740.5/11–2950
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)
| Participants: | Mr. J. G. deBeus, Netherlands Minister |
| Mr. Perkins—EUR | |
| Mr. Scott1—WE |
Mr. deBeus called at his request to state the position of the Netherlands Government with respect to the current discussions in the Council of Deputies. He said that the questions I had put informally to Ambassador van Roijen in my talk with him yesterday2 had prompted The Hague to instruct the Embassy to state its views officially. They wished to do this particularly because they thought favorable reaction to the proposal we had made last week in the [Page 500] Deputies might possibly be considered as presaging ultimate support for the French plan for a European federation.
He began by saying that our proposal contained an expression (he did not identify it further) which appeared to open up the possibility of a European federation. There were some who thought this would encourage the French to persist with their plan without substantial modification. In fact, from private conversations with the French, Netherlands officials had concluded that the ultimate French objectives were basically the same as they had been at the October meetings. In reply, I noted that our proposal and the French plan were susceptible of concurrent development. I added, however, that I did not think it correct to assume the French had in no way modified their views since the October meetings here; on the contrary, we thought they had come some distance since then in modifying their views.
Mr. deBeus then went on to say that The Hague wanted to make sure we understood that Dutch acceptance of our proposal, following upon their agreeing to participate in the Schuman plan, did not mean they intended to accept the French concept of a European federation. On the contrary, The Hague had come to the conclusion that it could not accept the French plan now for the very reasons Ambassador van Roijen had anticipated in his talk with me yesterday.
Mr. deBeus then repeated that The Hague was convinced that the UK would not in the foreseeable future participate in a European army of the kind the French had in mind. If the UK didn’t, the Scandinavians wouldn’t either. This would leave only the Italians, the Benelux countries and Western Germany to go along with the French. In such a group, the Dutch believed either the Germans or the French would necessarily play the dominant role. The need to avoid German dominance required no elaboration. On the other hand, the Dutch were unwilling to depend on French leadership in such a group. DeBeus mentioned French involvements in Indochina and North Africa and the strength of the Communists in metropolitan France as being among the major reasons the Dutch considered they could not depend on French leadership in any defense arrangement. In view of this and in view of the fact that Anglo-Dutch and American-Dutch relationships (now that the Indonesian problem has been essentially solved) are as close and friendly as they are, The Hague has concluded it would not be willing to participate militarily in anything less than an “Atlantic” group or at least a European group which included the UK and the Scandinavians. In such a broader group, however, The Hague has resolved to go to extraordinary lengths to help bring into being a workable defense system.