396.1 LO/5–550: Telegram

The Head of the United States Delegation at the Tripartite Preparatory Meetings (Jessup) to the Secretary of State
top secret   niact

Secto 147. Personal for Secretary from Jessup. Development of discussions to date indicate British and French at preparatory talks level are not prepared to meet fundamental questions we have posed namely: (a) If US and perhaps Canada will play greater role in European and North Atlantic affairs what obstacles would that remove in way of further integration of Germany in Western Europe and of further participation of UK on European continental consolidation? (b) What are the present obstacles? (c) What kind of US role would they think necessary to overcome them?

These questions posed against background of: (1) Agreed appraisal of seriousness of cold-war situation requiring Western cooperation; (2) General agreement Germany must be oriented to the’ West and (3) Understanding by US we are not asking their merger [Page 911] in a European federal state and are not ourselves talking of merging in a North Atlantic federation. We have read them A–8/1a (post 1952 paper).1

Under these circumstances Perkins, Byroade2 and I suggest you consider following procedure. At first trilateral talks you request restricted meeting of Bevin, Schuman and you with only one associate each. Would recommend just you three except Schuman may need interpreter. You would state you desired this intimate talk to permit frankest discussion lines of desirable policy. You could not commit US but [could be?] prepared to explore policies which you would be willing to recommend to President and Congress. You would express willingness recommend continuing role for US with reference to European and North Atlantic community after 1952. You could not frame or carry through such recommendation unless you could say UK and French Governments were spontaneously seeking approval policies directed toward further integration of a Europe in which both UK and Germany would play a part. You would ask them to tell you frankly their answers to questions posed first paragraph this telegram. If frank exchange resulted this approach foundation would be laid for continuing discussion specific agenda items with advisers present in usual way.

Believe something of this kind necessary to make real progress on fundamental issues. Same results could not be achieved in bilateral talks since important have Bevin and Schuman discuss these issues in each other’s and your presence but will continue to press these issues until your arrival and may be able to give you a better picture of basic positions at that time.

[
Jessup
]
  1. Dated April 20, p. 848.
  2. Henry A. Byroade, Director of the Bureau of German Affairs.