740.5/11–2950: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 1
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2987. For Bruce eyes only. This is message referred to in our tel 2986 Nov 29 which should be delivered at once:
“My dear Mr. Schuman. During our conversation in Sept, we had a thorough exchange of views on the problem of developing our common defensive strength and on the difficulties involved in associating [Page 497] the German Federal Republic with such a development. Since then, these questions have been explored in an even more detailed manner by various representatives of the North Atlantic countries; Whatever differences may have existed on timing or method, I know that our sense of the urgency of the situation and the broad objectives which we have in mind are identical.
If I now make a fresh personal approach to you it is because of a deep conviction that, on the one hand, failure to solve our defense problem forthwith may lead to an immense calamity for the civilized world and that, on the other hand, we stand on the very threshhold of an unprecedented advance in the organization of the free world if we can only give a strong lead promptly.
The situation in Germany, it seems to me, is noticeably deteriorating, or at any rate tending to harden unfavorably in the absence of a concrete proposal which we can discuss with the German leaders. It is imperative that we put an end to this dangerous drift of German opinion by uniting upon a practicable plan.
You are of course familiar with the proposals which Mr. Spofford has made for combining elements of the French and United States plans. These proposals seek to permit the earliest possible development of real defensive strength (including a German contribution) and at the same time to pursue vigorously the course of European consolidation. I want to express my belief that we ought to settle the matter along these lines without further delay. The situation we face cannot tolerate delay in further attempts to link initiation or phasing of the defense build-up to future political and economic developments. An early start should be made on the process of organizing German manpower. The Supreme Commander ought to be named as a tangible step which is bound to give form and impetus to our military effort. Each-week of continued delay on these matters worsens our relative position, both militarily and psychologically.
I think there will be no doubt in your mind as to the far-reaching and tragic significance of the shocking turn of events in Korea in these last days. I am convinced that our response must be to forge ahead without further delay in our efforts to build defensive strength in Western Europe.
For all these reasons, I sincerely hope that you and your government are giving the most sympathetic consideration to the proposals Mr. Spofford has made and will join us in now accepting something along these lines as an essential first step to further progress.
I should like to emphasize that I consider adoption of these proposals to be only a starting point. I do not need to remind you of the attitude which the Government of the United States has displayed on innumerable occasions and in many forms, toward European integration. We favor it. I favor it. If the European countries could work it out in a practical manner a sound basis would be laid on which military and economic strength could be built. A rallying point would be created around which a free and civilized Europe could muster its energies for a successful defense of its beliefs and the traditions of its history against the attacks of Communist nihilism and Soviet imperialism. It would perhaps be the soundest basis on which this generation could reinsure the next against another dangerous German aberration.
[Page 498]In the forefront of our problems is that of the future political development of our relations with West Germany. This presses hard upon us in connection with our discussions of military planning. Chancellor Adenauer’s aide-mémoire presented to the High Commissioners on November 162 opens up many of the questions which face us. A continuation of the Occupation regime in its present form is rapidly becoming incompatible with many of our broader objectives and certainly with any defense program for Germany. If your government in close consultation with the German and other European Govts could evolve the main outlines of a plan for binding the free nations of Europe more closely together in the spirit so well represented by the Schuman Plan, we could reasonably hope for long-term solution of our many problems, be they political, military, or economic. This task is one of great magnitude. It will require time and, as a practical matter, it will be necessary to approach the problem by stages. Nevertheless, I believe that even a partial solution along these lines would make it much easier to find answers for problems such as Chancellor Adenauer outlines.
One thing remains to be said. The US has given every evidence in statements, actions, and treaties, of the depth and permanence of its interest in Europe, its support for closer European association, its willingness to cooperate with Europe. That this will continue and increase, is, I am convinced, the will of the American people. It is my conviction that the broad framework of the Atlantic Community is an essential part of the free world structure, whether it be from the point of view of global security or of permanently ending the threat of German domination. We will continue to work with you and our other friends toward the goal of strengthening the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which gives expression to this concept. This is an essential corollary to an orderly progression from German cooperation in defense, to European integration, and thus final solution of the problem of relations with Germany. I believe your leadership, so fruitful in the past, can go far to accomplish our common objectives.”