Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/12–550

Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall) by His Assistant (Burns)

top secret

Washington, December 5, 1950.

Subject: Contribution of Germany to an Integrated Force

There is presented herewith a summation of the present situation in reaching NATO agreement on the contribution of Germany to the defense of Western Europe and an estimate of the situation which will face the Defense Committee at its next meeting.

1. Preparatory Measures.

As agreed by the Defense Committee, the Military Committee and the Council Deputies are now separately considering the contribution of Germany to the defense of Western Europe. The Standing Group, with the Accredited Representatives, has completed an agreed paper¹ for consideration by the Military Committee. The Deputies have not arrived at an agreed paper but have, as of 28 November, outlined the scope of their considerations. There is general agreement that the series of meetings should not take place unless there is reasonable assurance of agreement. This has not yet been determined. The situation in the Deputies is expected to be clarified after their scheduled meeting of 1 December.²

2. The Military Committee.

The Standing Group paper, which has received tentative twelve-nation approval, including the French military, has every chance of receiving Military and Defense Committee approval. Its main points are:

a. A European defense force, i. e., a composite force under political control of a European body as desired by the French, is militarily acceptable but its achievement must not delay the contribution of Germany.

b. By inference, if a European defense force (as a component of an integrated NATO force) is not successful, that Germany would contribute units directly to the integrated NATO defense force.

c. The formation of small German units should be started in the immediate future and these to be built up to the required size (unspecified and postponement of decision acceptable). SHAPE to determine when re-groupment necessary of German brigades.

d. The unit of a division is the best German contribution but the RCT or brigade group would be^* acceptable if this is judged to be desirable for political or other reasons.

e. Germany should be allowed a defensive air force of limited size, trained in support of ground operations, and a naval force of light naval craft.

f. Positive and negative safeguards are outlined, including the limitation of German land formations to one-fifth of the total like Allied land formations allocated to and ear-marked for SHAPE.

g. German production should contribute to the greatest extent possible to the German military effort and to other phases of the common defense as may be reasonable and within her capabilities. Germany should not be permitted to produce heavy military equipment, military aircraft or other than minor naval vessels.

h. Detailed plans should be made by the occupying military powers and appropriate German authorities. Administrative and logistic as-spects of German units should not be a responsibility of SHAPE.

3. The Council Deputies.

Discussion by the Deputies has centered on a United States proposed line of action which can be summed up as follows:

a. Separate the problem into two lines of concurrent action during a transitional period:

(1) the recruitment of German manpower and production under provisional controls;

(2) endeavor to solve, without the pressure of military urgency, the political problem of achieving the French proposal for creating certain European political institutions.

b. These provisional arrangements would be progressively superseded as effective permanent mechanisms, either military or political, were developed.

c. The German manpower contribution during the transitional period would be controlled by the occupying powers using German federal agencies and in coordination with the Supreme Commander, SHAPE. Production and supply controls would be exercised by the High Commissioners, with a military security board, in conjunction with NATO.

d. Arrangements to incorporate the German contribution into the integrated force, particularly the minimum effective size of units, are matters for determination by the Military Committee.

Note: French position is that RCT is highest standard unit of national contingents. United States position (not announced) Is that balanced unit of divisional strength is smallest national unit. This would not be insisted on in initial period but end result must be effective divisions created with minimum delay. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, insist that the requirement for the ultimate need of divisional units be made unequivocal in the basic paper.

e. If the French have not developed their political institutions by the time the Germans are ready to be incorporated into the integrated NATO defense force, it would be necessary to include German units as national contingents directly under SHAPE. This would be without prejudice to any future success which the French may have in implementing their proposal.

f. Meanwhile, the French would convene the European powers (including Germany) to formulate proposals for creating the European institutions adequate to the point of creating and supporting effectively the military forces of Europe on a non-national basis. The forces are to be suitable and militarily effective for integration with other NATO forces under SHAPE (from United States, United Kingdom and other sources).

g. The appointment of a Supreme Commander and the practical experience acquired in creating the integrated force should facilitate solution of the detailed problems raised by German participation.

4. European Reactions.

On the whole, European reactions have been favorable to the American proposals. As previously evident, the only serious difficulty has been with France. The French Government has insisted that progress of German rearmament be linked to creation of the European defense force. The French Government believes the RCT is the final maximum size of German units, but this has not been an issue so far, since at present the final decision on the size is postponed. The British and other countries definitely favor the American proposal, and, if not committed to it, at least have not expressed any serious doubts. An interesting proposal has been made by the Netherlands Representative that it would be better to have a NATO High Commissioner to control the rearmament of Germany than a limited European Commissioner, or Defense Minister, for this purpose. He pointed out that NATO was more effective in numbers than a doubtful European coalition.

5. As a result of the detailed considerations by the Military Committee and the Council Deputies the content of the joint paper which they are to submit to the Defense Committee should have no large controversial issues provided there is careful handling of two points. These two points are the ultimate size of German units and the linkage between German rearmament and the French European defense force. Action within the Defense Committee on the German issue may be confined to only general discussion, followed by agreement. The importance of the Defense Committee meeting, therefore, would seem to rest not in the German paper but what to do as a result of reaching agreement on this issue. You will remember that at the last meeting consideration was postponed on the formation of an integrated defense force for Europe and the establishment of a Supreme Commander with his headquarters. By inference the United States declined to agree on the force and its commander until the question of Germany’s contribution had been settled. If, then, the question of Germany is agreed to, the important Defense Committee actions are whether or not to inaugurate the integrated force and establish SHAPE and designate the Commander.

a. On this matter the previous views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be noted. The agreement that would be reached at the Defense Committee, and presumably automatically approved by the Council, would be that there was agreement on the question of the immediate creation of German military units insofar as NATO is concerned. The precise situation existing at the close of the Defense Committee meeting could not, of course, be accurately foreseen by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their previous considerations. It is believed that the intent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is that the United States would support an integrated defense force in Western Europe with a Supreme Commander if proper provision were made for German participation. That is to say, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not require full German agreement as to their collaboration before initiation of the force and its commander. Separate negotiations with the German authorities would still be necessary and could conceivably take a great length of time or even end in failure.

b. The delays in reaching a decision by the North Atlantic Treaty countries on the participation of Germany are making the situation more difficult and complex within Germany. The recent state elections have indicated a political division within the country regarding the conditions under which Germany would consent to re-arm a designated number of units. So far there has been no complete NATO proposal made to Germany, and while this will be forthcoming there has been no effective NATO action to date. Psychologically it would be a great advantage to show the Germans that we mean business by creating the force and actually naming the Supreme Commander. Whether or not additional American units would be assigned to the force would not necessarily have to or be capable of decision at this time.

6. In order to clarify these points there is attached (Tab A) a draft statement³ of your intentions on action to be taken at the forthcoming Defense Committee meeting. It is suggested that, if you concur, this be sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration and if they agree that you inform the National Security Council after consultation with the Secretary of State.

1. A reference to MC 30, November 18, 1950, “Report by the Standing Group to the Military Committee on Military Aspects of German Participation in the Defense of Western Europe,” which is summarized below.
2. For a report on the 36th Deputies’ meeting on December 2, see Depto 258, p. 508.
3. U.S. will seek to insert here the word “initially”. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. Not printed.