Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

Conference Piles: Lot 59 D 95: CF 44

Report by the North Atlantic Military Committee

top secret   cosmic

London, December 12, 1950.

D/MC–D/2¹

Joint Meeting of the Council Deputies and the Military Committee

military aspects of german participation in the defense of western europe

Report by the Military Committee

The Need for German Participation

1. The defense of the NATO area requires that Western Europe be defended as far to the East as possible. To be fully effective such a defense must ensure that the three main fronts in Europe form a co-hesive whole and are mutually supporting. This is only possible if the Western European Region adopts a forward strategy and bases its defense as close to the Iron Curtain as possible. In this way the territories of all the Continental NATO nations can be secured and the enemy denied the advantages of being able to concentrate his attack, along inside LOC’s, on any one of three separate fronts.

2. The adoption of such a strategy is also essential in order that the considerable potential of Western Germany is denied to the enemy and secured for the Allies, to give depth and continuity to the ground and air defenses of Western Europe^*, to honor the pledge of the tripartite forces to protect Germany, and to retain the good will of the Western Germans.

3. The greatest military threat that could confront the North Atlantic Treaty powers in Europe would be for Western Germany to be aligned with the Soviet. In Western Germany, the North Atlantic Treaty powers hold the initiative vis-à-vis Soviet influence more clearly today than at any time in the past several years. In Western Germany, this area may eventually be faced with the necessity, or desire, of coming to terms with the U.S.S.R.

4. The above considerations led the Military Committee to the conclusion that the objective must be to defend Western Europe as close to the Iron Curtain as possible.

5. It is the considered view of the Military Committee that an acceptable and realistic defense of Western Europe and the adoption of a forward strategy cannot be contemplated without active and willing German participation, and that the maintenance of the morale and the retention of the good will, resources and potential of the Western German people are militarily essential. Only in this manner will it be possible to gain the benefit of German assistance in defense of the soil of Germany, and at the same time to utilize their strength to our own advantage so that the Allies can muster the forces necessary to counter the Russian threat.

6. In addition, the Military Committee considers that any course of action selected, while not reducing in any way the scope and effectiveness of the German contribution, should also not create the impression that NATO is assuming an aggressive character. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is and should continue to be a defensive organization.

7. Studies which have been made to date show that the twelve NATO powers alone are not likely to be able to afford to build up and maintain in peace the forces required for this task. It is equally evident that if adequate forces are not produced, the whole of the effort which is already being made may be of no avail.

8. The process of building up the total forces required must be initiated in the immediate future if there is to be a reasonable prospect of having the forces in being by the time that the threat confronting the North Atlantic Treaty powers reaches its maximum. Decisions on the way in which the forces are to be produced can therefore not be delayed without jeopardizing the whole of the effort which is already being made.

Possible Forms of German Participation

9. The nature of a German contribution to the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area could either be by German participation in the form of the incorporation of German units into a European defense force, or by direct German contribution of Military units to the integrated NATO defense force,^†

10. The political desirability of creating a European defense force is not within the scope of the Military Committee. From the military point of view however there are some objections to such a form of participation. This solution might nevertheless be acceptable should it be accomplished in a way which would ensure no loss in the effectiveness of the formations and units concerned and in the defense of Western Europe as a whole, and provided these formations could be formed as rapidly as under any other system of German participation.

11. The military effectiveness of a composite force drawn from several nationalities, is limited by the differences which exist in language, training, tradition, tactical doctrines, pay, logistics, etc., and national as well as racial characteristics. The close coordination which is required between elements, services and formations in the conduct of combat operations, in any given area, makes it militarily necessary to minimize the above differences. It is recognized that limitations on the effectiveness of forces resulting from the above differences can be materially reduced, through intensive training and collective effort provided national units are not too small. This solution, however, will take time.

12. The national and political spirit of individual nations provides to a large degree the moral cohesion, and ideals, which motivate the efforts of armed forces. This spirit can best be inculcated in national elements fighting in the defense of their country. It does not appear to the Military Committee that there exists, as yet, in Germany the desire, or likelihood, of acceptance by the people and the troops of effective participation in formations which would have no national identity. This consideration alone would exclude from the military point of view, the creation of small non-homogeneous units, or national contributions of too small units such as battalions. It may well be, however, that higher ideals than patriotism such as would be inspired by the defense of a particular form of civilization can enrich national ideals and act as a driving force for the fighting man.

13. Before the incorporation of German units in a European defense force could be started, it would be necessary to solve such complex problems as political control and direction, the utilization of the European defense force in peacetime, financial contributions to its cost, and a large number of similar questions, each of which will require the agreement of all NATO nations. The time required to solve the purely military problems inherent in creating a European defense force, regardless of other possible delaying factors, is such that the generation of combat worthy German units should not await solutions to these problems outlined above.

14. The aim is to obtain with the utmost dispatch formations capable of fighting effectively. To this end, the formation of small units should be started in the immediate future, and these gradually built up to units of the required size and so contribute to the ability of the Allies to ensure the defense of Western Europe. This requirement is a primary concern, and any solution which prejudices it should not be accepted.

15. If maximum military efficiency is to be obtained from the German contribution, it should be achieved by applying as far as possible the principle of collectively balanced forces.

16. From the military point of view, the largest possible contribution would be most acceptable. The magnitude of the German contribution must, however, be decided in the light of the magnitude of the Soviet threat, contemplated contributions from nations other than Germany, and the safeguards necessary to prevent the resurgence of militarism in Germany. The goal should therefore be to provide German forces as required subject always to the limitations and safeguards detailed in paragraphs 21 to 24 below. These military limits on the magnitude of the contributions should be subject to review by the North Atlantic Defence Committee and by the Council.

17. The next problem which needs to be considered is the size of German formations which should be permitted, To obtain the highest degree of military effectiveness, the maximum grouping of national formations is normally desirable, but the risk attendant on the formation of German units is such that it is considered that the minimum acceptable size of formation should be adopted as the limiting size. In determining the size of units, some consideration should also be given to the factors which would make it possible for units to be included in formations which will act as effective “melting pots” should it be decided to create a European defence force.

18. This limiting size should be the smallest national formation In which the fighting arms, supporting arms and administrative services are welded into a single fighting formation capable of fighting a sustained major action with its own resources; it should be able to fight so independently that the soldier can be inspired by his own and his compatriots’ fighting powers; and should be the smallest national formation in which the internal care and maintenance can be organised uniformly.

19. In the case of land forces, the division is the smallest national formation which fully satisfies these requirements. The regimental combat team (RCT) or brigade group, although not as effective as the division, constitutes a useful size of unit which could be accepted under present conditions, if this is judged to be desirable for political or other reasons. In this event the combat teams would ultimately be utilized for the constitution of divisions under conditions to be determined in the light of conditions at the time, due weight being given to the views of the Supreme Commander. Account should be taken of the fact that any discrimination against the Germans, which might tend to diminish the effectiveness of their units participating in the defence of Europe should be avoided. Moreover, all precautions should be taken so that during the transitional period, the German combat teams shall not be welded into larger units, nor come directly under operational command of the German Government. In this respect, there is no objection to the combat teams being attached to Allied divisions under conditions to be proposed by SHAPE.

20. The German air contribution should consist of air defence squadrons which should be trained and equipped to give support to German land formations while recognising that at the outbreak of hostilities the primary role of these air units will almost certainly be defence against enemy air attack. It is realised that this question is of such importance that full weight must be given to the political implications.

Safeguards

21. The formation of a German force must, however, be done in such a way as to ensure that Germany cannot again plunge Europe into war. Agreement to allow any German units to be formed must, therefore, be conditioned by and subject at all times to adequate safeguards. These safeguards should be political, military, and possibly economic. The Military Committee in this report is concerned only with those safeguards of a military nature. The latter will be in part positive safeguards to be applied by NATO nations, either individually or collectively, as the situation demands, and in part negative safeguards in that they will be preventative and restrictive on Germany.

22. With, regard to the positive military safeguards, these already exist and must be maintained for as long as there is a risk of Germany being a threat to the peace of Europe. The three major positive safeguards are:

a. The ability to conduct air action against Germany, whose war-making capacity is centered as far as production is concerned in a small and extremely vulnerable area, the Ruhr.

b. The grouping of the twelve NATO nations in a defensive alliance to resist aggression, whatever its source, and the maintenance by these nations of forces not only considerably in excess of those permitted to Germany, but also collectively adequate whereas Germany’s if she stands alone will be unbalanced and inadequate.

c. The maintenance of Allied defensive forces on German soil.

23. With regard to the restrictive or negative safeguards, the Council has already agreed that “it would not serve the best interests of Europe or of Germany to bring into being a German national army or a German general staff.” In addition, it has been agreed that any German formation will be under the authority of the Supreme Commander.

24. In furtherance of the above, all military safeguards which do not unduly delay the implementation of the program, or its military effectiveness, should be adopted. In this respect, the Military Committee would recommend the following additional safeguards:

a. The German land force contribution to any NATO defense force should, from the point of view of safeguards alone, under no circumstances be organized into solely German formations which exceed the ceiling of divisional strength.

b. The German contribution in air forces, although they must be trained for air support of German land units, should be limited to units required primarily for defense against enemy air attack and these must be a component of the air defense system under SHAPE.

c. The German contribution in naval forces should be limited to the manning and operating of mine craft, patrol craft, and harbor defense craft.

d. The rotation of individuals from the regular forces to any reserve should be controlled so as to ensure that no unforeseen or undesired expansion of German forces is possible at any time. The question as to whether enlistment will be by conscription or by voluntary methods must be considered in the light of the balance required between maintaining safeguards and insuring essential military efficiency.

e. Germany should not be allowed to contribute complete heavy armored formations. This, however, should not preclude the inclusion of the necessary armor to complete the land formations authorized.

f. German forces should not be developed to the detriment of other Allied forces, nor should they be permitted to develop at a rate or to a degree that would constitute a threat to Allied Security. To this end, the number of German land formations should at no time exceed onefifth of the total number of like Allied land formations allocated to and earmarked for SHAPE. Specific limits in German operational aircraft, for defense in Germany, will be as recommended from time to time by the Supreme Commander and approved by the Military Committee.

g. The occupying powers should retain general supervision of officer recruitment and should rely insofar as practicable, upon recruitment and training of new officers. Similarly, supervision should be exercised over the training of noncommissioned officers.

h. The functions appropriate to the plans, operations and intelligence sections of military staffs, above the level of authorized tactical units, should only be discharged by international staffs under the Supreme Commander and should not be permitted in any German agency.

i. German forces cannot constitute a military threat unless they possess their own sources of essential war material. Therefore, it is considered that there should remain prohibited and limited industries in Germany. Germany should not be permitted to produce heavy military equipment, military aircraft, or naval vessels other than minor defensive craft.

j. The manufacture of atomic, biological and chemical weapons, and long range missiles, should not be permitted in Germany.

k. Research and development should be limited to requirements laid down by the Military Committee, and supervision and control should be exercised by the occupying powers.

Organization and Administrative, Considerations

25. The basic organization, initial training, and equipping of formations of all nations, and their logistic support and procurement functions must be primarily the responsibility of the nation concerned. From the military point of view, it would therefore be most undesirable for SHAPE, or its subordinate headquarters, to be made responsible for any administrative or logistic details of the German contribution other than those undertaken for the forces of other NATO nations. In this field SHAPE should be charged only with the coordination of the logistic support to be provided by nations.

26. The Military Committee considers that the scope and nature of an agency, or agencies, necessary for the discharge of administrative and logistic responsibilities for the forces contributed by Germany must await detailed negotiations with Germany, after the Council has considered the political aspects of the problem. The Military Committee does not consider, however, that these responsibilities should devolve upon SHAPE or its subordinate headquarters. The Military Committee further recommends that the equipment authorised for production in Germany for NATO forces, including German forces, be approved in each instance by the NATO Standardisation Agency.

27. From the military point of view the most desirable method of procuring equipment for German forces will be that which is the most rapid, since it will lead to the earliest possible augmentation of the common defense. Subject to the safeguards set forth above, the Military Committee considers that German production should contribute to the greatest extent possible to the support of the German contribution, and to such other phases of the common defense as may be reasonable and within her capabilities. The nature and size of the contribution required of the German armament industry should be decided in conjunction with appropriate governmental, political and production agencies. Consideration must be given to the strategic vulnerability of industry in Germany to Soviet attacks, and to its possible use against the Allies if captured, but it must be recognised that a substantial industrial contribution will be required of Germany for the defense forces of other Allied nations.

Implementing Considerations

28. The military view is that the German contribution of military units should take place at the earliest possible date. The sooner Allied forces can be augmented by this contribution, the greater will be the security of the North Atlantic Treaty area. The Military Committee recognizes that there are many technical problems which will have to be solved by the occupying powers, the Germans themselves, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization agencies. It is also understood that acceptance of a German contribution, and implementation thereof, will be dependent to a large extent on the responsible authorities arriving at an acceptable solution to these technical problems in their negotiations with the Germans.

29. The Military Committee considers that the detail plans for the raising and preliminary training of German forces should be made by the occupying military authorities in concert with the Supreme Commander and appropriate German authorities after the negotiations with the Germans have clarified the overall problems and the appropriate NATO agencies have considered the political aspects. Once the progrm has been agreed upon, every effort should be made to implement it as effectively and expeditiously as possible. The High Commissioners of the tripartite powers and their military commanders, acting in concert, should be charged with the responsibility for the supervision of German participation to the extent necessary to assure that the agreed safeguards are applied.

30. The training of German personnel will have to be accomplished in German schools and/or in schools of NATO nations. This training in any event should be accomplished rapidly so that effective German forces can be created at the earliest possible date.

31. In developing German forces, the initial aim should be to create separately the lesser component parts of the German formations to be ultimately contributed. The size of these initial units will vary with the system adopted to bring the German contribution into being. German units will have to be utilized to constitute larger formations under SHAPE. The nature and composition of these formations cannot be finally established until the combined action of the Military Committee and Council Deputies has determined the final size of German units to be integrated into the European force in light of the considerations set forth in paragraphs 17–20 above.

32. The primary military aim is to obtain an effective German contribution at the earliest practical date. In war, and eventually in peace, divisional formations will be required. While all-German divisions would be the most effective form of contribution from the point of view of military effectiveness, contributions the size of brigade groups or RCTs could be accepted under present conditions. It is agreed that a German contribution of units less than RCTs or brigade groups, such as battalions, would present technical problems of such magnitude as to make such contributions militarily unacceptable.

33. The Military Committee therefore considers that the ultimate decision as to the use of German units to form all-German, or composite European, divisions should not be permitted to delay the immediate creation of such units up to and including the brigade group. If agreement cannot be reached on the ultimate grouping of these units at present, there is no military objection to postponing the final decision pending resolution of political problems, provided it is clearly recognized that agreement will have to be reached by the time sufficient brigades exist to make this necessary as in the view of the Supreme Commander.

34. A limiting factor to the speed of incorporation of German units and formations into the force for the defense of Europe, will be availability of equipment. German units should not be equipped to the detriment of other North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces. Their equipment, however, should be procured concurrently to the extent possible, and to the extent that this will not delay or reduce the matériel made available to the forces of NATO nations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization procurement programs must therefore be augmented to the extent necessary to provide sufficient equipment for the ultimate German contribution envisioned.

35. German officers should be commissioned as required for German units, and some should also be gradually integrated into selected posts on the international staff of the Supreme Commander and his major subordinate commands when German units are assigned. Determination of the extent of the contribution from the German officer corps to the integrated staff should await the recommendations of the Supreme Commander, and in any event should remain flexible until such time as the program for the creation of German units is worked out.

Conclusions:

36. Based upon the above analysis of the problem of a German contribution to the common defense of Western Europe, the Military Committee concludes that:

a. The defense of Europe, including Western Germany, as far to the East as possible will require a German contribution in terms of effective military units.

b. A European defense force operating as an element of an integrated NATO defense force, is militarily acceptable if its achievement, under no circumstances, would delay the contribution of Germany to the defense forces of Western Europe.

c. The only militarily practicable short term contribution by Germany would be in the form of complete German formations, with necessary supporting arms and services, for incorporation, either directly or in the form of European units, into an integrated NATO defense force. This, however, is acceptable only provided the necessary safeguards, outlined in paragraphs 21–24, are applied.

d. Military considerations alone indicate that the German contribution should be in terms of the largest practicable formations; however, the need for adequate safeguards make it advisable that the contribution be limited to the lowest completely balanced unit. In the case of land forces, the division best meets the above requirements but, under the conditions discussed in paragraphs 18 and 19, the regimental combat team or brigade group would be acceptable, under present conditions.

e. The German contribution in air forces should be limited to appropriate air units for the defense of Western Germany and for the support of German ground units. The maximum limits would be as recommended from time to time by the Supreme Commander and approved by the Military Committee.

f. The German contribution in naval forces should be limited to the manning and operation of mine craft, patrol craft, and harbour defence craft.

g. The detailed program for the development of German forces must await negotiations with Germany after the Council has considered the political aspects of the problem. In developing these forces, the initial aim should be to create separately the lesser component parts of the German formations to be contributed to the integrated force.

h. A substantial, though controlled, German industrial contribution to the Western European defence is desirable.

1. D/MC–D/2 is the designation given the revision of MC 30 as agreed by the NATO Deputies and the Military Committee. This report was combined with D–D/196 (Final) (supra), and the composite document was given the designation C6–D/1, dated December 13. The joint report, C6–D/1, was approved by the Defense Committee and the NATO Council on December 18. For the U.S. Delegation minutes of the Council meeting of December 18, see USDel Min–1, p. 585.
2. Western Europe is used herein in the general sense and includes the territories of all NATO nations in Europe and Western Germany. [Footnote in the source text.]

3. Definition.

   a. Integrated NATO Defense Force: A force composed of several national contributions integrated under a single unified command and in which each nation retains political and certain military controls over its own forces.

   b. European Defense Force: A composite force composed of contributions by two or more nations under the political control of a European body. This force could be an element of the Integrated NATO Defense Force. [Footnote in the source text.]