under the terms of the proposal, in the event of an attack by the Soviet Union on Turkey.
Mr. Acheson replied that he did not visualize that anything would happen. Under the terms of the proposal the Turks would simply consult with the other nations regarding military planning. If the Soviet Union does attack, it would probably be in conjunction with a general attack and not aggression against Turkey alone. The Soviets would not attack Turkey alone because that would warn the Western Powers that a general war was in the making. The proposed directive would only provide for the formulation of plans, such as the action to be taken in the eventuality that the Straits are mined by the Soviets.
Mr. Acheson said he thought that the Turks were shortsighted in raising the question of admission to NAT.
Mr. Schuman believed that they had raised the question for domestic political reasons.
Mr. Bevin thought that it might create a difficult situation if the Turks were rejected on the grounds that no more members would be admitted into the Pact at the present time. Suppose Spain were to be admitted while the Turks were kept out? There is a good deal of pressure in the House of Commons to bring Franco into European defense plans and the feeling is so unpredictable that anything could happen in Parliament within half an hour.
Mr. Schuman said that the same situation existed in the French Parliament with respect to Spain.[Page 1220]
Mr. Acheson said that Senator Cain11 had recently made a speech coupling Turkey and Spain and urging that both be included in western defense plans. The two countries were often spoken of together in this connection.
After further discussion about drafting the proposed directive was agreed upon, subject to minor drafting changes.12
Mr. Acheson then read and introduced a draft resolution for the North Atlantic Council, submitted by the U.S. Delegation, regarding the Medium Term Defense Plan and the forces to be made available by July 1, 1951, and July 1, 1952 (Int. Doc. 2213).
Mr. Bevin asked for clarification about the expansion of forces mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the draft. Is the UK expected to expand its armed forces beyond the point now being discussed by Parliament?
Mr. Acheson explained that paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the draft were not intended in this sense. Rather, the objective was to obtain a clear definite report from the Defense Committee which could be used to put the plan into action.
Mr. Bevin said that he did not want to agree in this meeting to a greater expansion of UK armed forces than he had just agreed to with Parliament. If he agreed to Document 22, would he be increasing the British commitment?
Mr. Acheson went over the draft in more detail, pointing out that he hoped that the Defense Committee was already doing what was set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, but that this resolution simply urged them to get on with the job.
Ambassador Franks suggested that the difficulty seemed to lie with the Preamble and especially the phrase “… beyond those steps already taken by member governments …” it could refer to troops actually raised, or to plans for the expansion of the armed forces adopted by Parliament but not yet fully realized. The difficulty arose from the fact that different steps were now being taken by different governments.
Mr. Acheson was willing to change or eliminate the Preamble.
Mr. Schuman thought that paragraph 2 of the Preamble was a desirable safeguard since it recognized the need for financing the plans for equipping and maintaining the increased forces.
Ambassador Franks accepted Mr. Schuman’s point. He suggested that the Preamble be omitted and that the portion of Paragraph 2 [Page 1221] referring to finance be worked into the beginning of the Recommendation which comes at the conclusion of the Resolution.
The Ministers agreed to this suggestion and agreed to the document, referring it to the Deputies for redrafting.14
Mr. Acheson read and introduced a draft resolution prepared by the Deputies for introduction in the NAC on the subject of a European defense force (Int. Doc. 2415). He pointed out that the phrases in parentheses had not been agreed to by the UK Deputy. He also pointed out that the phrase in the first paragraph “… freedom in Europe.” might have to be modified since the European defense force might be fighting over the invasion of a satellite, such as Yugoslavia.
The Ministers agreed that this wording could be reworked.
Mr. Acheson suggested that paragraph 2 be deleted and replaced by some such phrase as “We recommend that the force be organized in accordance with the following principles.” Paragraphs 1 to 4 would follow and after paragraph 4 there would be a request to the Chairman of the Defense Committee to put the foregoing recommendations into operation.
The Ministers agreed to this suggestion.
Mr. Bevin suggested that the phrase “… in due course …” in paragraph 1 be omitted since a Supreme Commander should be appointed soon or otherwise the project would not work out.
Mr. Acheson thought that it would be difficult to induce an eminent soldier to accept the position of Supreme Commander unless some troops were actually in being. Therefore, a Supreme Commander should not be appointed in the near future.
Mr. Bevin felt that a man should be appointed who could really get on the job. It was absolutely essential to get a Supreme Commander and a Chief of Staff right away. The experience in Europe since 1948 regarding the creation of a multination armed force had been terribly disappointing because it had not proven possible to get the project going. It was essential to get the NATO forces off to a good start. Everything depends on its creation. If people lose faith in this force, they will lose faith in everything.
Mr. Schuman agreed with Mr. Bevin that the experience in Europe had not been happy, but he felt that it had to do with the position of Chief of Staff, not of Supreme Commander. What was lacking was a person who would be responsible for others. The important point is that one person should be responsible. It is not necessary to give him the title of Supreme Commander right away.[Page 1222]
Sir William Elliott said that a Chief of Staff cannot assume the functions of a Commander in Chief. If trouble breaks out someone would have to take command immediately. The Ministers might present the Defense Committee with a statement of objectives and let the Defense Committee work out the requirements for Chief of Staff and Supreme Commander.
Mr. Acheson agreed that the Council should not undertake to do the work of the military people. He did not share the conviction, however, that all the Ministers were agreed as to the need for the immediate appointment of a Supreme Commander. World War II went on for some time after 1939 before a Supreme Commander was appointed. The Staff did the ground work which permitted General Eisenhower to go over and assume the post of Supreme Commander of the European theater. At some time the European Defense Force needs a Supreme Commander; certainly, at the start, it needs a Chief of Staff. Mr. Acheson agreed that there was a difference between the functions of a Chief of Staff and a Supreme Commander, but a Chief of Staff could take care of the early needs, such as coordination of forces of different nationalities and training.
Sir William Elliott replied that the Chief of Staff could not perform these tasks unless he was Chief of Staff to a Supreme Commander. You could not have a Chief of Staff without a superior.
Mr. Acheson asked if the Chief of Staff would not be responsible to the Standing Group.
Sir William Elliott suggested that the Council might send a directive to the Defense Committee saying that it desired a Supreme Commander and Chief of Staff and then the Defense Committee could submit a recommendation to the Council as to the details of the appointments.
Mr. Acheson agreed that perhaps this could be done.
Mr. Bevin suggested that the desired result might be better achieved by a letter to the Defense Committee telling them what was wanted rather than by the resolution under consideration.
Mr. Schuman said that France has an army but no Supreme Commander, that a Commander in Chief is not appointed until his presence is actually required. The appointment of a Supreme Commander for the European defense forces now might create the impression that there was an immediate danger of war.
Mr. Bevin suggested that the titles might be omitted from this resolution and that the Defense Committee could draw up a plan based on the stated objectives of the Council. He wanted to get on with the job of creating an army and not waste any more time. There were small forces already on the Continent but he was not sure how good [Page 1223] an account they would give of themselves in the event of hostilities. He was afraid that we might have an army without generals.
Mr. Acheson asked for the attitude of the Ministers regarding paragraph 2.
Mr. Schuman asked what was meant by “contingents.” Would these be the national armies?
Mr. Acheson thought that the objective here was to differentiate between the national forces and the forces to be under command of the Supreme Commander.
Mr. Bevin reiterated his anxiety about any further delay and his desire to achieve a powerful centralized force.
Ambassador Franks suggested that the Ministers had been emphasizing three different aspects of the same problem. He thought that there was general agreement on this subject but that it might be reached more rapidly if the various considerations were recognized and weighed. He believed that one of the arguments had been based on strategic considerations: the need for a potent command in view of the possible outbreak of hostilities. A second argument had been political: that the transition from the planning stage to the creation of an actual defense force might proceed more rapidly under the stimulus of a Supreme Commander. The third argument had been professional: a discussion of the professional aspects of the transition from Chief of Staff to Supreme Commander.
Mr. Schuman suggested that it might be left up to the judgment of the Defense Committee to choose a proper time for the selection of a Supreme Commander.
Ambassador Franks suggested that the phrase “… in due course …” be eliminated since it connoted an indefinite delay before the appointment of a Supreme Commander.
Mr. Bevin said that he would have an opinion in the morning.
It was agreed that the press would be told that the Ministers had reviewed a report of the International Study Group, had discussed related German questions and that these discussions would continue tomorrow.
The Ministers agreed that the next session would be a private meeting at 10:30 a. m., Thursday, September 14th.16
The meeting was adjourned at 6:51 p. m.
- Dated September 4, p. 1248.↩
- Not printed. A copy of the brief of the ISG report, SFM D–4, dated September 8, is in CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 152: SFM Documents.↩
- Regarding the decision on displaced persons made at London by the ISG, see p. 1263.↩
- For the text of the Occupation Statute for Germany, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, p. 179.↩
Paragraph 3 of the Occupation Statute read:
“It is the hope and expectation of the Governments of France, the United States and the United Kingdom that the occupation authorities will not have occasion to take action in fields other than those specifically reserved above. The occupation authorities, however, reserve the right, acting under instructions of their Governments, to resume, in whole or in part, the exercise of full authority if they consider that to do so is essential to security or to preserve the democratic government in Germany or in pursuance of the international obligations of their Governments. Before so doing, they will formally advise the appropriate German authorities of their decision and of the reasons therefor.”↩
The section of the Occupation Statute dealing with foreign affairs read:
“2. In order to ensure the accomplishment of the basic purposes of the occupation, powers in the following fields are specifically reserved, including the right to request and verify information and statistics needed by the occupation authorities:
(c) foreign affairs, including international agreements made by or on behalf of Germany.”↩
- Information on Chancellor Adenauer’s memorandum of August 29 concerning the reshaping of the relationship between the occupying powers and the Federal Republic is scheduled for publication in volume iv.↩
- For the text of the Petersberg Protocol, November 22, 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, p. 343.↩
- For the text of December 27, see Document 27 (Revised), p. 1283, and footnotes thereto.↩
Document 31 read:
“The request of the Turkish Government for admission into the North Atlantic Treaty was carefully considered by the Fifth Session of the North Atlantic Council. It was the opinion of the Council that at the present stage of development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization it would not be feasible to extend the Treaty to new members. It was recognized, however, that in the case of the Mediterranean area, it would be desirable, if the Turkish and Greek Governments so desired, to make arrangements which would permit these two countries to be associated with appropriate phases of the work of the various North Atlantic Treaty military planning bodies engaged in planning the defense of the Mediterranean. The purpose of these arrangements would be to facilitate coordinated military planning without extending the membership of the Treaty.
“The Governments of Turkey and Greece will be informed of the foregoing decision of the Council. If they indicate a desire to conclude such arrangements, the Defense Committee will be so informed and is authorized to take appropriate steps so that representatives of Turkey and Greece may be associated with such phases of the work of the North Atlantic Treaty military planning bodies as is deemed appropriate by the Defense Committee.” (CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 152: SFM Documents 1–40)↩
- Senator Harry P. Cain, of Washington.↩
- For the text of Document 31 (Revised), “Proposed Directive to the Defense Committee of the North Atlantic Council,” see p. 1284.↩
- Dated September 13, p. 1277.↩
- For the text of Document 22 (Revised), see the first footnote 2, p. 1278.↩
- Dated September 13, p. 1280.↩
- At the United States Delegation Staff meeting at 9:30 a. m. on September 14, Secretary Acheson indicated that he wanted another restricted session to ascertain Schuman’s final position on German participation in the defense of the West and to explain again the situation to Bevin. (USDel Min 3: CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 152: USDel Mins)↩