Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

396.1 LO/5–650: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Preparatory Meetings to the Secretary of State

secret

London , May 6, 1950—11 p. m.

Secto 181. Seventh US–UK bilateral May 6.

1. Bipartite paper UKUS/P/9 on certain aspects of items three, four and six B of bipartite agenda was approved. (Secto 109 and paragraph 2 Secto 164) Full revised text in separate message.¹

2. Bipartite paper USUK/P/5 approved with new paragraph 6 reading as follows:
“It is further recognized that the close relationship between the US and UK should assist closer UK relations with Western Europe and foster the development of closer relations between all members of the Atlantic community.” Subsequent paragraphs renumbered. This new paragraph 6 replaces text suggested by Jessup as paragraph 5a and transmitted in paragraph 4 of Secto 164.

3. Bipartite paper UKUS/P/10 submitted as agreed report by subcommittee Q on item 13 of bipartite Ministers agenda on colonial questions.² Paper was not discussed in detail but is to go to the Ministers as agreed report from subcommittee (Secto 128³). Two points raised in course of subcommittee Q discussions were briefly brought to attention of bipartite meeting: (1) desirability of referring to other areas in statement issued at close of NAT Council meeting. British stated that it might prove awkward if every time there were NAT statement something had to be said about Greece, Turkey and Iran. Hare, however, pointed out that in view of importance of role of three countries they could not be ignored. He suggested it might at least be possible to include a clause in NAT declaration as a peg on which to hang a later reference to satisfy the three countries. (2) Possible association with NAT organization of other nations mentioned but not discussed.

4. Hare also mentioned question of statement of declaration in regard to shipment of arms to the Near East and security. As question had been submitted to Bevin subcommittee could not proceed further. It was suggested that two delegations might wish give further consideration matter in light of Bevin’s reply when received.

5. Short report on Japan was received from committee R. As text made no mention of Japanese peace treaty because officials not in position to discuss it, it was agreed to preface report with following statement:
“The question of the Japanese peace treaty was deferred until the arrival of Mr. Acheson. In the meantime it was agreed that …” Full text in separate message.⁴

6. Short paper in items 2 and 4 of Ministers’ agenda (roles)⁵ (see paragraph 6 Secto 164) was submitted by Wright with provisional approval of Makins and Strang. It was agreed that it was desirable that Ministers should have some such paper before them and hope was expressed that opportunity might be found for discussion of Wright paper before subject reached on Ministers agenda.

7. Wright again explained that paper on roles with body of bipartite papers from subcommittees to serve as check list could be regarded as setting forth common objectives which could be reviewed jointly from time to time by Ministers. Purpose would be to see how far policies were being carried out and how well common objectives stood up.

8. Hare indicated that there was one further report to be submitted by subcommittee R on the Indian subcontinent.

9. It was agreed that delegations should have bilateral meetings next week if there were papers to be cleared or it was felt discussions might be useful.

1. Secto 192, May 8, not printed (CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 151: Secto Cables).
2. Not printed. A copy of this paper, dated May 6 and entitled “Joint United States/United Kingdom Paper on Item 13: Colonial Questions,” is in Conference Files: Lot 59 D 95: CF 24.
3. Dated May 4, p. 950.

4. Transmitted in Secto 191, May 8, not printed, this report read:

   “The question of the Japanese Peace Treaty was deferred until the arrival of Mr. Acheson. In the meantime it was agreed that:

   • “(I) The fundamental problem is to ensure that Japan is not drawn into the Soviet orbit.
   • “(II) Time is not on the side of the democratic powers. As time passes it becomes more difficult to achieve a solution on the lines best calculated to safeguard the interests of the democratic powers, and the problem is, therefore, one of urgency.
   • “(III) There should be joint Anglo-American study and consultation about the future of Japan’s foreign trade, with particular reference to the political and economic implications of the restoration of Japan’s trade with (a) China and (b) Southeast Asia.” (396.1 LO/5–850)

5. The paper under reference has not been found in Department of State files.