740.5/4–2450: Telegram
The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Preparatory Meetings to the Secretary of State
Secto 7. This telegram continues summary this afternoon’s meeting.
Wright summing up, expressed view we agreed extent common danger and could ill-afford permit Soviet strengthening comparison with West. Based, thereon, do we believe:
- (1)
- One means building strength of West is further development Atlantic framework or pact itself;
- (2)
- Do we consider the Atlantic framework viewed from angle western interest throughout world cannot work if US or UK working at cross purposes;
- (3)
- If the answers to (1) and (2) are affirmative, shouldn’t we do everything we can to strengthen each other;
- (4)
- Would it be of assistance attempt develop common objectives various areas towards which we would work.
Jessup indicated generally we would reply affirmatively all questions but would not wish this point reduced to text because of the relative element. He indicated illustratively that in strengthening each other we would not wish to weaken some other area in which we are interested. Jessup indicated he was quite clear on point (2), that development of the pact was a means of gathering strength. On point (4) he agreed the NEA precedent extremely useful and that that experience could be applied on broader basis. He also mentioned on (1) that we would not want to carry to extreme which would result in destruction or serious injury to UN. Strang summarized by indicating he believed agreement in broad terms on Wright’s four points existed.
Jessup then reviewed briefly problems in areas we feel are lost, from paper A–8 as amended.1 Strang indicated agreement that situation not good in Burma. He felt India, Pakistan serious but now more hopeful. On Iran, UK very concerned and will want to discuss in detail. Agrees situation Greece has improved. Considers Germany very important and one of main purposes of the talks. Agrees Russians assign Germany high priority.
Discussion then turned to importance of the West taking and holding initiative. British seem less concerned than we are that Russians indeed have initiative and pointed out various steps in western Europe past two years where we had seized initiative. Agreed, however, [Page 857] psychological aspects most important and both should continue strengthen. Jessup suggested UK and US had developed special skills this field and should lend helping hand to others, such as France.
Agreed British bilateral tomorrow morning discuss various items Atlantic Pact agenda and item 7a, the question of future UN meetings and Chinese representation UN. Agreed discuss tomorrow afternoon agenda items 3 and 4.2
Throughout today’s meeting British were obviously seeking avoid commitment to become involved in any close European union while agreeing they should give leadership. We avoided any encouragement this line deferring issue until specific points reached later meetings.3
Sent Department Secto 4, repeated Paris 640.
- Regarding this paper, presumably FM D A–8a, see FM D A–8 and footnote 2 thereto, infra. ↩
- For the identification of the items under reference in this paragraph, see telegram 1731, April 17, p. 835.↩
- Following this first bilateral meeting with the British, Jessup and Perkins met briefly with René Massigli, the French Ambassador in the United Kingdom, who “emphasized that the item of prime importance to Schuman was Indochina.” The United States representatives agreed that this should be discussed in tripartite meetings rather than bilateral and told Massigli that the principal topic in the meeting with the British had been a review of the world situation. Secto 5, from London, April 24 (9 P. m.), not printed (396.1 LO/4–2450).↩