Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

850.33/10–550: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France ¹

confidential

Washington, October 5, 1950—7 p. m.

1757. Fol are Dept and ECA comments on relations of Schuman Plan countries to outside countries, on which added comments promised in Deptel 1717, Oct 3. Points below shld be made in manner which recognizes primacy of US objectives re Schuman Plan of achieving supranational Auth and single market.

(1) No US Govt view yet exists on best means by which Schuman Plan countries cld obtain internatl acceptance of Plan embodying Schuman principles. Dept and ECA exploring all possible approaches. It seems clear to us that if plan is developed along lines Schuman principles, US Govt support for plan will not be meaningful unless; it includes vigorous efforts to dissuade UK and possibly other countries who might decide to resist consummation plan by six countries.

(2) Whatever tactics US may adopt, however, it is already clear that provisions of Schuman Plan which directly affect interests of outside producing and consuming countries must be developed with utmost care. While US is committed to support a plan which incorporates original principles expressed by Schuman, no such commitment exists on part of UK and other countries. These countries may decide to resist consummation of a plan which US wld support, relying upon existing bilateral and multilateral commitments in conflict with plan as one means of exercising pressure. Accordingly, State and ECA believe that US objective shld be (a) to insure that provisions of plan are consistent with Schuman objectives as originally stated and (b) to insure that provisions which directly affect outside producer and consumer countries are reasonable and equitable. The achievement of these objectives wld serve the double purpose of contributing to achievement of plan which US cld accept and of denying other countries excuse for blocking plan.

(3) For above reasons, Dept and ECA believe Schuman Plan negotiators are strongly advised to avoid development provisions of protectionist character. For example, if minimum tariff provision adopted, minimum shld be set at or below present Benelux level. Reaction to specific quantitative restriction proposals still under study.

(4) By same token, Dept and ECA disturbed by drift in direction eliminating provisions to safeguard outside consumer countries, in contradiction of principle expressed in early Schuman declarations that such countries wld have access to production of complex on nondiscriminatory basis. For example, provision in Embtel 1664,² Para 15–e, now appears guarantee nondiscriminatory prices only within complex, not to outside markets, while Para F lays down standards for export prices which cld readily result in dual pricing and discrimination. In same vein, Auth’s review of private restrictive agreements does not seem to include agreements relating to export activities of enterprises in complex.³

Webb

1. Repeated to London as 1784 for ISG and to Torquay as 35 for USDel GATT.
2. Not printed.
3. The instructions to Bruce in this telegram 1757 and in telegram 1717 of October 3 were supplemented by telegram 2205 to Paris on October 26. This message, not printed, dealt further with six points already covered in the earlier telegrams and in addition expressed concern over the projected power of the Court of Justice to overrule a decision of the High Authority. (850.33/10–2650)