Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 152: Documents 1–40

Paper Preparedly the Tripartite Drafting Group of the Preliminary Conversations of the United States, United Kingdom, and France¹

top secret

[Washington,] September 1, 1950.

Document 8 [D–6a]

Southeast Asia²

a. areas of agreement

1. Indochina must be regarded as the principal problem.

a. Its key strategic position and the extent of the threat to which it is at present exposed demands priority of treatment.

b. In spite of great sacrifices, French Union forces urgently need increased military assistance in the form of modern equipment to defeat Vietminh forces which are, with Chinese Communist assistance, now passing from guerrilla groups to organized divisional formations which may take the offensive during 1950.

c. The formation of expanded national armies of the three Associated States should be accelerated.

d. In spite of considerable political concessions by the French Government, the bulk of the indigenous population in Indochina continues to remain aloof. This population must be expeditiously given security and protection by further economic and military aid.³

e. World opinion, especially in Asia, must be made aware of the extent to which the national aspirations of Indochina have been and are being met. In the US and UK view, the concessions to be made by the French Government should be of a nature to attract support for the Associated States by Asian and Western countries.⁴

f. In view of the possibility of overt aggression or intervention by the Chinese Communists, there should be urgent consultation between United States, French and UK Governments of joint action to be taken in this eventuality. In this connection, French representative requested direct U.S. tactical support by air and indicated that his Government would request from the U.S. Government the equivalent of 50,000 million francs for maintenance of French Union forces in Indochina.⁵

g. No useful purpose could now be served by discussion of Indochina in the United Nations. The French Government is opposed to mediation or any form of reference to the U.N. In the event, however, of a Chinese Communist attack, or flagrant intervention, the matter should be referred to the Security Council. In case the initiative to bring the matter before the U.N. should be taken by some other Government, the three governments will consult with a view to reaching a common position.⁶

2. Malaya. It is vitally important for the whole of Southeast Asia that the British efforts to defeat Communist bandits in Malaya (the Briggs Plan) should be rapidly brought to a successful conclusion.⁷ The U.S. is sympathetically considering a U.K. request for economic and military assistance in the execution of the plan.

3. Burma and Siam. The British Commonwealth and the United States should continue, so far as possible, to supply to Burma and Siam such military equipment as may be required for the maintenance of public confidence and internal security, particularly in their border areas. Steps should also be taken by the three Governments to increase the effectiveness of Siam’s participation in the Arms Smuggling Committee in Bangkok. Increased efforts should be made by the U.K. Military Mission in Burma to achieve closer cooperation with the Burmese military organizations. U.S. collaboration in this was offered.⁸

4. Negotiations between the Dutch Government and the Indonesian Government on the future status of New Guinea should be allowed to continue without intervention at this stage by the three Governments.⁹

5. The three Governments should also press on urgently with plans for economic aid to Southeast Asia¹⁰ so that the peoples of Asia may realize that their welfare as well as that of the Western powers is at stake in the conflict with the Communist bloc. In the U.K. view, the economic development of South and Southeast Asia should contribute not only to the welfare of Southeast Asia but also to the balance of world trade by developing sources of raw material for the United States and Europe and so giving Europe an opportunity to earn by trade with Southeast Asia dollars spent there to buy raw materials for the U.S. and that in the short-term U.S. dollar aid is also needed in direct form to enable the necessary development work to go forward fast enough. Further, in the U.K. view, this aid should be given in an untied form so that Europe might have the opportunity to earn dollars by supplying the capital and other developmental goods on which these dollars might be spent.¹¹

6. The continuing rise in population in the rice consuming countries, the fall of rice production in key exporting countries, and the denial of traditional sources of supply for Japan have all contributed to a critical situation in rice supplies. It is therefore essential that there should be the fullest cooperation between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan and the governments of rice deficit countries.¹²

7. The Western Powers should strengthen the links between Southeast Asia and the West by all possible means, such as encouraging responsible Asian nationalism, developing the highest possible level of trade, discreetly helping such international bodies as the International Confederation of Free Trades Unions to extend their influence in Southeast Asia, increasing cultural exchanges, and providing adequate information about western and world affairs.¹³

8. The three Governments should ensure that Southeast Asia be made aware, by effective propaganda, of the true nature of the communist menace in Asia. In this connection support should be given to the present non-communist government of Indonesia.¹⁴

b. questions for ministerial consideration

1. Time, place and level of tripartite conversations on joint action to meet the eventuality of a Chinese Communist attack on Indochina.¹⁵

2. Character and timing of French plans to increase national armies in the three Associated States in Indochina.¹⁶

1. Attached to the source text was a cover sheet, not printed, which indicated that this paper had been prepared in the preliminary talks for consideration by the Foreign Ministers.
2. In Document 2 [D–6], submitted to the delegations on August 31, there was a preliminary paragraph which read: “Members of United States, French and British delegations discussed on August 30 the situation in Indochina and the Communist threat to Southeast Asia. Set out below are (a) the areas of agreement and (b) questions requiring Ministerial decision.” (CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 152: SFM Documents 1–40)
3. In Document 2 [D–6] there followed at this point the following phrase: “which will permit its educated elements to take their proper share of responsibility granted by the recent constitutional changes and pave the way for further political progress.”

4. In Document 2 [D–6] subparagraph e read:

   “World–wide opinion, especially in Asia, must be made aware of the extent to which the aspirations of Indochina have already been met. The concessions made by the French Government should be of a type to enlist the sympathetic recognition of the Associated States by Western and Asiatic countries.”

5. In Document 2 [D–6] subparagraph f read:

   “Chinese Communists are at present giving considerable material aid to Vietminh in terms of equipment, training and improved communications. In view of the additional possibility of direct overt aggression or intervention by the Chinese Communists, there should be urgent consultations between United States, French and British Governments of joint action to be taken in this eventuality. In this connection, French representative requested direct U.S. tactical support by air and indicated that his Government would request from the U.S. Government the equivalent of 50 billion francs for continued maintenance of French Union forces and military personnel in Indochina.”

6. In Document 2 [D–6] the first sentence of subparagraph g read: “No useful purpose could now be served by discussion in the United Nations of the situation in Indochina.” There was no fourth sentence.
7. The first sentence of paragraph 2 in Document 2 [D–6] read: “It was recognized as vitally important for the whole of Southeast Asia that the British efforts to defeat Communist bandits in Malaya (the Briggs Plan) should be brought to a successful conclusion as early as possible.”

8. In Document 2 [D–6] paragraph 3 read:

   “The British Commonwealth and the United States should continue, so far as their own rearmament programmers allow, to supply to Burma and Siam such arms and other military equipment as may be required for the maintenance of public confidence and internal security, particularly in their border areas. At the same time appropriate steps should be taken by the three Governments to increase the effectiveness of Siam’s participation in the Arms Smuggling Committees in Bangkok. Further increased efforts should be made by the British Military Mission in Burma to effect closer cooperation with the Burmese military organizations. U.S. collaboration in this was offered.”

9. In Document 2 [D–6] this paragraph was numbered 8 and read: “Negotiations between the Dutch Government and the Indonesian Government on the future status of New Guinea should be allowed to continue. Intervention at this stage by the three Governments would not assist the solution of the problem.”
10. The initial phrasing of this paragraph, numbered 4 in Document 2 [D–6], read: “While taking steps to make Southeast Asia as secure as possible against direct or indirect aggression, the three Governments should press on urgently with plans for economic aid ….”
11. In Document 2 [D–6] this last sentence was attached to the previous one as a phrase that read: “provided this aid is given in an untied form Western Europe will have the opportunity to earn dollars by themselves supplying the capital and other developmental goods on which these dollars may be spent.”

12. This paragraph, numbered 5 in Document 2 [D–6], read as follows:

    “The continuing rise in population of Southeast Asia, the fall of rice production in key exporting countries, and the denial of traditional sources of supply for Japan have all contributed to the critical situation in the rice deficit countries of Southeast Asia. It is therefore essential that there should continue to be coordination and sympathetic cooperation between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan and the governments of rice deficit countries.”

13. This paragraph, numbered 6 in Document 2 [D–6], read as follows:

    “The Western Powers should strengthen by all possible means both great and small the links between Southeast Asia and the West. For example, by lending encouragement to responsible Asian nationalism; by developing the highest possible level of trade exchanges and by discreetly helping such approved international bodies as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions to extend their influence in Southeast Asia; by increasing cultural exchanges between Southeast Asia and the West, and by providing sufficient accurate information about western and world affairs.”

14. This paragraph, numbered 7 in Document 2 [D–6], read as follows:

    “The three Governments should continue to ensure that the governments and peoples of Southeast Asia are gradually and discreetly made aware, by effective propaganda, of the true nature of the Communist menace in Asia. In this connection support should be given to the present moderate and anti-communist government of Indonesia, whose successful example would be of value not only in Indonesia itself but throughout the whole of Southeast Asia.”

15. Following this question and numbered 2 in Document 2 [D–6] was the following question: “Character and form of representations to Siamese Government to increase the efficiency of their participation in the Bangkok Arms Smuggling Committee.”
16. Following this question and numbered 4 in Document 2 [D–6] was the following question: “Further steps to be taken to continue cooperation between SCAP and the governments of rice deficit countries.”