Office of the Historian

762A.5/12–1650: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy), at Frankfort

confidential   priority
Washington, December 16, 1950—5 p. m.

4371. Special guidance. European Defense and the Question of German Participation

In the face of increasing expressions from German quarters indicating “rejection” of the anticipated NATO terms for German participation, and increasingly bold emphasis on the Germans’ own “terms”, a noticeable change in emphasis in our treatment of the subject for German audiences is in order:

  • (1) We must try to bring the German issue once more back into proper perspective by stressing that the problem is a defense organization for Western Europe, including Germany, in which the Germans will have an opportunity to participate.
  • (2) We should phrase our arguments in terms of general European problems, ignoring for the moment the specific issues raised by German groups and parties. This would enable us to bring the discussion once more back to the fundamental issues—danger, need for common [Page 581] defense, common effort now under way—which have been overshadowed by the German insistence on conditions for their participation. We may continue to emphasize that discussion of details is premature, pending NATO Ministers’ agreement to the plans as worked out in London, and formal consultation with the German government.
  • (3) The European defense organization now in the making is not designed for aggressive purposes. The US and the other nations of the West will continue to explore every fruitful avenue in order to avoid war.
  • (4) Experience has shown that unpreparedness and inaction are apt to tempt Communist aggression. The example of Berlin has demonstrated to all of Europe that the firm resolution to resist, backed up by the determined use of all available material means, is the first important factor in deterring aggression.
  • (5) It is only natural that the creation of a common defense organization of the Western nations has presented great difficulties. The progress made by the deputies group towards agreement among the NATO nations, through painstaking discussion, careful study of the mutual differences and deliberate concessions for the good of the common cause, is of historic significance. In spite of the remaining difficulties, it offers a basis for common action towards an effective defense organization.
  • (6) All Western European nations are faced with a decision which they have neither sought nor desired but which grim necessity is forcing upon them. Ultimately, the decision is between petty prejudices and reservations, and the defense of the common European heritage; between a narrow national outlook, and European solidarity; between submission to another totalitarian system, and the defense of free institutions; but also between doubts, inertia, and futility, and determined, joint, deliberate action.
  • (7) We should repeat that it is premature for Germans to take position on details regarding German participation (a) before these details have been fully decided upon, and the German government has had an opportunity to be consulted; and (b) because they first will have to make a fundamental decision along the lines indicated under (5).
  • (8) While not arguing German equality demands at this point, we should try to make Germans realize the progress towards a generally heightened position of respect and equality among the Western European nations which is entitled in defense participation.
  • (9) (FYI): (The German demand for equal status in the defense organization meets with basic difficulties which at least the NATO deputies have not been able to overcome. They lie in the generally agreed-upon intent to effect German military contribution while preventing the resurgence of a German national army. While the NATO nations have their own national armies to contribute, German elements have to be created and integrated into an international force in such a manner as to prevent later withdrawal into a national army. It is a curious contradiction—which we may point out as soon as detailed agreement by the NATO ministers has been announced—that the strongest clamor for German “equality” comes from the traditional anti-militarists who, at the same time, oppose reestablishment of a [Page 582] German national army, and who might logically be expected to cooperate in devising structural safeguards.)

Acheson