Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 152: SFM Documents 1–40

Paper Prepared by the Tripartite Drafting Group of the Preliminary Conversations of the United States, United Kingdom, and France¹

top secret

[Washington,] September 1, 1950.

Document 10 [D–7a]

Security of Greece and Turkey

The security of the Near and Middle East and therefore the security of the West would be endangered if the Soviet Union obtained control of either Greece or Turkey.

The United Kingdom and French Governments have a treaty of alliance with Turkey. The United States and United Kingdom Governments have publicly stated and demonstrated in practice their deep interest in the integrity of Greece and Turkey.

The Soviet Union, therefore, has every reason to believe that a direct Soviet attack on Greece or Turkey would lead to general war, and that a satellite attack on either country might involve a similar risk.

The three Foreign Ministers should discuss the problem posed by the Turkish request for inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in an endeavor to reach an agreement among themselves prior to its consideration in the NAT Council. Recommendations on this point will, if possible, be submitted to the Ministers prior to their meeting.²

It is believed, however, that the Ministers should also consider the broader question of Near Eastern security, of which the Turkish application is but one facet.

Other means of dealing with this problem might include the following:

(1) The establishment of a new regional pact covering some or all of the countries in this area and to which the United Kingdom, Franca and the United States might lend their support;

(2) The admission of Turkey and Greece to North Atlantic Treaty discussions on a consultative basis rather than as a full member;

(3) New unilateral declarations by the three governments concerning the security of certain Near Eastern states.

Some of the considerations affecting the decision as to the inclusion of Turkey in the NAT would also apply to certain of these alternatives.³

The admission of Turkey to the NAT would probably involve the admission of Greece also. If Turkey and Greece were admitted to the NAT some form of reassurance might be required for Iran. If some alternative form of reassurance were adopted for Greece and Turkey, very careful consideration would have to be given to extending this reassurance to Iran, in the light of the association of this country with Greece and Turkey in public statements, and to the possible extension of this reassurance to other Middle Eastern countries also.

Irrespective of the decisions taken on the broad security problems discussed above⁴ the importance of continuing and, wherever feasible, expanding the present program of the supply of military equipment to Greece and Turkey should be borne in mind. Urgent study should be given to the question of what military equipment, over and above that comprised in present programs, could and should be supplied to Greece and Turkey in case of an attack by satellite forces without overt Soviet participation.

Similarly,⁵ as a further measure of protection to Greece, and in the light of the possibility of the renewal of guerrilla warfare, the French, United Kingdom and United States Delegations to the United Nations General Assembly should be instructed to support the continuation of UNSCOB in its present form.

1. Attached to the source text was a cover sheet, not printed, which indicated that this paper had been prepared in the preliminary talks for submission to the Foreign Ministers. It is a revision of Document 6 [D–7], dated August 31, the text of which is indicated in the following footnotes. (CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 152: SFM Documents 1–40)
2. The last sentence of the paragraph was not present in Document 6 [D–7].

3. In Document 6 [D–7], the preceding two paragraphs starting with “It is believed” read as follows:

   “Among the considerations involved in this decision, over and above the NAT considerations would be the following:

   • “(1) Would the adherence of Turkey to the NAT give substance to the Soviet Government’s claim that the USSR is being encircled by the West?
   • “(2) Would refusal of the application without some alternative form of reassurance cause the Soviet Union to believe that Western interest in Turkey had decreased?
   • “(3) Would inclusion in the Pact deter aggression more effectively than the existing commitments and the expressions of interest already given?
   • “(4) Would the psychological effect on Turkey of the rejection of its application, in the absence of an acceptable alternative, be serious?

   “Possible alternatives to the inclusion of Turkey in the NAT might be:

   • “(1) The establishment of a new regional pact to which the United Kingdom, France and the United States might lend their support;
   • “(2) The admission of Turkey to North Atlantic Treaty discussions on a consultative basis rather than as a full member;
   • “(3) New unilateral declarations by the three governments concerning the security of Turkey. Some of the objections to the inclusion of Turkey in the NAT would also apply to certain of these alternatives.”

4. In Document 6 [D–7] the first 12 words of this paragraph were not present.
5. The first word of this paragraph was not present in Document 6 [D–7].