740.5/4–2750
Memorandum by Mr. William Sanders, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)
Subject: European Integration and NATO
It would appear that we have reached a point in our discussions of this matter in Washington and here where a common denominator is discernible.
The main proposals submitted to date are:
- (1)
- The RA draft of April 15 (FMD B–3/1)1 which would develop and reorient NAT as the basic organization in which US participates with Europe;
- (2)
- The second RA proposal of April 22 (FMD B–3/2) in which NAT would be the central organization with broadened functions but limited to the defense objectives of the Pact;
- (3)
- The Ger proposal of April 22 (FMD B–3/3) for a North Atlantic Council;
- (4)
- The UK idea which contemplates an “umbrella” organization (it is not clear whether within or without the NAT framework);
- (5)
- The French idea, which apparently involves: (a) general agreement with the US proposal for an arrangement (permanent commission) for a continuing NAT Council group at a deputy ministerial level, with a high calibre executive staff, and with functions somewhat similar to those set out in the US proposal referred to in (2) above; (b) a western economic organization or conventional arrangement for economic cooperation on a broad front, which would include non-Pact members of the OEEC and the US and Canada.
The main objections advanced to the first two are:
- (1)
- The complex of problems raised by German participation;
- (2)
- The failure to make a separation between military matters, on one hand, and political and economic, on the other, with consequent psychological and political repercussions, including the effect on German and “neutral” country participation;
- (3)
- The imprecise but real inhibitions on freedom of action in non-security matters which flow under the UN Charter from linking an [Page 76] arrangement for political, economic and social cooperation to a collective or regional defense arrangement.
As to the second proposal, there has been doubt whether it would satisfy the over-all requirements of the situation.
The third proposal would appear to require starting de novo and would give Germany a species of qualified membership that would relegate her to the role of a Cinderella colony in military matters.
Two major points have emerged in the discussions in London. The first would develop the NAT along the lines of the RA paper of April 22 mentioned in (2) above. The second calls for some organization or arrangement for continuing cooperation in the general economic field, that is, on matters not specifically related to the economies of the defense program. A further aspect of this question is raised by the Ger paper which would include cooperation in non-security political matters. Both the French and the Ger proposals are designed to meet the German problem. The French also place considerable stress on US, Canadian and “neutral” country participation in such a North Atlantic arrangement.
It is evident that agreement on some kind of continuing top level body under NAT for NAT purposes is likely at these meetings, particularly after today’s discussions with the French and the apparent move by the UK to drop their idea of an umbrella organization. Final conclusion on the French proposal will not be feasible. The French recognize this and agree that further study is necessary. The Foreign Ministers could: (a) agree on the terms of reference of such a study and on the methods for its execution; (b) agree on general principles but leave the issues of specific substance and organization for subsequent elaboration and agreement.
If specific terms of reference are required, they might contemplate an agreement on general principles of political (in non-security matters), economic and social cooperation. These principles could be as general or as specific as might be considered feasible and desirable. The agreement could be developed in terms of a reciprocal relationship between the US and Canada and the OEEC countries with provision for some consultative procedures. There would in any event be a minimum of organization to start with, the door left open to whatever institutional developments might be called for by experience and needs. The requirements that must be met include particularly: (1) the agreement must be non-military, chiefly because of Germany but also because of the French desire to include the “neutrals”, but should be able indirectly to backstop the broad economic implications of defense preparations under the NAT; (2) it must eventually have sufficient US participation and support to give the [Page 77] UK the reassurance she needs for a progressively closer association with Europe. In effect, the arrangement would be a combination of alternatives (a) and (e) of the RA paper of April 152 with the qualifications that the new arrangement would not absorb existing organizations. These would be integrated with or be related to the new arrangement or wither on the vine, depending on the needs and circumstances. The problem of initial duplication and overlapping is unavoidable whether we use the NAT framework or not.
The specifically military aspect could continue as at the present under the NAT setup, to which there could be a cross reference in the general agreement providing that the members would apply in the event of aggression against a member state the measures and procedures established in any special treaties to which they were individually parties. This provision would give the arrangement the necessary latitude for the UK idea of gradualism and hold out the possibility of eventual full German participation in defense matters through membership in NAT.
Such an arrangement could be initiated under Executive authority. Congressional authorization would be required depending on the cost and the nature of the commitments that might eventually be incurred.