396.1 LO/5–250: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at the Tripartite Preparatory Meetings, at London
Sec summarized pgs 17 to 25 by saying we apparently contemplated relinquishing controls except general right of intervention, control of relations with East, military potential, and right to maintain occupation forces, in exchange for German undertakings largely of technical and legal nature except for trade and decartelization. He did not see how such action depended on creation of new organization and queried whether new organization cld exert controls comparable to those relinquished. It was brought out that essence of problem was to secure wholehearted German cooperation with West which was primarily a psychological problem. It wld be desirable to have place where Gers cld argue their case publicly. Secretary suggested he might take line with Bevin and Schuman that German situation was unstable, that we must move in one direction or other, and that we must reduce controls. He wld ask what Britain and France wanted, including what protection. Cooper3 believed relaxation inevitable and shld be in a larger context where Gers cld participate in working out problems. Sec believed this wld be useful if it resulted in action. It was consensus that time running out on controls, occupation statute must be reviewed this fall, McCloy felt 18 months outside limit and ECA wld end 1952.[Page 914]
At Sec’s request Nitze summed up situation as fol: Situation unstable, we must move one way or other. It wld be disastrous if Ger not affiliated with West and more inclined bargain East against West. It is necessary gradually to relax controls and develop Ger responsibility. This is two way street and Gers must give Fr and others ground for confidence. In econ field they are in OEEC and will be in GATT. In polit field it is question of spirit and will on both sides. In security field if Ger is to be integrated emphasis shld be shifted from occupation to security, including greater Ger contribution to logistic support for both occupation forces and North Atlantic area. It is also important to have economically stronger Eur in which Ger economy cld develop. In reply Sec’s query what commitments from Ger we want it was stated we wanted action by Ger showing its voluntary affiliation with West, including Council for Europe, and logistic support. Sec commented we apparently must do much for Ger and are seeking rather negligible results in return. Cooper commented controls going to be relaxed and econ measures were necessary anyway. Fact Gers cld not be enmeshed without their own volition supported idea of new org in which common problems cld be discussed, including theirs, and in which they wld have increasing responsibility. It was observed solutions to all these problems wld require time to work out but that it was important to associate Gers with process as quickly as possible. Clearly Mins must agree on at least broad directives.
In conclusion Sec requested outline which S/P is preparing along fol lines: (1) Analysis of situation indicates we cannot sit still and various factors, such as need for review of occupation statute, limit available time. We must begin to move now. (2) What does West want from Ger? This wld include not merely Ger affiliation but specific matters such as commitment to help support Western armament effort rand not to conspire with or increase mil potential of East by trade. (3) What must West do in relaxation of controls and what further shld it do to give Gers real interest in affiliation? He felt E–1 and shorter A–2/3 “Policy on Ger”4 (which was not specifically discussed) [Page 915] too voluminous and confused and wld prefer outline from which he cld talk. Nevertheless he believed we are getting warmer. [Lewis and Achilles.]
- Geoffrey W. Lewis, Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of German Economic Affairs, and Theodore C. Achilles, Director of the Office of Western European Affairs.↩
- FM D E–l, “Position Paper on Germany,” dated May 1, not printed (CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 149: May CFM 1950 E, F, G, H Series).↩
- Presumably a reference to John Sherman Cooper who would act as a special assistant to Secretary Aeheson at the Foreign Ministers meeting.↩
Not printed. FM D A–2/3, dated May 2, and two subsequent drafts, FM D A–2/3a and b, dated May 4, neither printed, state the following as the United States objectives in Germany:
- “1. Progressive removal of all controls except those of a ‘peace treaty type.’
- “2. Development of economic conditions in the free world to support German economic needs.
- “3. Identification of a unified, independent and democratic Germany with the common objectives of the Western countries.
- “4. Identification of German security, welfare and independence with the security, welfare and independence of the West.” (CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 149: May FM Meeting A Series)
An outline of FM D A–2/3a, approved by Secretary Acheson, was transmitted to the United States Delegation on May 3 in Tosec 80, not printed (396.1 LO/5–350).↩