740.5/12–1550: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State
priority
3482. I took up Deptel 30541 with Bevin this morning. I had gone to see him with regard to another matter and before I had opportunity to outline position stated in reftel he referred to a message which he had sent to Secretary yesterday2 expressing concern re German attitude and went on to outline his personal thinking with regard to steps we should take with respect to Germany following Brussels meeting. He outlined the four following steps:
- (1) We should not make any offer or any proposal to the Germans concerning their contribution to western defense as to do so would invite a rebuff. He felt that an informal and unofficial conversation should be held with Adenauer much along the lines of paragraph 5 reftel.
- (2) We should proceed immediately with the appointment of the supreme commander and the organization of the NAT defense force.
- (3) While not relaxing in any way our efforts to increase our military strength, we should answer Russian note of November 33 and proceed to examine possibility of CFM.
- (4) We should appoint a “working party” which in close collaboration with the High Commission should begin discussions with the Germans with regard to their position in western defense. This working group should develop a plan which would progress step by step, we relinquishing controls and authority as the Germans took steps to play their part in western defense with the final objective of reaching a position where Germany could again be an equal and independent state.
Bevin emphasized that these are his personal thoughts and the matter had not yet been discussed with the Cabinet.
I then sketched in general terms the contents of reftel with some emphasis on encouraging the Germans conclude agreement on the Schuman Plan and to participate fully in conference to be called by French for European Army, etc. With respect to Schuman Plan Bevin said they would have no trouble in giving encouragement to the [Page 577] Germans, and the UK itself expected and was willing to enter in contractual arrangements once Schuman Plan created. Although expressing some doubt as to the possibility of the success of the Pleven Plan, he indicated that in his opinion HMG might go a little further than the present British position of saying that they would not obstruct Pleven Plan. I feel he might be persuaded to give it a cautious blessing.
I did not emphasize paragraph 6 of reftel as Bevin said that his idea of a working party was not dissimilar and the manner this party should be set up and function would have to be discussed later. He did say, however, that the High Commission should be drawn very prominently into the negotiations with the Germans and seemed to have some rather vague idea that the working party should consist of the High Commission plus some governmental representatives. It was apparent that he had not gone very far in his thinking as to how machinery should be set up for dealing with Germans on this question.
Bevin agreed that we ultimately will reach a position of “contractual relations” with western Germany but felt that we should reach that position by negotiating step by step. While he felt we should not initially mention this to Germans I believe that he could probably be persuaded to agree to tell them early in the discussions that our objective is to reach that point provided they, the Germans, do what is necessary to permit us to change our relationship.
I think that he will go to Brussels prepared to explore this possibility with Secretary and Schuman but that any agreement he may make at that time would be ad referendum to the Cabinet.
Although I do not believe that he is especially concerned that the rearmament of western Germany may provoke the Soviet Union, he nevertheless feels, I believe, that if we push our defense preparations resolutely there may be some chance of a CFM producing at least a lessening of the tension between East and West.
The prominence given in position outlined Deptel to the success of Schuman and Pleven plans may afford French opportunity further to delay integration of German contingents into defense force.
Although it may well be that the situation has so altered in Germany this delay will prove to be inevitable because of German attitude, nevertheless I think we should exercise great care that we do not hand French another opportunity to indulge in the type of maneuvering which has thus far caused postponement of action to bring about integrated force.
Sent Department 3482 repeated information Paris eyes only for Bruce Frankfort eyes only McCloy. Limited distribution to Department.