396.1 LO/5–550: Telegram
The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Preparatory Meetings to the Secretary of State
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Secto 162. Second general meeting on Germany resumed this morning with Kirkpatrick and Steel for British, Massigli and Bérard for [Page 930] French, Perkins1 and Byroade for US. Discussions centered around a paper prepared by British as result of yesterday’s talks. The paper as now modified by us and somewhat watered down by French is designed as discussion paper for the Ministers and will be transmitted by separate cable.2
Discussion of this paper has been difficult from the American point of view. It is difficult to object to the specific parts of paper as it contains many of steps which we would like to see taken in Germany if they are placed in the proper context. As matter of tactics, it did not seem wise to object to these specific steps, even though placed somewhat in the wrong surroundings, because it was not desired support French hesitation towards moving forward.
On other hand the paper sponsors a course of general lifting of controls, particularly foreign affairs, without any single specific return which we have desired from Germans, including question of contribution to the building of basic strength in the West and without assurance that either French or British are prepared take action themselves, particularly in economic field, that would minimize risks this course. It is a course of giving up controls without any assurance that an adequate framework is to be established either in Western Europe or in the North Atlantic area which would both create a drawing force on the Germans and tie them to a Western framework of significance either politically and economically.
If we proceed along these lines we face possibility of relinquishing our position of influence in Germany and hence to great extent in Europe in return primarily for Germany’s alignment with West through Council of Europe which light of probable developments is inadequate. Under these conditions Byroade reserved his approval of entire paper, stating that whether US wished to go this far or even farther in our German policy would depend a great deal upon type of framework we were building in West in which Germany could fit. Inasmuch as this subject was being dealt with elsewhere and would probably be dealt with by Ministers, he felt no agreed recommendations could be given the Ministers on policy towards Germany in isolation of this broader problem.
Discussion then turned to the subject of reply to request by Adenauer for establishment of central militarized police of 25,000. Massigli objected strongly to any affirmative action on this request without more careful study, pointing out familiar French pre-occupation at this element of control in hands of a central government. They proposed [Page 931] as an alternative that consideration be given the formation of separate and stronger units in the Laender which could be called upon by Federal Government. He stated that in his opinion French Government would be unable at this time conference even on ministerial level to give final approval of establishment of central police as such a step would require extensive coordination within their government.
The British argued for approval of Adenauer’s request almost solely upon fact that they were afraid of purely domestic disturbances and riots by Germans against decisions of their government in which British troops might have to interfere. They were afraid also that chance might arise where sympathy in Britain were with rioting personnel which would create a major public opinion problem in Britain if British troops were used. Kirkpatrick did not seem to connect in any way need for central police in West with fact that such forces are already in being in East.
Byroade stated it had been our hope that we could create a situation which would so identify Germany’s interests and aims with West that existence of a number of centralized police would not be viewed as a matter of concern or relative importance. However, he wished reserve his position as he considered it improper for a communication from Adenauer to HICOM to be raised for governmental discussion and decision prior to any formulation of opinion on the subject within HICOM. He stated that after arrival of HICOM it might be possible to formulate a position for Ministers. Kirkpatrick then stated that perhaps we could authorize Adenauer to create a limited number of federal police for control of Bonn area and reserve rest for future study. Massigli stated he believed this would be acceptable to French.
Subject of a protest note to Soviets regarding remilitarization of IC astern Zone was then discussed without conclusion. There were indications that both Kirkpatrick and Massigli were in agreement with US proposal but that they were still without clearance on this subject from their Ministers.
Committee will meet tomorrow to attempt finalizing various portions of communiqué and to confirm drafts of various other agenda items which have been under preparation in sub-committees. It is not expected that there will be further talks on major policy questions regarding Germany in advance of arrival of Ministers.3
Sent Department Secto 162, repeated Paris 763, Frankfort 207.
- George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.↩
- Secto 169, infra.↩
- The United States Delegation reported on the final meeting of Subcommittee B in Secto 199, May 8, not printed, indicating the agreement that had been reached on the various papers on Germany (396.1 LO/5–850). The agreed papers were then submitted to the Foreign Ministers.↩