740.5/12–1450: Telegram
Memorandum by Miss Barbara Evans, Personal Assistant to the Secretary of State
Secretary Acheson called Secretary Pace and said that he had looked over the question of leaving for Brussels on Saturday as Mr. Pace had suggested and found that he was not going to be able to do that. Mr. Pace said that was perfectly satisfactory with him. Mr. Acheson said that they would have Mr. Achilles in Brussels to be ready with everything from London that Mr. Pace would need. Mr. Acheson said McCloy and Spofford would be in Brussels. Ambassador Bruce probably would not be there, but the Secretary pointed out that Ambassador Bruce had not been in very close touch with this matter.
Mr. Pace said that he understood that he had Mr. Acheson’s proposed closing statement which he thought would be of major importance and he would look it over and have his views by the time that they got together at four o’clock tomorrow. At that time he would want to talk with Mr. Acheson about the sort of opening statement he (Mr. Pace) should make before the Defense Ministers, particularly in view of the statement which the President is currently planning to make on Friday night.
They discussed the timing of the meeting and Mr. Acheson said he thought that Pace could plan to be free Tuesday afternoon to go on to Frankfurt to meet with some of his commanders there.
Mr. Pace said that Admiral Sherman and General Gruenther1 are returning this afternoon and will be in a position to tell the Joint Chiefs of Staff what has been accomplished at the military meeting. [Page 569] He said at the same time it was his understanding that General Eisenhower would be down to discuss the terms of reference and we can get his views on what he thinks about what has been done and whether in his judgment something else must still be done. Pace said he understood from Gruenther that there would be a great deal of pressure in Brussels to announce the appointment of General Eisenhower during the meeting, and he would want to find out from Eisenhower his general attitude on the announcement and on the restrictions which were placed on him.
Mr. Pace said that before four o’clock tomorrow afternoon he should be able to have General Eisenhower’s views as to the legal and political advantages or disadvantages of moving slowly or with rapidity.
The Secretary then had quite a long discussion with Secretary Pace about the question which he has turned over to Mr. Fisher2 as to just exactly what powers in connection with this matter the representatives of the various governments at Brussels will have. Mr. Acheson said that it was quite clear to him that it was impossible for Mr. Schuman, Mr. Bevin, himself, and the others who will be meeting at Brussels to appoint General Eisenhowever to anything. They will not have the authority to appoint anybody. That power probably resides only in the President. He mentioned the article in the North Atlantic Treaty which says that there shall be a council which will appoint various committees including the defense committee; that this council has the power to recommend to governments implementing steps which shall be taken; therefore the Secretary thought that the essence of what would be accomplished at Brussels would be that the Governments would recommend the appointment of a Supreme Commander and possibly who he should be. The Secretary thought this would constitute a request to the President of the United States to designate a distinguished officer under his command to be the Supreme Commander.
It is possible that the Governments could accept this recommendation. On the other recommendations which would come out of the Brussels meeting, such as ratification of medium term plans and other defense papers which include the matter of troops, it is probable that the Governments cannot accept the terms of the specific regiments, etc.* The Secretary said that he thought that there was some discussion as to just exactly what level recommendations as to the size of the troop requirements from each country, had been passed on. However, Mr. Acheson said that regardless of whether this had been at [Page 570] the military level, all that we have is a recommendation on the minimum forces necessary for the defense of Europe and the numbers that the various countries should contribute. There is a gap between what they contribute and what should be contributed. In relation to material contributions which have been agreed upon, they are not even in existence in many cases. It is therefore up to the countries to act in order to implement the recommendations of the various NAT organizations. Mr. Pace agreed that this gap between the NAT organization recommendations and performance by the countries of the recommendations was due to the fact that there was no force upon the countries individually to implement the recommendations.
Mr. Pace said, however, that he thought that so far as this involved the appointment of the Supreme Commander before actual troops and matériel were in being, there had been a change of thinking. He pointed out that he thought there was agreement throughout this Government at least that, instead of waiting until there was something to command before appointing the Supreme Commander, we should look upon the Commander actually as a recruiter and that there should no longer be the requirement to his appointment that the contributions should be made before the appointment. Mr. Acheson agreed that this was probably so. He was not trying to raise this matter as a difficulty. He thought probably we were in a position of having to accept the appointment of the commander who would then go over and try to push through the contributions. What he did have in mind was that the Government representatives at Brussels would have no power of appointment but must come back to the President. He and Mr. Pace agreed that they would probably have as much of a commitment that the countries will make the contributions as it is possible to get before the Supreme Commander’s appointment, but General Eisenhowever should understand this and have these limitations clearly in mind.
The Secretary said that he was aware that the situation in Europe was getting more and more critical every minute. There was a great deal of weakness in France and he thought that General Eisenhower, who had great confidence in French morale, would be the one who could put heart into the French. He had come to the conclusion that any further efforts to negotiate might make the whole thing go to pieces.
Secretary Pace said that by four o’clock tomorrow he would be prepared to talk with all these things in mind. He would have General Collins with him, perhaps General Gruenther and perhaps General Eisenhower. The Secretary said that if General Eisenhower were to be in the meeting, he thought in order to avoid possible excitement [Page 571] it would be wise if he came over to the Pentagon rather than have the meeting here in his office.
- Lt. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, United States Army. From December 10, 1050 to April 1, 1951, he was Chief of Staff, SHAPE Advance Planning Group.↩
- Adrian S. Fisher, Legal Adviser in the Department of State.↩
- That requires governmental action. [Footnote in the source text.]↩