740.5/12–1450: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State
niact
Depto 342. During forthcoming period of discussions with Germans and Paris conference on European army we will face problem of reconciling [Page 574] several sharply divergent points of view, primarily French, German and British. To do so successfully will require US leadership in bringing all governments concerned to concentrate on overriding common interests as opposed to national considerations.
In broadest terms this means developing maximum collective strength of NAT countries plus Germany in shortest possible time and maintaining maximum unity of purpose. Each of the governments concerned has some broad basic interest, with need for maximum US participation in common defense effort, a major element.
We are committed support French desire, which Germans apparently share to some extent, to develop closer integration of continental countries provided it is within broader and stronger framework of Atlantic community, which finds its expression in NATO. It is to our advantage as well as to that of western Europeans and other NAT countries to utilize this desire for European integration to maximum provided that it is done in such manner as to further our common basic objectives. It seems to me that emphasis on common basic objectives is key to reconciling attitude of British and other Europeans who regard French proposals with skepticism and prefer integral development of NAT community.
In talking to our military now here I gather that they do not altogether exclude the possibility of development of some form of European “army” which could be effectively integrated into NAT European defense force, provided “army” is used in limited military sense and composed of national divisions. They are, however, skeptical of ability of Europeans to develop within time estimated to be available international arrangements for logistic and administrative support which would be nearly as effective as national arrangements which are national responsibility. If this could be done, they apparently would not worry greatly over what political superstructures were involved provided it would not in any way interfere with Supreme Commander’s authority. Other military, including French, still appear skeptical as to military realism of European army but their view might change if realistic and militarily sound plan were developed.
It is with respect to political superstructure that most Europeans here appear disturbed. On this I believe we would make (serious) mistake if we attempted to blueprint details, rather we should feel our way and leave initiative to Europeans, utilizing our influence primarily to bring them together on basic common objectives. If we can do this successfully, it should ensure that result fits satisfactorily into NA framework and in no way detracts from military effectiveness of NAT integrated force or authority of Supreme Commander.
[Page 575]Sent Department Depto 342, repeated niact Paris 1172, niact Frankfort 640.