396.1 LO/4–2550: Telegram
The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Preparatory Meetings to the Secretary of State
Secto 14. Following reports remainder second session bipartite conversations supplementing Secto 650.1
Jessup summarized our view on question of negotiations with Soviet Union following closely points contained paper B–21a 2. Referring to Lie proposal,3 he indicated that although we felt meeting would be futile and would prefer to avoid it, we did not feel we could respond in such a manner that we would appear to be blocking a “constructive” suggestion. British indicated they shared our view that negotiations in near future with USSR very undesirable and said was no particular pressure from UK public opinion for such a meeting.[Page 864]
It was agreed that, if impossible, to avoid negotiations with Russians either because of response to Lie suggestion or pressure of public opinion, special session of Security Council probably best forum but agreed that Chinese representation question would have to be settled first. Jessup indicated that if such a meeting held, we felt it would be desirable to put principal outstanding issues between east and west on agenda. British apparently less sure about items to be put on agenda and felt question might be jointly considered further. They felt reaching agreement with Russians even on an agenda, would be exceedingly difficult.
Jebb indicated that if it were possible to avoid discussions, it might be desirable for Atlantic powers to make a declaration of principle. Such a declaration might be either a detailed statement of conditions which would have to be met before Atlantic powers could negotiate with Russians or alternatively a restatement of western principles. He felt such a statement might reduce pressure of public opinion for negotiation with Russians. Jebb indicated he agreed completely with Secretary’s views as expressed in recent statements that essential step prior to any negotiation was further building of strength in west. British statements added up to rather strong position against broad negotiations with Russians, if can possibly be avoided.
Discussion indicated British may feel point of Russian non-cooperation could if necessary, be proved by meeting on some specific subject rather than broad discussions.
Turning to question of Chinese representation, Jessup restated our view on problem.4 Jebb indicated concern lest our attitude might lead to eventual dismemberment UN. He pointed out that if at Security Council meeting when question of new members to UN was considered we, in absence of USSR, voted for our entire list5 of new members, situation might be created which would make it virtually impossible for USSR to return to UN. Jessup recognized that admission all of our proposed new members without action on USSR proposals might create awkward situation for Russians but felt we [Page 865] could avoid having question of new members arise or at least avoid taking action on question. He recognized that it was possible that developments in Formosa over next few months might mean some alteration in our position. If situation deteriorated and no Nationalist Government existed, question would obviously be materially different from that at present. He threw out as a feeler the possibility of “universal” membership in UN to which the British were decidedly cool.
British pressed us hard on Chinese representation indicating they viewing situation in UN with increasing alarm. They share our view, however, that Soviets not now contemplating permanent withdrawal. We gave them no encouragement we could change our Chinese representation position but stressed we were not attempting influence action other Security Council members this question.
Sent Department, repeated Paris 651.
- Same as Secto 13, supra.↩
Not printed; it considered the question of negotiation with the Soviet Union and concluded:
- “1. Broad negotiations with the Soviets are undesirable at the present time.
- “2. It is, however, possible that broad negotiations will be necessary this year.
- “3. In the event that such negotiations are held the Western powers must be prepared to demonstrate that their reasonable position on the great issues is unacceptable to the Soviets, thus debunking Soviet ‘peace’ propaganda and gaining the offensive in the cold war.
- “4. The UN Security Council or CFM would appear to be the preferable forums for such negotiations.
- “5. There should be no hurry to proceed with negotiations since delay of a few months may help to clarify necessity for them.
- “6. A special limited meeting of the UN Security Council, in response to Secretary General Lie’s proposal, could not meet the general purpose of strengthening Western morale and resolution but might be benefiicial to the UN itself.” (CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 149: May FM Meeting B Series)
One earlier and two subsequent drafts of this paper, FM D B–21, 21b, and 21c, dated April 12, 20, and May 6, respectively, are in the CFM Files, ibid., all have the same set of conclusions.↩
- For documentation on Secretary-General Lie’s proposal for a special meeting of the Security Council, see vol. ii, pp. 228 ff.↩
- According to FM D F–1/1, “Chinese Representation in the UN,” the United States “opposed proposals to unseat representatives of the Chinese National Government in United Nations Organs and would oppose proposals to seat Chinese Communists.” The United States believed that Chinese representation was a procedural question and it would accept the parliamentary decision of the several organs on the question. FM D F–l/1 recommended that this policy “should be maintained.” (CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 149: May CFM 1950 E, F, G, H Series). For documentation on the Chinese representation question, see vol. ii, pp. 186 ff.↩
- According to FM D F–2, “United Nations Membership,” not printed, the United States favored the admission of the following 15 states: Jordan, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Austria, Finland, Ceylon, Nepal, Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Albania, Mongolian People’s Republic, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. (CFM Files, ibid.)↩